Foreign Relations of the United States, 1989–1992, Volume XXXI, START I, 1989–1991

129. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, May 19, 1990, 3:30–4:45 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• US:

  • The Secretary
  • Dennis B. Ross, Notetaker
  • Interpreter

• USSR:

  • Eduard Shevardnadze
  • Sergey Tarasenko, Notetaker
  • Interpreter

Shevy: You’ve been working and we’ve been doing the same. I’ve read your letter² and I have studied all the elements of the letter and our thoughts I think are very much working in the same direction. You do remember that we said that we were ready to make an exception on Tacit Rainbow, but we identified a number of points of concern: (1) We wanted a confirmation that they wouldn’t be nuclear; they would remain non-nuclear; and (2) we wanted confirmation on what its range might be. Those two questions in particular have now been answered satisfactorily, and we appreciate that. As for the other three points that we formulated yesterday and for the remaining points of the other package, we’re ready to drop those. Therefore, I think we can note that we now have an agreement on the entire package.

On SLCMs and the entire package of ALCMs, we now are agreed. I think this shows that there is a spirit of cooperation and mutual understanding and that each side is taking into account the interests of the others, and it is significant because these are problems that have been out there for a number of years. And as I have said, I very much value your constructive approach.

Baker: Well, let me say I value yours as well. I am glad that we are finally able to wrap up ALCMs and SLCMs. It’s no small achievement at this Ministerial, but it is obviously an achievement at this Ministerial—an achievement that is the function of quite a few ministerials. I think we might also have non-circumvention.

Shevardnadze: Well, let me try to sum up the status of questions on ICBMs.

First, you raised some other questions on the problems of heavy ICBMs with the President. As a matter of principle concerning the heavies in our minds have been resolved. They will be covered by the main provisions regarding the future treaty. As for future talks in the next phase of negotiations on strategic arms, the draft text on future talks that were worked out for the Summit could include a provision on our intentions with regard to the entire complex of issues, including the future limitations on heavies. If you want, that would also include a limits on flight tests. So this is what we would suggest on dealing with that question.

Second, on non-circumvention: I believe the main portion of this question has been prepared. We have in mind a draft text of Article 13 of the treaty and the draft unilateral statement of the US side as regards Trident II and Great Britain. We do have two questions. And I can’t really comment on your answer in great detail because they require some serious study but the unilateral statement that you have causes us some serious doubts in our minds. Particularly, because it becomes possible in this circumstance that you could transfer to Great Britain all kinds of strategic arms that are covered by the Treaty. Therefore, I think our experts need to do more work on this. Now we don’t have an argument on Trident II, but we are concerned about everything else. In any case, why don’t we think about this more and discuss it.

Third, is the Backfire aircraft. We believe that you are suggesting additional unilateral obligations regarding this bomber and frankly they are not justified. The questions of these aircraft can be addressed in the Vienna talks as already stated. Such aircraft in this context that belong to naval air should not be included in the Vienna talks.

Fourth, the next issue I see is that of mobile ICBMs. I think we are close to agreement on regulating the operation of the ICBM, but we do have some differences as regards the question of notification. There is no question that we’d like to find and need to find a mutually effective and simple solution to this problem, and we believe it is possible. Progress on this could be accompanied by a reduction in the sub-limit on mobile warheads. I gave you a number of 1,200, but I do have some margin of flexibility on this.

Fifth, the next issue is the duration of the treaty, and I think that issue is resolved.

Sixth, the next issue is that of our substantive discussion on what goes into the statement on follow-on talks—talks on strategic arms and stability. We believe that this discussion can take place in Geneva and also at the Summit, and I think we should be able to work out something.

Now, let me say a few words about the Vienna talks. Let me emphasize that we attach great important to an early completion of a CFE treaty and that we want to see that treaty signed at the CSCE Summit this year. As you know, our experts have made reciprocal proposals designed to find some solutions, and we are going to study the US proposals very carefully. And we hope you will do likewise with ours. And I also here am referring to the suggestions you made to me in our one-on-one meeting.

On chemical weapons, I think there has been a great deal of work that’s been done. The draft text of the bilateral treaty is really for all practical purposes been completed. There has been a real break-through for destroying chemical weapons, and I think that’s important. I think there’s no doubt we can sign a bilateral agreement in Washington—it will stimulate further, I think, movement toward a multilateral convention. We do have some serious technical problems with destruction, but we also have some interesting ideas and after the signing of the bilateral agreement, we also see good potential for cooperation here.

We have in addition to this a good draft that’s been prepared non-proliferation in general and we’re also be able to sign and complete the NTT protocols.

In any case I think despite the fact that we still have some questions remaining I think it fair to say that the main substantive elements of START will be completed by the time of the Summit. We can think about a title or document that incorporates the main provisions of this treaty and also similar or other documents of a future START treaty. I think we ought to agree that we should have such a document—maybe we should instruct our people on both sides to go ahead and draft such a document, then in a few days our people would come to Washington to try to finalize the text.

Baker: Are you saying that the final text or documents should be signed?

Shevardnadze: We both decided to have a document, and I think they might want to have it signed. It will have to be prepared quite well. The other document could be the declaration of our intentions for the next phase of START.

Baker: Well, we had in mind a joint statement to cover the follow-on negotiations on what would be included in the follow-on to START. And I think, in fact, that is being worked on in Geneva. The only other thing that relates to START is whether we will have a joint statement the parties can agree on that says all the major substantive issues have been worked out because you have identified some important remaining issues. In fact, I think, if I understood, you to say that the non-circumvention issue is still not resolved.

Shevardnadze: Yes, it is not fully agreed because in the reply that you sent us the statement that you made, it doesn’t fully cover the issue of supply of nuclear weapons to third countries. I think there could be some misunderstanding—Britain is in a position to receive all kinds of weapons, they could in fact be stabilized via the strategic situation.

Baker: No, what we’re doing with Britain only relates to transfers to existing patterns of our cooperation, and we have furnished you with a statement describing our cooperation to explain that that pattern of cooperation would not be transformed. Maybe after you have taken a closer look at that statement, then it would be okay.

Shevardnadze: Well, that’s why I responded as I did. Personally, I think there is some serious work to be done to study your answer and maybe your statement can be made more definitive.

Baker: In any case, non-circumvention still remains to be done. Now, as for the question of heavies and our requirement that some sort of restriction on flight testing, this too is an issue that still needs to be resolved. You’ll note that we abandoned our suggestion that you cease production in 1993 and we are suggesting simply to a limitation on flight testing. I understood you to say that you have done all you are going to do on heavies in this agreement. And I’m saying for us that this is still an issue because we do want to see some agreement on limits on flight testing. As for the question of limits on mobiles, that, too, is still unresolved, so you say you have some flexibility on numbers.

Regarding the Backfire Bomber, what I understood you to say is that there wouldn’t be any assurances on the Backfire. I would like you to reexamine that position because it’s a major stumbling block to a treaty. We need to be able to point to the fact that this aircraft is going to be dealt with someplace—if not in START, then CFE. I think our request is quite reasonable. We ask only that you tell us that you’re not going to transform it into an intercontinental bomber and that you’ll agree to handle it in CFE.

On joint statements, I understand they will proceed to work them out in Geneva and then we will exchange texts. And as you say duration is resolved. Another issue that is not resolved is verification of road mobiles—that one is still open. There was an agreement ad referendum in Geneva, but you are not able to agree to it now I gather. Somehow we’re going to have to find an answer to this important issue. I hope you will please add this to your list.

The other issue that come to my mind is a preliminary point of monitoring, but that is a very technical issue and I think that ought to be worked on by experts. Maybe some other START issues are still out there, but they will have to be evaluated.

On Vienna, I’d like to have an honest discussion with you. We see time going by and we brought forthcoming proposals and even pushed our allies to go along with the proposals that we brought. Our allies are very sensitive to the fact that we might be negotiating something bilaterally when CFE is not a bilateral issue. In any case, we did bring something and maybe you just need more time to digest what we brought. But I must say that the feeling on our part and on the part of our allies is that there’s been a basic change in the Soviet Union attitude toward CFE. Now there seems to be resistance to move on questions you have, particularly about the size of Bundeswehr. I think one has to remember that if one doesn’t conclude a CFE, we’re not going to hold a CSCE Summit. I have already indicated our willingness to institutionalize CSCE and to ensure that Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union have a forum in which they can all get together with the rest of Europe to discuss not only economic issues but also security matters. However, as I said we feel very strongly that it doesn’t make sense to have a CSCE Summit until after we have a CFE agreement. We are disinclined as are the Germans to deal with a conventional force limit in a Two-Plus-Four context. I know that the British and the French feel the same way. We’re all willing to move quickly on CFE and to deal with your needs and to deal with your needs as they regard the Bundeswehr and the follow-on negotiations or possibly in a protocol or something like that. I understand your concerns and others understand them as well. There won’t be any foot-dragging or delay on our part. We’ll move quickly to a follow-on discussion or to a protocol. I guess what I’m saying is that it seems to me if you delay CFE, you’re going to delay the time at which it will become possible to deal with limits on Bundeswehr. Meanwhile, the political situation is going to pass us by. Even some of the decisions that we’ve already tentatively agreed to on CFE are tending to be over-taken by events. But, of course, it’s a decision you’ll have to make and I just want you to know that we’re willing to work quickly and push our allies to get a quick CFE agreement. If we can do that we can have a CSCE Summit and I think then we can deal with the question of restrictions on forces in the Central Zone. I can’t speak for the Germans, but I can just tell you where I think the Germans are and I think that they are willing to do that.

One final point. I want to reemphasize the problems that is presented in START by the Backfire. We’re going to have a very hard time going to the Congress with a deal that neither includes it in START or in CFE.

Shevardnadze: I think we can decide to have our experts discuss intensively, if necessary, in this area. I think we have established a good procedure now of exchanging letters now if necessary. So I believe the remaining time until the Summit we can be actively dealing with each other. If necessary, we can become personally involved in this process. And that way, we’ll be more likely to complete the process. I really can’t add anything to what I’ve said on heavies. On mobiles, I think there is a basis for us to work. As to Backfires, I think I’ve been clear that we do agree that it ought to be in the CFE talks. And that implies by definition that we will be discussing it bilaterally.

Baker: Would you explore the possibility of writing me a letter like the one I wrote you on Tacit Rainbow saying, for example, (1) that this would be dealt with in CFE, including that Backfires that have been assigned to naval operations; and (2) that you would not make it into an intercontinental bomber?

Shevardnadze: We’ll try to formulate in a written form our attitude towards the Backfire taking into account your concerns. And I will send you an official formal letter.

Baker: Okay.

[Omitted here is a discussion of the CFE Treaty]

Baker: The sooner we get CFE I over with, the sooner we’re going to be able to address that.

Shevardnadze: I agree, there’s no difference here. We have an interest in getting this done soon. So let’s wrap up the agreement and we can then interact on the follow-on talks that were done in Geneva.

Baker: Well we can work on that document, that’s a different issue, but we can work on that document here.

Shevardnadze: Yes, that’s true. But if we need to have intensified work on a follow-on statement, maybe our experts can come and see yours in Washington. The original START agreement is one that is obviously close to conclusion. The main provision of the 50% reduction treaty is done, we have five days before the Summit and our experts might come with a draft on what we want to say about START as well. And that document could address itself to the main issues that have been resolved.

Baker: Well, that’s not what we really had in mind, not what I had in mind. I think that once we start drafting some kind of text, we’re going to find that problems in the drafting will inevitably arise. I don’t rule out doing it, but I’m just saying we ought to consider that that could be difficult. For example, on ALCMs, we have a history of dealing with this issue and finding out that it is very difficult to resolve it in a treaty text.

Shevardnadze: Yes, but we ought to at least be able to discuss the main elements without writing out every detail.

Baker: If you want to say that the parties agree on a 50% reduction and how they’ve agreed to handle ALCMs and SLCMs, that’s okay.

Shevardnadze: In that document? Why couldn’t we just set out everything that’s been agreed to?

Baker: You mean record everything on which we agree?

Shevardnadze: Yes. I don’t think there should be any difficulties there. A general outline of what we have been able to agree to is something that we ought to be able to report. Certainly, that’s what we agreed to in Moscow on the main elements.

Baker: Well, we’re willing to try.

Shevardnadze: Also, we probably need some working mechanism between now and the Summit. Maybe we could have experts working in Moscow and Washington.

Baker: Well, you said before you want to start five days before the Summit, so we still do have some issues that we would like to resolve.

Shevardnadze: Well, I’m going to send a team—I’m willing to send a team tomorrow.

Baker: Well, we’re happy to receive them. Why don’t you send them when you can—but we won’t be back until Tuesday.³

Shevardnadze: Well, there’s no objection. And I think that you and I should be involved as needed. And we can have the working groups report to us, and I think that will help prepare us for the Summit.

Baker: That’s good. In the press conference, let me say, I think we were able to resolve two of the remaining major issues and that these have created problems for years and we now have them behind us. Now we are in a position to be able to have the two Presidents resolve all the major substantive issues of starting a Summit just as they said they would at Malta. And also we are going to mention chemical weapons as well.

Shevardnadze: That’s my intention also. Overall I’m going to offer a very positive assessment and say that this ministerial has been very productive. Maybe we don’t have to use phrases like a breakthrough, but this has been a very productive ministerial.

Baker: Well, I think CW is a breakthrough. It is an issue, after all, that has gotten nowhere, hasn’t moved at all; it’s been an issue for a long time and certainly it’s one we want to get resolved and yet we’ve now made an agreement and we have a chance to really move ahead.

Shevardnadze: Should we join our colleagues and maybe have a few words on what bilateral agreements we’re in for.

Baker: Yes.

End of conversation.

1. Source: Department of State, Policy Planning Staff, Lot 03D102, Dennis Ross Files, US/Soviet Memos of Conversation—1989/1990. Secret; Nodis. The meeting took place in the Osobnyak Guest House of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Baker returned to Washington later that day.
2. See Document 128.
3. May 22.