Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLIV, Part 1, National Security Policy, 1985–1988

92. Memorandum From Sven Kraemer, Robert Linhard, and William Wright of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Poindexter)¹

Washington, December 17, 1985

SUBJECT

• Noncompliance Report—NSDD

The NSDD attached at Tab A² reflects your decisions and notes on the Verification Committee’s Decision Memo for the latest report to the Congress on Soviet Noncompliance with Arms Control Agreements to be transmitted Friday, December 20.³ If you approve it, it is ready for you to discuss it tomorrow with the President for his approval and signature.⁴

Presidential decisions are needed urgently at this time in order that we can retrofit his findings and the introductory policy framework into the classified and unclassified reports, as well as to finalize public affairs/diplomacy materials. Such retrofitting requires very substantial additional work and preparation during the next few days, and should be initiated by tomorrow, Wednesday afternoon, December 18. FYI: The Verification Committee is continuing its daily 4–6 hour meetings to meet the December 20 deadline.

Concerning four issues indicated in your notes as awaiting further NSC staff or DCI information, we have checked back with the DCI’s representative (Doug George) on each of the issues and have incorporated appropriate recommendations of NSC staff and DCI into the text of the attached NSDD. Specifically:

1. SA–X–12. You had already checked the NSC staff (plus State, ACDA, JCS) recommendation on the issue of ABM capabilities of Modern SAM Systems. The basic finding is not affected by the DCI’s note that it was too early to decide the specifics of the SS–X–12 issue since there is more than enough in terms of other systems and agreed SA–X–12 evidence to support the proposed reaffirmation of the February 1985 finding on the SAM ABM capabilities issue.

2. Use of Facilities at SS-7 Sites and 3. Aerial Refueling of Backfire. In both cases, we confirmed DCI views and earlier NSC staff recommendations.

4. Throw Weight of an SLBM. A sentence in NSDD indicates finding on this sensitive issue will be transmitted separately. This involves a codeword issue, handled the same way in the February report, and all agencies have agreed to affirm the February finding.

[1 paragraph (11 lines) not declassified]

Two other aspects of the attached NSDD deserve special mention. First, the Introduction is essentially the same as the chapeau to the report attached to the Decision Memo and represents language almost totally agreed by all agencies. Second, the Tasking section at the end of the NSDD picks up on February tasking formulations and adds new tasking formulations worked out by NSC staff (Kraemer) during today’s Verification Committee meeting.⁵

While we urge earliest possible Presidential approval and signature of the proposed NSDD at Tab A,⁶ and while we are providing a distribution memo at Tab I for your signature to distribute the approved NSDD to appropriate agencies and officials, we strongly recommend against actual distribution upon the President’s signature tomorrow. Instead, NSC staff (Kraemer) will have its elements retrofitted into the report and, as appropriate, worked into (still classified) draft public affairs materials while we double check for typos and possible small inaccuracies on Wednesday, prior to its distribution late Thursday.

RECOMMENDATIONS

That you review the proposed NSDD attached at Tab A and if you approve, that you discuss it with the President for his approval and signature.⁷

That if you and the President approve and the President signs the proposed NSDD at Tab A, you let NSC staff know as soon as possible so that we can work with the Verification Committee to complete the text of the classified/unclassified report, appropriate public affairs materials, etc., but that you not sign the distribution memo at Tab I transmitting the report to agencies and officials until Thursday, December 19, giving us an opportunity to check for any small inaccuracies, etc.⁸

1. Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Staff, Box SR–91, NSDD 202. Secret; Sent for action.
2. Printed as Document 94.
3. Not found.
4. Poindexter drew two vertical lines in the right-hand margin beside this paragraph.
5. No minutes were found.
6. Attached but not printed. See footnote 1, Document 94.
7. Poindexter approved the recommendation.
8. Poindexter underlined “transmitting the report to agencies and officials until Thursday, December 19,” and approved the recommendation.