Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLIV, Part 1, National Security Policy, 1985–1988

262. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union¹

213218.

Washington, July 2, 1988, 0546Z

SUBJECT

• ABM Treaty Review.

1. S—Entire Text.

2. Ambassador should propose to the Soviets that the ABM Treaty review be conducted in Geneva on July 14–20, using talking points in para 3 below.

3.

— Soviet representatives have from time to time sought U.S. views on the conduct of the five-year review required by the ABM Treaty.

— We propose the review be conducted by delegations of senior officials convened for this purpose. The U.S. delegation would be led by MGen William F. Burns, the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. His delegation would include senior representatives of the United States Government.

— The U.S. proposes to begin the review on July 14, 1988, in Geneva, Switzerland, and to conclude the review on July 20. Both the opening and closing dates should be agreed upon in advance. The review would consist of three to five plenary sessions.

— In our view, the review is to focus on compliance concerns, the most important of which are the Krasnoyarsk radar and the ABM radars at Gomel. These issues have been discussed extensively in other fora. The results of the review would depend on whether violations are corrected.

— We expect the Soviet side will come to the review prepared to resolve these violations.

— As the U.S. made clear at the Moscow Summit, the only solution to Krasnoyarsk is to dismantle the radar in a verifiable way.

— Given the subject matter and the timing we suggest for the review, the U.S. proposes that the reconvening of the Defense and Space Negotiations be postponed until shortly after completion of the review.

— The United States further believes that with this meeting of delegations to conduct the ABM Treaty review, there is no need for a meeting of the SCC later this year. The review meeting would obviate the need for the required second session of the SCC this year, and we would be prepared during the meeting to exchange required notifications.

— We look forward to your response.

4. If asked about a joint statement, you should reply that if the violations are not resolved there will be no joint statement, and we would record our concerns in a unilateral statement.

Armacost

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880564–0444. Secret; Immediate. Drafted in the White House; cleared by Timbie, Roger Harrison (PM), Perito, and in S/S and S/S–O; approved by Ridgway.