Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLIV, Part 1, National Security Policy, 1985–1988

260. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Powell) to President Reagan¹

Washington, June 27, 1988

SUBJECT

• Restructuring the SDI Program

At Tab A is an OSD paper outlining a plan for restructuring SDI to: (1) commit us now to develop and deploy space-based sensors; (2) hold open the option for deployment of limited strategic defenses in the early- to mid-1990s; and, (3) place less emphasis on the space-based kinetic interceptor.

The OSD paper is written to present publicly changes Frank Carlucci favors because of Congressional budget cuts and higher than anticipated costs for the space-based kinetic interceptor. Because the paper is written for the public, it does not discuss the full programmatic and policy implications of the proposed restructuring. The issues highlighted below are implicit in the OSD paper, and were raised by earlier drafts of the paper, which were toned down for public presentation.

Sensors. The first element of the proposed restructuring plan, to emphasize sensors, makes sense. We need to improve our ballistic missile early-warning and space surveillance capabilities. Moreover, improved sensors are necessary for any system of effective strategic defenses. Since some of the sensors would be deployed in space, we may also further our objective of moving SDI into space by starting with systems which are clearly benign.

Limited Deployment. The second element of the proposed restructuring, to hold open the option for deployment of limited strategic defenses, is more problematic. Those who favor such a deployment believe it would give us: operational experience; open production lines as a hedge against Soviet breakout from the ABM Treaty; and greater public understanding of and support for the feasibility of more extensive defenses.

SDI supporters who oppose a limited deployment argue that land-based, terminal defenses would divert us from our real objective—comprehensive defenses that can intercept ballistic missiles in their boost phase. Moreover, we would be playing to a Soviet strength because they have long worked to protect what they value (their leadership and military forces) through terminal defenses and deep underground bunkers. Such defenses cannot protect what we value, our society.

Under the ABM Treaty, limited defenses could be deployed at either Grand Forks, N.D. or Washington, D.C. The JCS will support a limited deployment only if it is at Washington. SDIO has suggested, and the OSD paper anticipates but does not explicitly mention, a $5 billion system with 30 interceptors protecting Washington.

Such a system could be overwhelmed by four large Soviet ICBMs. Moreover, even a $5 billion system (an estimate that may well be too low) would delay the day we could deploy more comprehensive defenses by about two years. Even holding open the option for such a deployment would mean spending substantial sums starting next year. Finally, there is the political danger that such a costly system with such limited capability would undermine support for any further strategic defense efforts. We would gain experience, but not with the systems that are critical for comprehensive defenses—i.e., space-based systems.

Less Emphasis on Space-based Kinetic Interceptors. This would entail diverting money from the relatively mature space-based kinetic interceptor, toward directed energy programs, such as lasers. Two factors motivate this proposal: (1) a space-based kinetic interceptor system may cost, $52 billion, for a total cost of $118 billion for a Phase I strategic defense deployment; and, (2) budget cuts have delayed the deployment decision point, giving lasers and other more advanced technologies a chance to catch up with space-based kinetic interceptors.

In the current Defense Authorization Bill, Congress has sharply cut the space-based kinetic interceptor program. Our only recourse would be to veto the bill. Thus, the question may be moot. However, space-based kinetic interceptors will be a necessary part of any comprehensive strategic defense system we may deploy. It is not now clear how large their role should be. General Abrahamson is working hard to bring down their cost; but, unless he is successful, lasers and other directed energy weapons may be our best alternative as the backbone of a system. Even so, as noted above, there is a real question as to whether money should be diverted from space-based kinetic interceptor research toward deployment of limited, ground-based defenses.

Conclusion. The Pentagon is continuing to review its options. I hope to schedule an NSPG meeting next week to give you an opportunity to discuss Frank Carlucci’s proposal with your other senior advisors. We will follow up with a package for your decision.

Tab A

Paper Prepared in the Office of the Secretary of Defense²

Washington, undated

A RESTRUCTURED SDI PROGRAM

The SDI program is vital to U.S. and allied security. As the President has directed, we are moving to provide the Nation with options to deploy a highly effective nation-wide defense against ballistic missiles and to provide our allies with options to deploy such defenses against intermediate and shorter range ballistic missiles. In the nearer term we are providing a hedge against possible Soviet breakthroughs in defense research, and possible Soviet breakout from the ABM Treaty. We are also moving to provide options to enhance deterrence and increase stability through a greater reliance on defenses that could be deployed as we progress toward the President’s long term goal.

The technical progress of the SDI program has been excellent. A large majority of the contracts and experiments are on or ahead of schedule, and the record of testing successes has been outstanding. These accomplishments are a tribute to effective program management and the creative, dedicated efforts of thousands of people involved in the research effort across this Nation and with our Allies. In part because of this progress, poll after poll continues to indicate that the American people are solidly behind the President’s vision of acquiring an effective means of countering a ballistic missile attack. Unfortunately, there is also a negative side to the history of SDI. In the past 5 years, SDI has been the subject of unwarranted criticism, a lack of understanding of the program, dramatically reduced budgets, and the continuing debate on the proper interpretation of the ABM Treaty. These have served to draw attention away from the objectives and progress of the program. Still, most responsible analysts now endorse the research effort at a minimum. Although Congress has repeatedly not provided the full budget requested by the Administration for SDI, it has increased resources each year. This reflects a significant measure of bipartisan consensus on the research aspects of the program.

The SDI program has been hurt by the funding cuts that have occurred. The development of defenses and the date at which possible deployment of defenses could occur have been delayed. The program would be hurt even more by any further cuts. Because of these reductions and other factors, we are taking steps to restructure SDI. We wish to get more from each dollar we spend; we also intend to fight for increased funding.

Last year, the Joint Chiefs of Staff confirmed the long-term goal for SDI research. They also developed the performance requirement for the first major strategic defense deployment step that would provide a militarily useful contribution to deterrence. The requirement for this Phase I Strategic Defense System is based on the reality that ballistic missile defenses acting in concert with our offensive forces can significantly enhance deterrence. This does not mean that a Phase I System would only defend military targets; it does mean that the layered defense concept that is fundamental to SDI will provide much greater assurance that we can prevent a nuclear war from ever starting. Our system architecture work, which dates back to the Fletcher Commission study of 1983, has shown consistently that a multi-layered system concept will provide the best chance of achieving the requisite defense effectiveness to meet the President’s goal.

A principal Department of Defense challenge is planning security programs in the face of reduced military budgets. SDI has had to absorb its share of these reductions along with other DoD programs. That reduction inevitably forces a difficult series of choices—for example, either slow the entire program or maintain the pace on those technologies that are most mature, while slowing other parts of the program.

The pace of SDI was the subject of a recent review by a panel of the Defense Science Board. The panel recommended a series of incremental steps that would build on the program’s progress, with each one providing additional confidence for the next step. These increments would be on the path to the Phase I System which would meet the Joint Chiefs’ initial deployment requirement as well as on the path to the President’s long-term objective of a thoroughly effective defense.

In the context of the above factors, and especially the reduced SDI budget, candidate programmatic adjustments for SDI are being examined. Information to support possible programmatic decisions should be available in two to three months. It should be noted that the research program will continue in accordance with domestic law and U.S. international obligations, including the ABM Treaty. The following program priorities will be the basis for these adjustments:

(1) Continue to emphasize space-based defenses which can destroy missiles soon after they are launched, anywhere on earth. Space-based defenses that can destroy missiles in the boost phase are essential to achieving a thoroughly effective defense. In addition, such defenses provide a means of responding to the challenge to our security presented by Soviet efforts to control space. The technical progress in developing space-based interceptors has been impressive. As we proceed, care must be taken to maintain a careful balance in the allocation of resources between increasingly mature kinetic energy interceptor technologies and the more advanced directed energy concepts which are also making excellent progress in SDI research. In addition, budget reductions and their effect on the overall SDI program require additional evaluation. Consequently, a study is now underway to evaluate the appropriate pace and mix of these technologies. This study will examine each technology’s potential effectiveness, its availability for deployment, and the opportunities it offers to reduce the costs of a deployed system further. This will provide a solid basis for future decisions on the appropriate nature and mix of space-based defense components.

(2) As a first priority in developing specific systems, proceed as quickly as possible to deploy a national sensor system. This system would meet existing requirements for enhanced warning, attack assessment, space surveillance and improved verification of arms control agreements. This system could also provide the basic sensor and communications capability for SDI anti-ballistic missile weapons. The system would be composed of satellites, communications equipment, ground radars and command centers. With sufficient resources, deployment of these sensors could begin in the mid-1990’s.

(3) On the way to Phase I, make the option available for a deployment which would provide limited protection against accidental, irrational or unauthorized ballistic missile attacks. This could also provide a means of dealing with threats from the growing list of countries who are developing or purchasing ballistic missiles that may become nuclear armed. A Limited Protection System (LPS) could serve as an operational laboratory providing important experience and confidence. This system would be part of the terrestrial-based layer of a Phase I architecture. Its deployment could begin in the first half of the 1990’s. The SDI program has made excellent progress on interceptors to counter attacking warheads. These technologies present us with choices from which we may select. A commitment to this deployment, where it would occur and how it would fit with the ABM Treaty, as is the case with the other programmatic adjustments, will be the subject of future decisions.

(4) Finally, the SDI program will continue to move toward the goal of providing the Nation with an effective, nationwide defense that will meet the JCS requirements and satisfy the President’s long-term goals. This will require that we continue to examine ways to reduce the costs of future defenses and ways to overcome responses that might be taken to counter defense effectiveness. Continued real growth in the funding for SDI is necessary to accomplish these objectives.

1. Source: Reagan Library, Robert Linhard Files, Arms Control Chronological File, SDI NSPG, 07/05/88. Secret. Sent for information. Copies were sent to Bush and Howard Baker. A stamped notation indicates Reagan saw the memorandum on July 1. Reagan initialed the memorandum in the upper right-hand corner.
2. Secret.