Office of the Historian

250. Electronic Message From William Cockell of the National Security Council Staff to the Special Assistant to the President and Deputy Press Secretary for Foreign Affairs (Popadiuk) and the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Negroponte)1

Washington, April 27, 1988, 11:29 a.m.

SUBJECT

  • S-C-P Breakfast 04/27: Strategic Forces

Will Taft observed that the Defense bill will be on the House floor today. There are hundreds of amendments, including some aimed at SDI and strategic forces. Some contain language restricting what we could do under the ABM Treaty, essentially taking the Soviet position. George Shultz commented that he “couldn’t help feeling that we had an opportunity in the negotiations . . . if we could identify test ranges—whatever these ideas are—it would make us better off in terms of the negotiations. Things are not going to get better on the Hill in ’89–’90. The House will be about the same.” Colin said it is not at all clear the Soviets are going to sign up to our proposal on sensors. Kampelman said they would have to think about it for a while. Shultz asked Taft how funding is coming along for ICBMs. Taft replied that the Administration had asked for $800m for MX and $200m for SICBM. The House had changed that to $500[m] for each. The Senate authorizing subcommittee had changed the figures to $700m for MX and $50M for SICBM. Exon is very much opposed to SICBM. The sub-committee mark was adopted [Page 901] by the full committee. On the appropriations side, the Senate will probably zero SICBM if it can. Taft went on to point out that the number of missiles we buy in FY–89 is independent of basing mode. We still need the 12 MX we asked for to build up the spares required for testing. That would be true even if we did not go beyond the 50 land-based missiles. The uncertainty about the future of US mobiles doesn’t help us in the START negotiations, Taft pointed out. Shultz observed that “given the increase in accuracy and the vulnerability of fixed base missiles, we have to get mobiles if we are going to have any land-based missiles.” Taft agreed. But the JCS, he continued, fear that Congress won’t give us mobiles, and we will wind up facing the SS–24s and 25s anyway. Colin noted that it is better to constrain the Soviet (mobiles) than to have no constraints on them. Shultz commented that it is unfortunate the country seems to have lost its taste both for arms control and for defense at the same time. Max Kampelman said he had met with the Senate arms control observers group yesterday and Gore had raised the issue of whether we should sign a START agreement before the election. There is some feeling that any conclusion of START before the election would be seen as a partisan act, favoring Bush. This could sour the process (on the Hill). Shultz noted that Dukakis supports a 50% reduction, so any agreement would have a bipartisan flavor to it. Taft said we should go forward with the negotiations, but if we reach agreement, wait to sign it until after the election. Kampelman thought no one would have any problem with that. He went on to say that Pell had asked whether the President shouldn’t invite Byrd and Dole to the summit.2 Colin said we have received a letter3 to that effect—but it’s more than Byrd and Dole. Taft asked whether anyone had told them that’s out of line.

  1. Source: National Archives, PROFS system, Reagan Administration, ID 77896. Secret. Sent through Stevens and Perito. No minutes of the breakfast meeting among Shultz, Carlucci, and Powell were found.↩
  2. Reference is to the May 29–June 1 U.S.-Soviet Summit. Memoranda of conversation for Reagan and Gorbachev’s meetings are printed in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989, Documents 156–163.↩
  3. Not found.↩