134. Memorandum From Arnold Kanter of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft)1
SUBJECT
- Status of START Issues
This memorandum reports on the status of the major START issues following the recent Moscow Ministerial, and describes the game plan for how we plan to proceed with the Soviets between now and the Summit.
Soviet Arms Control Team
One of the key unknowns concerns the team of Soviet arms control experts which is due in town later this week. This team (which is now scheduled to arrive on Saturday instead of today as previously planned) will be headed by Viktor Karpov. It evidently will not include General Omelichev or other senior level General Staff representation. The first meeting is now scheduled for Saturday afternoon, with plans to meet through the Memorial Day weekend.
We have told the Soviets that we envisage these meetings to be a continuation of the Bartholomew-Karpov arms control working group that met in Moscow. As such, we expect this group to continue to work the unresolved START issues (as well as try to make progress on CFE and Open Skies). We also expect it to work on two joint statements that might be issued at the Summit, one that records substantive agreement on the major START issues and one that describes the objectives of follow-on negotiations.
The Soviets have told us that they agree with this approach. Their late arrival date and lack of General Staff representation, however, leave unclear whether they will be in a position to implement it unless the extra time in Moscow has been used to get them the guidance and authority necessary to close deals. At a minimum, we will want to use the presence of the Soviet team to come as close to agreement as possible on the two joint statements.
Resolved Issues
The ALCM and SLCM issues were settled in Moscow. Geneva is now working on final versions of the SLCM declaration and the ALCM “agreed [Page 725] elements.” There undoubtedly will be hiccups (or worse) along the way as we translate these policy level agreements into detailed treaty text, but I do not expect anything further to arise in these two areas between now and the conclusion of the Summit. The issue of the START Treaty’s duration was resolved in Geneva immediately before the Ministerial. All of the other outstanding START issues remain unresolved.
Unresolved Issues
Baker got nowhere with the Soviets in Moscow on additional heavy ICBM limits, mobile ICBM limits, road-mobile verification, Backfire, or non-circumvention. This list will constitute our initial agenda for the weekend meetings with Karpov. The recent NSD gives us flexibility on some of these issues that was not used in Moscow. I convened my Ungroup yesterday to review the state of play and to identify other potential areas of flexibility (e.g., a different package on Backfire, dropping our 3000/3300 ICBM RV sublimit). With the possible exception of mobile ICBM limits, however, none of the unresolved issues is a candidate for quick and easy agreement with the Soviets in Washington.
We have been careful to avoid identifying any specific remaining issues as ones that must be resolved by the time of the Summit. We likewise have worked to preserve the option of deciding that, with ALCMs and SLCMs, we already have reached “substantive agreement on the major START issues.” With issues such as Backfire and SS-18 still open, however, this could be a hard sell.
More generally, we want something from the Soviets on most of what is left to resolve. Declaring victory on the basis of the current areas of agreement, therefore, will weaken our hand on the remaining issues. This tactical situation argues that we should not be too quick to signal during the weekend meetings with Karpov that we are more eager than the Soviets to announce substantive agreement on START at the Summit.
Joint Statements
As noted above, there are two possible joint statements that could be signed or otherwise issued during the Summit. The first would be a document that recorded the substantive agreements that have been reached to date in START. The Soviets reportedly have a 20 page draft they will be bringing to Washington to work during our weekend meetings. State has just circulated for comment its cut at a U.S. draft.
It is likely that these drafts will become the vehicle for addressing at least some of the unresolved issues (e.g., each side includes its version of the prospective agreement on the heavy ICBM issue). At some point, therefore, we will need decisions on what we can accept in the joint statement on each of the unresolved issues, including which ones can be omitted altogether and which, if any, need to be explicitly noted as still outstanding. After we see what has been agreed with the Soviets, [Page 726] we also will need a decision about whether the President will want to sign this document. It is possible that this can all be worked out in the Bartholomew-Karpov meetings, but we probably should plan on some of these questions going to the Baker-Shevardnadze, if not presidential, level after Gorbachev arrives in Washington.
The second document would be a joint statement on the follow-on negotiations. We brought our draft to Moscow. The Soviets also had theirs. There is somewhat more overlap in these drafts than I had expected, especially on topics related to “defense and space,” but also the obvious areas of disagreement. A bracketed text is being worked in Geneva. Rick reports that the Soviets have the greatest difficulty with the implicit SDI reference to “a cooperative transition” and the explicit mention of “a ban on mobile MIRVed ICBMs.” He will bring back the current version when he returns to Washington this weekend for the Bartholomew–Karpov meetings. I will get it to you as soon as it is available.
We also will need decisions to resolve disagreements about the substance of this document and regarding whether the two presidents should sign it.
Robert Blackwill, Rich Davis, and John Gordon concur.
- Source: Bush Library, George H.W. Bush Presidential Records, National Security Council, Gordon Files, Subject Files, OA/ID CF01657–027, Moscow—Follow-up—May 1990. Secret.↩