Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLIV, Part 1, National Security Policy, 1985–1988

39. Talking Points Prepared in the Department of State¹

Washington, May 28, 1985

Interim Restraint: Talking Points for Meeting with the President

— Decision on whether to continue to abide by SALT I and II will be one of most important of your Presidency, with major impact on Geneva negotiations and overall US-Soviet relationship.

— Monday’s NSC meeting² is important opportunity to look at the issue in all its aspects, and to air different viewpoints.

— I will be departing for NATO Ministerial after the NSC. Allies have made clear their interest in discussing Interim Restraint issue, and I would like to have opportunity to consult and personally report their views before final decisions are taken.

— In weighing our decision on Interim Restraint, have to balance two competing considerations:

○ On one hand, can’t ignore Soviet violations of certain provisions of SALT I and II, appear to sweep them under rug.

○ On other hand, must take into account adverse military and political consequences of potential unraveling of existing limits.

— Soviet violations are serious, and erode confidence in arms control. Most clear-cut violations of SALT are testing of second new-type ICBM and encryption of telemetry.

— Krasnoyarsk radar also represents gross disregard for spirit and letter of ABM Treaty. While radar is separate from Interim Restraint and should continue to be pursued in SCC and Geneva talks, it is part of larger problem of Soviet non-compliance.

— Clearly, something needs to be done in response. At NSC meeting you will hear full spectrum of views, including recommendation that we end all further observance of SALT limits.

— In my view, however, we must not throw out baby with bathwater.

— Soviets have continued to dismantle systems to comply with SALT ceilings on numbers of launchers (see table). Their increased military threat is due largely to the permissive SALT II limits, not Soviet violations.

— Intelligence Community estimates Soviets could expand to 16,000–19,500 missile warheads by mid-90s if not bound by SALT constraints, or 30–55 percent more than likely if they continued to abide by the SALT launcher and warhead limits.

— We should avoid actions that give Soviets license for a further build-up, while we take blame for scuttling arms control and provide Soviets with major propaganda tool.

— Perception US was abandoning current restraints would cause serious concerns on part of Allies and many in Congress, undercut support for our positions in Geneva. For example, British Foreign Secretary Howe told me it would be difficult to obtain Allied support for SDI if it appeared existing restraints were unraveling.

— On balance, it is in our net interest to maintain existing framework largely intact, as we pursue better arrangement in Geneva. We must, at same time, respond to Soviet violations to maintain our credibility and continue to hold Soviets accountable for their non-compliance.

— I see two realistic courses of action:

— My first choice would be to continue to adhere to the provisions of SALT I and II, and to seek a supplemental defense authorization to accelerate our strategic modernization program as a measured but meaningful response to Soviet actions.

○ This would address current and potential military significance of Soviet violations, deny Soviets pretext for a further breakout from SALT limits, while we continued to press for corrective action to reverse erosion of SALT restraints.

○ The supplemental would need to encompass measures that look beyond the strategic modernization program. Joint Chiefs should decide where additional efforts should be made.

○ We will, in any case, want to press for funding for those programs curtailed by Congress.

— I recognize that it will be extremely difficult to build support in Congress for a supplemental, particularly post-MX.

— My second choice would be to continue to adhere to main SALT I and II provisions, but with certain modifications to offset Soviet violations.

— Specifically, we would remove Poseidon missiles from the active force to stay under the MIRV missile limits, but deactivate rather than dismantle the boats.

— Likewise, we would claim right to an appropriate response to the SS–25. This might entail going forward with Midgetman as a second new-type ICBM. (Paul Nitze also suggests the possibility of proceeding with a Multiple Protective Shelter system, as encouraged by Senator Nunn; this was judged earlier as consistent with SALT II.)

○ This approach might be seen as more direct response to Soviet violations, yet still demonstrate US desire to maintain framework of restraint while Geneva negotiations proceed.

○ It could, however, pose greater risk of an unraveling of remaining limits, if the Soviets selectively abandoned other provisions, or deactivated systems in unverifiable ways.

Attachment

Table Prepared in the Department of State³

Washington, undated

SALT Dismantlements Since 1972

	U.S. Launchers	USSR Launchers
ICBM	18	229
SLBM	128	221
Total	146	450

○ The USSR also has converted 800 launchers of SS–9s and SS–11s into launchers for SS–17s, SS–18s, and SS–19s. Without SALT I the Soviets could have retained the old ICBMs as new ones entered the force.

○ SALT I does not limit heavy bombers. No formal procedures exist for the dismantlement, destruction, or conversion of heavy bombers accountable under SALT II. The U.S. has dismantled 42 B–52s which remain accountable under SALT II. The Soviets have converted 2 Bison bombers to tankers, and deactivated 35 Bisons, which also remain accountable under SALT II.

1. Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, 1985 May 29 Mtg. w/ the PRES. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Vershbow. A stamped notation indicates Shultz saw the talking points. Burt and Chain forwarded the talking points to Shultz under cover of a May 28 memorandum, in which they wrote: “Attached are talking points on Interim Restraint you may wish to draw upon in your Wednesday meeting with the President.” (Ibid.) According to the President’s Daily Diary, Shultz met with Reagan and McFarlane in the Oval Office from 2 until 2:30 p.m. on May 29. (Reagan Library, President’s Daily Diary) No minutes have been found.
2. June 3.
3. Secret.