132. Telegram From the Head of the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva (Burt) to Arnold Kanter of the National Security Council Staff1
SUBJECT
- ALCMs—Dracula revisited?
(S) 1. Arnie:
No arms control issue took more of our time in Moscow than did the ALCM issue. Thanks to your hard work we were able to end the meeting on a high note, asserting that all ALCM issues have been solved. In fact, I’m worried that they have not been. There are some elements in our position which the Soviets may not have fully digested. Once they understand what we are after, I think we may see some significant reopening of things we thought were settled.
(S) 2. I raise this now for both political and substantive reasons. Politically, we don’t want any further disagreements over ALCMs to cloud the summit. Substantively, I’m not sure that some of our positions are sustainable in the long run.
(S) 3. The problems arise from the perfectly legitimate desire of the military to protect our options to exploit cruise missile technology in non-nuclear roles. In essence, the military wants two things: it [Page 721] wants the freedom to deploy non-nuclear cruise missiles on as many aircraft as possible, including aircraft accountable under START, and it wants to keep the Soviets from gaining access to sensitive cruise missile technology.
(S) 4. Unfortunately, our current treaty approach to implementing these desires will almost certainly prove unacceptable to the Soviets. Specifically:
a. The Soviets have accepted our position that conventional ALCMs on tactical aircraft are not part of START. But our position also provides that START-accountable nuclear bombers can carry conventional ALCMs, even though such bombers only count as non-ALCM carriers. Moreover, we say that these non-ALCM bombers (even if they are equipped with conventional ALCMs) cannot be inspected. I’m still not certain that the Soviets understand this aspect of our position; I am certain that when they do understand it, they’re going to come unglued.
b. We’ve agreed in principle to allow Soviet inspections of bombers. In practice, however, our inspection regime is quite limited. For example, bombers on alert can’t be inspected, and we won’t put a limit on how many can be on alert. The B–1 can only be inspected at B–1 bases; the B–2 cannot be inspected at all (anywhere). Heavy bombers that otherwise would be inspectable can’t be inspected if they are at certain airbases. The reason is that some future weapons, which we do not want the Soviets to see, might not be able to be removed prior to an inspection at airbases at which a heavy bomber may be visiting. I am certain that the Soviets will have problems with this whole regime.
c. Similarly, the inspection rights we’re willing to accept for weapons storage areas and for non-nuclear ALCMs are quite limited. We only allow exhibitions of new types of non-nuclear ALCMs if the new type will be located at certain airbases. We unilaterally pick the distinguishing features that “prove” that these are non-nuclear ALCMs; the Soviets can’t object to the features we pick. If we claim that non-nuclear ALCMs aren’t located at a particular base, no weapons storage areas at that base are inspectable. At bases where we do allow inspections, only those bunkers specifically declared to contain non-nuclear ALCMs need be opened or entered. Finally, there is no right for the Soviets to verify that nuclear ALCMs are not where they are not supposed to be.
(S) 5. Maybe we can sell all this, but I’m skeptical. Thus, I think there are both short-term and long-term implications. In the short term, our goal should be to avoid casting a shadow on the summit. Thus I do not plan to expend much effort this week in trying to work our new ALCM language. I will use the excuse of its complexity and the other tings which need to be done before the summit to avoid getting into the details of the inspection regime. This simply postpones the problem, but it avoids any possible unraveling of the Moscow agreements before the summit.
[Page 722](S) 6. In the long term, however, our current position may need to be reexamined in light of the agreements reached in Moscow. I know that the Ungroup scrubbed the current position carefully. If we can get it that position, fine. But I’m afraid that we’ll find this a tough sell. Thus I believe that, after the summit, it may be necessary to make a political, cabinet level judgement about how much future flexibility we are going to try to protect. I’m afraid that if we fail to do this, the ALCM vampire will keep coming back to life.
(U) 7. Lets talk about this while I’m in Washington after the summit. Cheers,
- Source: George H.W. Bush Library, Bush Presidential Records, National Security Council, John A. Gordon Files, Subject Files, OA/ID CF01657–030, Backchannel—May 1990. Secret; Eyes Only. Sent via privacy channels.↩