Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLIV, Part 1, National Security Policy, 1985–1988

99. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Poindexter) to President Reagan¹

Washington, March 24, 1986

SUBJECT

• Tuesday’s NSPG on the U.S. Response to Soviet Violations of Arms Control

Background. Last June, you faced the issue of whether the US would continue to not undercut SALT I and SALT II when the 7th US TRIDENT SSBN, the Alaska, went to sea later that summer. You decided that the US would continue to show restraint and dismantle POSEIDON SSBNs as needed to offset the sea trials of the Alaska and stay within SALT I and SALT II numerical limits. You also announced that, while going the extra mile, that the US would consider appropriate and proportional responses to uncorrected Soviet violations of arms control commitments; and you asked the Department of Defense to produce a report providing its recommendation on US options to do just that. This decision was reflected in NSDD–173 (attached at Tab A).²

In December, the Secretary of Defense provided his recommended programmatic options. Since then, the Arms Control Support Group (ACSG) has been reviewing the options recommended by Defense in addition to a few others suggested by other agencies. The options are described in the ACSG paper provided at Tab B.³

Upcoming Decision. The unratified SALT II Treaty expired on December 31, 1985. The Soviet Union has not corrected major violations that we have cited. Moreover, we see new potential violations on the horizon—including the testing of what may be a new heavy ICBM which the Soviets will likely claim is a modification of their current SS–18. Against this backdrop, the 8th TRIDENT SSBN, the Nevada, will begin sea trials on May 20th.

US interim restraint policy has been not to undercut agreements so long as the Soviet Union exercises equal restraint. You have stated that you will not accept a double standard on compliance. With the Nevada going to sea, you face the decision whether the US should continue to adhere to the SALT I and SALT II ceilings in spite of uncorrected Soviet violations. You will need to make this decision by mid-to-late April to give time for consultation with allies prior to the Nevada going to sea and to put some distance between this subject and the Economic Summit in Tokyo.

Tuesday’s NSPG. This Tuesday⁴ we will have the first of two planned NSPG sessions on the future of US Interim Restraint Policy and on US options for responding to Soviet violations of arms control commitments. The primary purpose of Tuesday’s NSPG is to review these specific options so that you can see what programmatic steps are available to add concreteness to any policy decision you wish to take. As the paper at Tab B indicates, we have relatively few immediate options, and even these have drawbacks that should be recognized. Therefore, this first session is designed to be an informational meeting. With this information about the programmatic options as a foundation, the second NSPG on this subject, scheduled for April 16, will be designed to address the broader political issues and frame the policy decision that you will then face.

The Options. At the NSPG on Tuesday, we will discuss eight specific programmatic options that have been developed. These are described in detail in the paper at Tab B. Since you will have supporters of each option highlighting its virtues at the meeting, it may be well to review some of the downsides of each, prior to the meeting.

Option A—Preserve POSEIDON SSBNs. Under SALT I and II ceilings, when the next TRIDENT ballistic missile submarine (SSBN), the Nevada, puts to sea in May, we would be required to begin the dismantlement of two older POSEIDON submarines using agreed procedures. Under this option, rather than dismantle two POSEIDON submarines, the Secretary of Defense would recommend that we simply tie these submarines up to the dock, remove the missiles, defuel the nuclear reactors, and maintain the ships’ systems to preserve the option for their future overhaul or conversion to other missions.

The provisions of the SALT agreements give us six months to complete the dismantlement of these submarines. However, under this option, we would make clear that we do not intend to follow these dismantlement provisions. While it would be equally clear that these submarines were not capable, in their defueled condition, to perform any combat mission, failure to dismantle them fully would still be in technical violation of the SALT II limits on MIRVed systems and the SALT I limits on submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers.

The main military problem with this option is that the POSEIDON submarines involved, even after a complete overhaul, are very near the end of their useful life. To put them back to sea, each will need an overhaul that takes some 27 months to accomplish (at a cost of $167 million)—and even then, we could have as little as three additional years of service with them carrying the older, POSEIDON C–3 missile which has limited capability against all but soft targets. In short, even without SALT, we would be considering retiring these submarines in the near future (though we might save some money by not fully dismantling them according to SALT procedures).

Option B—Replace 50 Minuteman II with Minuteman III Missiles. This option, also proposed by the Secretary of Defense, would put 50 Minuteman III ICBMs that we now have in storage into Minuteman II silos. This could be done relatively quickly at modest cost (about $33 million). This would put us in violation of SALT II MIRV limits.

The idea of deploying additional Minuteman III missiles has often been suggested. It is not a new idea. The question we must face is whether we could get the funding through Congress for this purpose.

Option C—Encryption of Data from Strategic Systems. The original version of this idea, suggested by the Secretary of Defense, called for the US encryption of data on both the TRIDENT D–5 missile and the MIDGETMAN, as well as taking other steps to tighten control on data on US strategic systems in general. The Senior Arms Control Group review of this option reached the consensus view that we should not call for the encryption of the TRIDENT D–5 since this would delay the flight testing of this critically needed program. At the same time, the SACG agreed that we should be prepared, in the context of a broader decision on overall US restraint policy, to make the point that, given Soviet encryption, the US will evaluate its denial practices on a case-by-case basis in light of US national security requirements and the uncorrected pattern of Soviet encryption. The MIDGETMAN program already provides for data encryption during flight testing should we decide to exercise that option when flight testing begins in 1988.

Option D—Intensified R&D on Biological and Chemical Countermeasures. This option, suggested by the Secretary of Defense, calls for an additional $120 million for the acceleration of research and development on countermeasures to Soviet biological and chemical weapons. The SACG review of this option led to consensus that this should be dropped as a response option to Soviet violations, but pursued as a normal programmatic activity. Everyone agrees that this type of activity warrants consideration. The problem is that it was designed to be part of what was initially thought to be an FY86 supplemental request. If not part of such a supplemental request, it can be addressed in a more routine fashion. Additionally, if made a part of a package framed as a response to Soviet violations, it would be difficult to describe in a simple, understandable fashion to the general public the research that would be pursued for the $120 million.

Option E—Small ICBM. This option, suggested by the Secretary of State, would reaffirm our commitment to pursue ICBM modernization and the Small ICBM (SICBM or MIDGETMAN) program. It is framed to not foreclose the possibility that the small ICBM could have either a single warhead or 2–3 MIRV warheads. The main drawback associated with this option is that we already pointed to the MIDGETMAN as a response to the Soviet development of their SS–25 mobile missile, so this may be considered by some as old news. On the other hand, the SACG review of this option led to consensus that in the context of a decision on US policy, a reference to the need for ICBM modernization and to the pursuit of the small ICBM program (without prejudice to the issue of whether it carries one or more warheads) should be made.

Option F—Penetration Aids for US ICBMs. The Department of State also suggested an option of pursuing additional funds for penetration aids (decoys or maneuvering reentry vehicles) for US ICBMs to counter the threat of a Soviet breakout from the ABM Treaty. The Department of Defense is already pursuing some penetration aid capability. The main problem with this option is that Defense feels that the specific programs being suggested by State do not represent the best use that could be made of the funds involved. Defense feels that the threat simply doesn’t warrant this level of spending on the types of penetration aids proposed.

Option G—Equip Additional Attack Submarines with SLCMs. State suggested that we do something to accelerate the deployment of SLCMs. The option suggested would have us backfit up to 31 LOS ANGELES class attack submarines with a vertical launcher for SLCMs. Our cruise missile program is certainly a matter of concern to the Soviets, and this would get their attention. The downsides of this option are that the first actual backfit would not occur until 1989. Also, this would spotlight the SLCM, a system about which we have not made any arms control proposals because of the difficulty in verifying limits on such systems. If there is interest in a SLCM option, we may wish to ask the Department of Defense if we could accelerate the deployment of SLCMs on other ships (perhaps additional surface combatants) so that the impact would be felt earlier than in 1989.

Option H—Accelerate Procurement of Advanced Cruise Missiles. ACDA and Ambassador Rowny suggested that we consider an option to accelerate the procurement of advanced (stealthy) air-launched cruise missiles (ACMs). The specific option described in the paper at Tab B talks about using the additional advanced cruise missiles to arm 69 B–52G bombers that we intend now to convert for conventional warfare missions. SACG review of this option noted that this would involve the procurement of additional KC–10 tankers to support the B–52G bombers at considerable cost. It would also mean that we can’t count on these 69 bombers to support conventional forces if needed. The SACG directed that staff reframe this option so that it would call for the acceleration of ACM procurement with the idea that we would replace the current, less capable air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) with the newer, more capable ACMs. This reframed option may have merit.

The Broader Problem. The problem that we face is much broader than simply the selection of options from the above list. It is how to maintain a principled policy of restraint as we pursue a new START agreement while not allowing the Soviet Union to operate under a double standard with respect to compliance. Actions that appear to indicate compliance with the expired SALT II Treaty will be strongly protested by some of your staunchest supporters as inconsistent with your position on this flawed and unratified treaty. On the other hand, actions which move us beyond SALT limits will likely generate considerable concern not only from domestic critics, but from a number of Allied leaders.

At this point, we think that the best answer lies in a policy that not only rejects unilateral compliance with critical elements of existing Treaties but also advocates a system of restraint that is equal, fair, and protects US security. Ken Adelman has suggested an approach which describes what he calls “elements of a new restraint policy.” While we think that the details of such an approach need additional thought, the general idea that Ken Adelman suggests is worth pursuing. With some carefully crafted discussion, it may provide the path to an Administration consensus on how to handle the difficult, broader problem. We intend to use the period between this first NSPG and the next meeting in April to work on this and refine the elements of such a declaratory policy.

Conclusion. The entire process will come together when we can build upon Tuesday’s discussion of concrete programmatic options by putting them in a broader political context at the NSPG planned for April 16. It is essential that you hold your cards as close to the vest as you can until that time. Because of the depth of feeling on this issue, advocates will attempt to interpret your every remark to support their position over the critical next few weeks. To best serve you, we need to maintain maximum flexibility in pulling together not only a decision package for your use, but a plan for first consulting as needed about the decision and then for presenting it in the best possible manner. If we let any element get out in front of your decision, the risks of a significant problem increase rapidly.

Recommendation

OK NO

____ ____ That you use Tuesday’s NSPG to gain information about the programmatic options, staying in the listening mode and avoiding being drawn into providing your views at the meeting.⁵

1. Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR–104, NSC 00118. Secret. Sent for action. Prepared by Linhard, Kraemer, and Wright. Reagan initialed the memorandum in the upper right-hand corner.
2. Attached but not printed. See Document 47.
3. Attached but not printed.
4. March 25.
5. Reagan initialed his approval and placed a checkmark next to his initials.