Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLIV, Part 1, National Security Policy, 1985–1988

75. Memorandum Prepared by the Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Courtney)¹

Washington, October 11, 1985

Today’s NSPG on ABM Treaty

CH tells me the Secretary returned from the NSPG thinking he had argued persuasively that we should: 1) say the treaty is ambiguous,² 2) say we intend to pursue SDI within the framework of the customary interpretation³ of the ABM Treaty, and 3) assert ambiguity in the Geneva talks⁴ as a means of arguing the need for clarification of the Treaty. Nitze also seems upbeat. He predicts the President will announce, quite soon, an even stricter position: there is ambiguity, but we see no necessity to change the Treaty guidelines.

I don’t know whether the Secretary’s private talks with the President bear out the optimism, but the drift of the meeting was not clearly in our direction. Only Baker backed the Secretary.⁵ Crowe and Adelman waffled. Weinberger and Meese wanted to change the interpretation now; Casey seemed to agree, but stressed withdrawal from the treaty. Nitze thinks Bud’s comments were balanced, perhaps leaning slightly our way. The President said nothing, but noted he had received a message from Mrs. Thatcher (we don’t have).⁶

Specific Comments (in order).

McFarlane. The issue is the interpretation you (the President) wish to place on the treaty. It is a political and legal matter. In the past we have had a narrow interpretation, but that was taken in the hope the Soviets would adopt this stance. Both the Soviet and our SDI programs will run up against the treaty. The issue is whether to reinterpret it now.

Article II defines the then current technology (interceptor missiles, launchers, radars). One argument is that Agreed Statement D allows the “creation”⁷—research, development, and testing—of future types of systems. The opposing argument is that Article II covers future types of systems. But if that were true there would be no need for Agreed Statement D.

The negotiating record shows that the narrow view was meant to limit mobile (including space-based) systems. You backed the narrow interpretation in the March 15 SDI Report to Congress. This is compatible with the Camp David four points. If we alter the interpretation now, we will evoke “criticism.” You want to know whether we can have effective SDI defenses, and the SDI program is designed to answer this question.

Shultz (summary attached.)

Weinberger. What is our goal? Do we want SDI, or the treaty? We shouldn’t spend too much time arguing about this. If we wait to change our interpretation, then it will seem to have been done just for our SDI program. Abrahamson’s work has moved faster than expected. He is now bumping up against the treaty. Eventually we will have to pull out of it anyway. Asking the Soviets for clarification of the treaty is a mistake. Lawyers could argue all day long on its meaning. I’ve never seen such passions as on this treaty. We should define it the way we want.

Crowe. If we need to make a change, our lawyers say there is a basis for doing so. More flexibility is always helpful. We are upset with Soviet interpretations. There is a public perception problem. If we can, we should make the reinterpretation more palatable.

Casey. We think SDI is vital and can be done. The treaty should not stand in the way. If the Soviets say we are in violation, then they were in violation long ago. Fortunately, the negotiations provided an amendment procedure. We have a propaganda problem. We should not let the treaty get stronger. We should exercise the amendment and withdrawal procedures. The public should know this now. We should not let this simmer.

Adelman. There are upsides and downsides. The Soviets won’t help us. There are good legal arguments on both sides. The question is whether the Congress will give us the funds for SDI. I suggest a one-month search of the files by a commission of lawyers. I’m not sure what SDI work cannot be done now. (Weinberger: “Field testing.”)

Meese. We should not call a panel of lawyers. It would create doubt about our own interpretation. The Department of State legal advisor is probably right. We should not give up Article XV (the withdrawal clause). We should say that Article V permits testing.

Baker. We do not want to go to the Geneva meeting with Alliance disunity. We should finesse the issue for the time being.⁸

Nitze. A broad interpretation of the treaty will undercut our argument on the Krasnoyarsk radar.

The meeting ended.

WHC

Attachment

Paper Prepared in the Department of State⁹

Washington, undated

FOUR POINTS

1. The Treaty is subject to considerable ambiguity

— There is room for maneuver for us

— and concern about the Soviets’ interpretation; ours should not be stricter than theirs

So there is a real need for clarification

2. We have adhered to a relatively restrictive view, as in the March 15 document and Hicks’ testimony in late September.

3. While any researcher would like a free field, our scientists tell us that the SDI program is designed so that the President’s question (can we have a defense against ballistic missiles?) can be answered without changing the familiar interpretation of the treaty.

4. These last two points have created expectations and have been used to sell the SDI program in the Congress and with the Allies.

So if we change our interpretation that support will be called into question. We would find ourselves going to Geneva on the winds of a hurricane.

Therefore, we should:

— state the fact of the treaty’s ambiguity

— state our intention to pursue SDI within the framework of the familiar interpretation

— assert the fact of ambiguity at Geneva as a means of arguing the need for clarification of the treaty.

In this way we can have our cake and eat it too.

1. Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR–145, State Dept. Chron Files. Secret. A stamped notation in the top right-hand corner of the memorandum indicates Armacost saw it on October 17. The National Security Planning Group met in the Situation Room from 11:03 to noon on October 11. (Reagan Library, President’s Daily Diary) No minutes were found. Linhard’s handwritten notes are in Reagan Library, Robert Linhard Files, Arms Control Chronological File, NSPG Meeting—10/11/1985.
2. Armacost underlined “is ambiguous.”
3. Armacost underlined “SDI within the framework of the customary interpretation.”
4. Armacost underlined “assert ambiguity in the Geneva talks.”
5. Armacost underlined “Only Baker backed the Secretary.”
6. Armacost drew a bracket in the right-hand margin beside this sentence.
7. Armacost circled “creation.”
8. Armacost drew a bracket in the left-hand margin beside this sentence.
9. No classification marking.