Office of the Historian

158. Note From Arnold Kanter of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft)1

Washington, September 23, 1990

Brent:

Following is a run down of the first session of the Bartholomew-Karpov working group.2

We met Sunday3 from 10:00 to 1:00, going over START issues. Although there were a few hopeful signs, for the most part each side once again went over what is by now painfully familiar ground. (Woolsey met separately with Grinyevsky and reported having made some real progress on CFE verification.) Mercifully, the scheduled 3:00-6:00 session was cancelled when Karpov was unexpectedly summoned (along with Grinyevsky, but not Nazarkin) to New York to meet with Shevardnadze. No one knows what is behind the Shevardnadze summons, although it may be no more than a reflection of the fact that [Page 868] the Foreign Minister is finally out of Moscow and able to focus on his agenda for the Wednesday meeting with Baker. Assuming Karpov gets back to Washington, we are scheduled to resume at 10:00 on Monday.

Non-circumvention. This was the lead-off topic. Karpov said that “The principal problem [in START] is the problem of non-circumvention.” The Soviets pressed again to limit our “existing pattern of cooperation” with the British to SLBMs. Curiously, they said they were not concerned with the size of the UK deterrent and were not trying to limit it in START. If they actually mean what they say, then our reiteration of the Hurd statement that the UK deterrent is and will remain a minimum one is beside the point. Reg, in keeping with his plan to leave all the real negotiating to the Baker-Shevardnadze meeting (and beyond?), simply hammered with our standard arguments.

Backfire. Karpov came in with a offer of 550 (down from 600). Per his game plan, Reg stonewalled, but it looks as though the Soviets are ready to deal and that there is an agreement to be had in the 500–525 range.

Third-country basing (i.e., SSBNs at Holy Loch). Karpov’s presentation was unusually muddled on this subject, but he seemed to be indicating Soviet flexibility. Given our own flexibility (i.e., we probably can offer the Soviets more than they say they need), Baker should be able to close out this issue too.

Heavy ICBMs The familiar dialogue of the deaf ensued on this issue, but the Soviets did agree, almost in passing, to a ban on increasing the launch weight and throw-weight of SS–18s.

—Arnie4
  1. Source: George H.W. Bush Library, Bush Presidential Records, National Security Council, John A. Gordon Files, Subject Files, OA/ID CF00953–027, Washington Meetings—September 1990. No classification marking. Copied to Gates and Rice. All brackets are in the original.↩
  2. No formal memorandum of conversation was found.↩
  3. September 23.↩
  4. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.↩