Tab 1
Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for
Intelligence and Research (Abramowitz) to Secretary of State Shultz4
Washington, August 9, 1985
SUBJECT
- Advanced-Technology Weapons and Soviet Strategic Defense
Recent Soviet statements have led some to believe that they are exploring
our receptivity to a proposal that would limit SDI deployment, but would permit some types of research. We
have assumed their motivation for such an approach would be to allow
some US research as a “face-saving” way
for the US to agree to an SDI limit. Actually, the Soviet motivation
in allowing some research may be to permit their own programs to go
ahead. This memorandum briefly sketches what we know about the Soviet
programs.
The Soviets have been working with directed-energy (laser, particle beam,
and radiofrequency) and kinetic-energy technologies for about the last
twenty years. A portion of those technologies is applicable to BMD, and part of the Soviet effort is
believed to be focused on that goal.
We cannot precisely identify the size and scope of Soviet research
efforts in these areas, nor can we pinpoint the status and goals of any
related weapon development programs. These technologies can have both
weapon and nonweapon applications, making it difficult to determine the
purpose of any detected research effort. These limitations, in turn,
would make it difficult to monitor any future restrictions on
research.
Using Kvitsinskiy’s terminology, some Soviet advanced-technology research
could be construed as “fundamental” or “purely scientific.” But in at
least one case, ground-based lasers, the “purposeful and directed” label
seems more appropriate. Intelligence indicates that the Soviets are
interested in ground-based laser BMD,
and at least one Soviet facility is judged to house a high-energy laser
that might support BMD testing. To
protect their ground-based laser research from restrictions on
advanced-technology strategic defenses, the Soviets could attempt to
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exempt ground-based weapons
from such restrictions, or could simply try arguing that the research in
question is only “fundamental.”
○ High-Energy Lasers: In a laser weapon, an
intense beam of light is aimed at a target by an optical device. The
target is damaged by explosive shock, heating, melting, or
vaporizing.
The Soviets have a military-sponsored program to develop high-energy
laser weapons. [less than 1 line not
declassified] the existence of a Soviet project to develop a
ground-based laser weapon for terminal defense against ballistic missile
warheads. While there are doubts about the possibility of using
ground-based lasers for BMD, the
Soviets could conduct feasibility tests during this decade, perhaps
using the high-energy laser at Sary Shagan. If that proved successful, a
prototype ground-based weapon could be tested in the early 1990s. A
fully operational weapon is unlikely before 2000.
The Soviets may also have plans for a space-based laser. While ASAT would be the probable initial
application of such a weapon, subsequent BMD use is possible. In the 1970s, this “project” was
reportedly in its early stages. We have had no evidence of its status
since then, and do not know where the effort stands. To develop a
space-based BMD laser, the Soviets
would have to achieve a number of major technological advances. The
Intelligence Community estimates that, even if this can be accomplished,
no prototype will be available before the mid-1990s, and no operational
system before 2000.
○ Particle Beam Weapons (PBWs): In PBWs, intense
beams of electrons, protons, or atoms are produced by a high-energy
accelerator and aimed at a target by magnets. Damage results from
thermal, mechanical, and secondary radiation (nuclear or X-ray)
effects.
Our intelligence on Soviet work on PBW technologies is limited. We
believe they are conducting research under military sponsorship for the
purpose of acquiring the ability to develop PBWs. We have no evidence
that they actually are developing such weapons. We lack firm knowledge
as to the size or scope of their efforts, and do not know whether it is
comparable in scale to their laser program. We believe they are capable
of testing the feasibility of some PBW concepts but not others. It is
not clear whether they have actually succeeded in demonstrating the
feasibility of any. Indeed, it is not clear that PBWs are technically
feasible at all.
The Intelligence Community believes the Soviets are at least 10–15 years
away from testing any long-range, ground-based particle beam weapon for
terminal BMD. A prototype space-based
PBW, for damaging ballistic missile electronics, is also at least 10–15
years away, assuming the Soviets pursue development of such a system.
Eventually, PBWs might be refined for use in RV or booster destruction.
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○ Radiofrequency (RF) Damage Weapons: In an RF
weapon, electromagnetic radiation is aimed at a target by an antenna.
Electronic components or the target structure may be destroyed by
circuit overloading or thermal effects. The Soviets have conducted
research in the use of strong RF signals, which have the potential to
interfere with or destroy components of missiles and warheads. We do not
know if a Soviet RF weapon program exists. If they were to pursue such a
program, the Soviets probably could develop an RF weapon which could
destroy the unprotected electronics of missiles at a range of up to one
kilometer. A prototype capable of doing this over ranges of tens of
kilometers could be possible by the late 1980s.
○ Hypervelocity Kinetic-Energy Weapons: In a
hypervelocity kinetic-energy weapon, a mass ranging from a stream of
microscopic particles to a solid projectile is directed at a target.
Impact causes melting, vaporization, and chemical decomposition.
While we know that the Soviets have conducted research and development on
kinetic-energy technologies with potential applications for strategic
weapons, we have no information indicating that they intend to develop
long-range kinetic-energy weapons. The Intelligence Community estimates
the probability of a Soviet prototype for such a weapon in the next ten
years to be very low.
Tab 2
Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for
Intelligence and Research (Abramowitz) to Secretary of State Shultz5
Washington, September 20, 1985
SUBJECT
- How the Soviets Look at SDI: Your Query
The Soviets probably do not know what they “really think” about SDI, and will not know for some time. They
have called it destabilizing, a violation of the ABM Treaty, and part of a US attempt to gain superiority. At the same
time, the Soviets have been researching SDI-type technologies for about
20 years. They currently are behind the US in such key supporting technologies as electronics and
computer software. They are ahead of the US in some basic weapon-related technologies
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and behind in others, but
probably believe the US soon will pull
well ahead.
In response to SDI’s deployment, the
Soviets could bolster their offensive forces, move to a counter-city
strategy, or deploy nationwide BMD of
their own. For the near-term they appear to have decided against moving
toward “defense dominance.” A major reason for this probably is that,
compared to the present situation, effective US defenses—no matter how the USSR might respond—would make Soviet deterrence of the
US much more uncertain, and clearly
more expensive.
You wondered the other day at the Casey6 briefing how the Soviets view SDI. This is a distillation of what the
Soviets say about SDI, what research
and development they are undertaking in SDI-type systems, and our
assessment of what the Soviets really think about SDI.
Soviet Pronouncements on SDI
In public and at Geneva, the Soviets have characterized SDI as destabilizing and a violation of
the ABM Treaty. They have taken the
view that SDI will only provoke Soviet
counter-measures, and thus will result not in greater security but in
increased military expenditures and levels of arms. Gorbachev has also warned that SDI will cause a breakdown of the Geneva
arms control process. In essence, the US
and USSR have exchanged scripts—the
Soviets are making much the same arguments about BMD now that the US made in the 1960s.
The Soviets profess to view SDI as part
of an overall US first strike strategy
aimed at obtaining strategic superiority. They consider new US offensive weapons—MX, Trident II, cruise
missiles, and the Pershing II—as intended to destroy as many Soviet
offensive weapons as possible in a first strike, with SDI cleaning up the remaining Soviet
weapons. (This is essentially a mirror-image of the Soviets’ own
strategic concept.) Since, the Soviets say, SDI cannot provide a leakproof defense against a large,
coordinated strike, its only logical role is against a “ragged
retaliation.”
Soviet SDI-Type Research and Development
The Soviets have been researching laser, particle beam, radiofrequency,
and kinetic-energy technology for about the last 20 years. We cannot
precisely identify the size and scope of Soviet research efforts in
technologies applicable to BMD, nor can
we pinpoint the status and goals of any related weapon development
programs. These technologies can have both weapon and nonweapon
applications, making it difficult to determine precisely the purpose of
Soviet R&D efforts. Nevertheless,
there are SDI-type technologies in which Soviet research
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is progressing, and in which we can
identify or hypothesize links to BMD.
High Energy Lasers. The Soviets have a military
sponsored program to develop high-energy laser weapons, including a
ground-based weapon for terminal BMD. A
facility at Sary Shagan is believed to house a high-energy laser which
may have a BMD application. The Soviets
may also have a project for a space-based laser—while ASAT would be the probable initial use
for such a weapon, subsequent BMD use
is possible.
Particle Beam Weapons (PBWs). We have limited
evidence on Soviet PBW research. While we believe they are conducting
research under military sponsorship in an attempt to acquire the ability
to develop PBWs, we have no evidence that they actually are developing
weapons. We believe they are capable of
testing the feasibility of some PBW concepts, but not others, and it is
not clear whether they have succeeded in demonstrating the feasibility
of any.
Radiofrequency (RF) and Kinetic-Energy Weapons.
The Soviets have conducted research in the use of strong RF signals,
which have the potential to interfere with or destroy missile
components, and on kinetic-energy technologies with potential BMD applications. But we do not know the
extent, if any, of Soviet RF and kinetic energy weapons programs.
Who’s Ahead? We don’t know where the Soviets
currently think they stand vis-a-vis the US in SDI-type technologies. In our view, they are ahead of
the US in some basic technologies and
behind in others, but well behind in the key supporting technologies of
any SDI
weapons system (e.g.,
electronics and computer software). Wherever they think they stand now,
the Soviets probably believe the US soon
will be well ahead.
What Do They Really Think?: An Assessment
Even the Soviets probably don’t know what they “really think” about
SDI, and are unlikely to know for
some time. A meaningful Soviet evaluation of SDI, and of the USSR’s
ultimate position toward it, will depend on a number of factors, many of
which—such as the effectiveness of future US and Soviet defenses and countermeasures, as well as the
costs involved—are not known at this time. We can, however, illuminate
the key doctrinal factors likely to affect the Soviet view of SDI, based on Soviet military writings and
programs, and the USSR’s positions in
past arms control fora.
SDI’s Threat. An
effective US
SDI system would make the Soviets’
counterforce strikes less effective. In order to continue their present
strategy of deterrence through war-fighting, the Soviets would have to
bolster their counterforce capability to penetrate US defenses, and deploy additional defenses
of their own to compensate for their lessened counterforce
capability.
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Alternatively, the Soviets could move to a counter-city strategy, which
is easier for the attacker and very demanding for the defender (only one
warhead would have to penetrate the defenses to destroy a city). This
strategy would require many of the same offensive force improvements as
war-fighting, but would be less costly. Some increases in defenses also
probably would be required, if only to complicate US attack planning.
SDI’s Promise.
The Soviets could choose to respond to SDI by deploying missile defenses of their own. Indeed,
“defense of the homeland” is the keystone of Soviet planning. An
effective nationwide BMD system is the
most important defensive “missing link” in their current strategy, which
explains why the Soviets have been conducting their own SDI-type
research.
However, the Soviets do not have a fixation on defense for its own sake.
While they clearly would prefer a world in which only the USSR had effective defenses, the Soviets
almost certainly regard this as unrealistic since the US would respond by deploying defenses of
its own. As pragmatists, they would therefore weigh the risks as well as
the benefits of competing with the US in
an SDI race.
The Soviet SDI
Dilemma. Would the Soviets prefer a situation in which both
sides have nationwide BMD, or in which
there are no such defenses? For the near term—and neither we nor the
Soviets know what they’ll decide over the long term—the Soviets
apparently have chosen the latter. They may have taken this stance for
some of the same reasons they signed the ABM Treaty in 1972: they perceived the US as having a technological lead, and
decided that it was more feasible to limit damage to the USSR by offensive counterforce strikes
(which could be hindered relatively easily by US defenses) than by nationwide BMD (which was essentially impossible).
The Soviets have political reasons for opposing SDI; it plays well as
part of the “peace” campaign, since many see SDI as a major reversal of US strategy and a threat to arms control. Nonetheless,
their position that SDI is dangerous
and destabilizing also is due to the fact that, compared to the present
strategic environment, effective US
defenses—no matter how the USSR
responds—would make Soviet deterrence of the US much more uncertain, and clearly more expensive to
attain. Today, the Soviets can be highly confident that their ballistic
missiles will reach their targets; US
defenses would make this much more uncertain. At the same time, the
Soviets would have crucial doubts about the inherent effectiveness of
their own defenses which would be compounded by US offensive countermeasures. The Soviets would be reticent
to give up a known situation, in which they probably believe they are
doing well, for an unknown “defense dominant” world of increased
strategic uncertainty.
