Office of the Historian

88. Memorandum From the Acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Watkins) to Secretary of Defense Weinberger1

JCSM–415–85
Washington, December 6, 1985

SUBJECT

  • Response to Soviet Violation Policy (U)
1.
(S) In accordance with your recent request,2 the Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed possible responses to Soviet violations. Two previous JCSMs3 on this subject described our thoughts on the importance of modernization.
2.
(S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff find several options which provide military utility and potential leverage to influence Soviet behavior:
a.
(S) Accelerate penetration aids and antitactical missile (ATM) program funding to move from research to production as soon as feasible. In light of the potential for Soviet ABM territorial defense and the clear violation of the ABM Treaty by the Krasnoyarsk radar, these compliant measures could be taken to frustrate Soviet efforts to counter our strategic and theater nuclear deterrent posture.
b.
(S) Implement telemetry encryption of future tests of strategic reentry and PENAID systems. This noncompliant measure would impede Soviet monitoring of system testing.
c.
(S) Place POSEIDON SSBNs in decommissioned, defueled and inactive status for up to 1 year rather than following the dismantling procedures in the SALT I agreement. This would violate central limits of SALT I and SALT II. This would, in turn, give the United States the flexibility, conditioned on Soviet actions, to redeploy SSBNs, dismantle the SSBNs later, or use the SSBNs for other military purposes.
d.
(S) Deploy 50 additional MINUTEMAN III missiles in MINUTEMAN II silos. While this would violate a central MIRV limit of SALT II, it is reversible. Limiting deployment to 50 missiles is necessary to maintain the MINUTEMAN III assets required for a balanced reliability testing program.
e.
(S) Provide accelerated funding for chemical protective measures to include shelters, alarms, clothing and masks to protect ground forces in the field. These measures have military utility in countering Soviet violations of international conventions on the use of chemical weapons.
3.
(S) While POSEIDON and MINUTEMAN launchers may prove to have utility in Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO) Programs, there are significant technological and service-life problems to be resolved, and it is too early to confirm that these are viable options. However, while evaluating SDIO usefulness of these launchers, we could delay the dismantlement of POSEIDON.
4.
(S) We know that you will consider the following factors:
a.
(S) Implementation of any option that would violate the central limits of the SALT agreements, limits which the Soviets have observed during force modernization, could be viewed by many as an escalatory reaction rather than an appropriate and proportionate response. In short, the political risk associated with being the first to noncomply with these central limits could be significantly greater than the leverage accrued by maintaining these systems. This is particularly noteworthy in light of their marginal military utility, in the overall force context.
b.
(S) Noncompliant options could place public, congressional and allied support for modernization programs at risk. Retention of older systems, which provide only a marginal addition to US warfighting capabilities, could impact on force modernization plans, and allied backing for needed intermediate-range nuclear force and conventional force modernization could be damaged by undercutting central limits.
5.
(S) It should be noted that FY 1986 supplemental actions could create binding, long-term financial obligations which would affect the desired balance between strategic and conventional programs. The impact of such supplemental actions could be seriously exacerbated by future budget reductions.
6.
(S) In summary, although our fundamental position remains that continued, balanced force modernization provides the most effective military response to Soviet noncompliance, the compliant [Page 298] and noncompliant responses cited above are feasible and offer some military utility. The question remains whether the influence of these responses on Soviet behavior will be offset by political ramifications and ultimate erosion of our modernization program.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

James D. Watkins
Acting Chairman,
Joint Chiefs of Staff
  1. Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Weinberger Papers, Department of Defense Files, Box CL 838, Subject File, 1985 U.S.S.R. #169—180 (14). Secret.↩
  2. Not found; see, however, Document 87.↩
  3. References: JCSM–329–85, 24 September 1985, “Response to Soviet Violation Policy” JCSM–410–85, 26 November 1985, “Response to Soviet Violation Policy”. [Footnote is in the original.]↩