54. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Weinberger to President Reagan1
SUBJECT
- PEACEKEEPER Basing Options (U)
(U) This letter describes our plan to develop a basing mode proposal for the second 50 PEACEKEEPER missiles. In struggling with this problem of PEACEKEEPER basing over the years we have learned a great deal about what not to do, and we must take advantage of this experience.
(S) The need for the deployment of the second 50 PEACEKEEPER missiles is predicated upon a set of strategic factors that continue to favor the Soviet Union. In the more than two years since your Scowcroft Commission advocated moving ahead with PEACEKEEPER and a small missile deployment, the Soviet Union has increased the numbers of its most modern ICBM warheads, has deployed one new ICBM (SS–X–25), is preparing to deploy a second new ICBM (SS–X–24), and has continued to harden and expand its target base. For the reasons outlined in the Report of the Scowcroft Commission, the United States continues to have a critical military requirement for 100 PEACEKEEPER missiles, complemented in the far term by Small ICBMs. In order to obtain the 100 PEACEKEEPER Missiles required, the Administration is required by the Congress to demonstrate that it can offer a basing mode for the second 50 missiles that provides increased survivability.
(U) Ever since the prospect of a Congressional restriction on the deployment of fewer than 100 PEACEKEEPER missiles arose last June, we have been reevaluating permanent and more survivable basing modes for the PEACEKEEPER missile. In an effort to ensure that sufficient survivability for the second 50 PEACEKEEPER missiles is realized, we have reviewed more than 30 basing modes factoring in three areas of change since the Scowcroft Commission reported their results in April 1983.
(U) First, because of the recommendations of the Scowcroft Commission, the Air Force and the Defense Nuclear Agency have been vigorously pursuing follow-on basing technologies to improve our understanding of nuclear effects and the hardening of structures against [Page 181] nuclear effects. After two years of effort we can confidently say that for reasonable cost, structures can be built that are very much harder than previously projected. These technology advances dictate that we reexamine those basing modes that rely on hardening for their survivability.
(U) Second, our findings, while applicable to developing a small missile in a mobile basing mode, may be translatable to certain mobile options for the larger PEACEKEEPER missile. We are pursuing mobility for the Small ICBM; however, the Soviets have carried matters one step further. They are deploying ICBMs in mobile ground and rail modes. These developments dictate that we reexamine mobile basing modes as possible means of securing additional survivability for PEACEKEEPER.
(U) Third, a major shift in policy has occurred since 1983. As a result of your Strategic Defense Initiative this shift dictates that when we examine fixed and mobile basing concepts, we consider the potential for incorporating a strategic defense to enhance the survivability of the nation.
(S) We will evaluate all candidate proposals on a schedule that could permit a full-scale development decision late next year. Interim reviews have been scheduled in October and December 1985. We will provide progress reports resulting from these reviews this November and in January 1986. If sufficient progress has been made by January 1986, we will recommend intensive research and development of candidate basing modes to begin in Fiscal Year 1987.
- Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Weinberger Papers, Department of Defense Files, Box CL 828, Subject File, 1985 President—Memoranda to #249–332 (6). Secret. A stamped notation on the memorandum reads: “Signer’s copy.”↩