247. Electronic Message From William Cockell of the National Security Council Staff to Roger DeKok of the National Security Council Staff and the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Stevens)1
SUBJECT
- S-C-P Breakfast 1/13: SDI
Colin raised this non-agenda item, noting that Abe Sofaer had been tasked2 to render legal opinions on issues relating to space-based kinetic systems, and ground based systems such as ERIS, specifically addressing whether they are based on OPP within the meaning of Agreed Statement D. This request had been based on Defense’s feeling that they needed a definitive judgment, for planning purposes. Frank replied that, as he understands it, there is a committee within DOD which must review all planned testing for compliance with arms control agreements. Taft said that is correct; it operates under USDA. Sofaer had been asked because he is the most experienced in this area. He has asked the counsels in all relevant agencies, including Defense, to provide him an input on this subject, Taft noted. Shultz observed that the issues are very complex in the case of SBI kinetic systems, “which are part traditional and part OPP . . . we can’t say at this point how Sofaer will come out, but we don’t want something negative.” Colin asked when we really need the judgment. Frank replied that the testing would probably occur in 1990, but we need to budget for long-lead items in 1989. Our agreement with Nunn, he continued, is that we can plan, but that there will be no metal bending (without Congressional approval.) Colin asked whether submission of the issue to OSD’s committee shouldn’t be the first step. Taft said he thought that Abe had wanted to do the analysis, rather than have someone else do it. Shultz commented that “this is one of the toughest cases.” Frank said that rather than looking at the issue of KKV/OPP, we should be examining whether we would violate the treaty if we bought long-lead items for testing. (All agreed that simply buying the long-lead material would not violate the treaty.) Colin asked if OSD [Page 889] would take the first shot at the issue, through its compliance committee; and in the meantime we would tell Abe to continue to stand by, but not go forward with his legal analysis at this time. Taft said that Abe would prefer not to complete the work unless we really want it. Shultz asked if somebody would send a note to Abe. Colin replied that he would take that for action. Taft said he would energize OSD’s compliance group. Frank then turned to another facet of SDI, observing that “we’ve always said that early deployment would not be feasible . . . that may not be true . . . ERIS could be deployed and give ABM coverage to almost all of CONUS . . . and there is a good chance it would be treaty compliant . . . this would fit into our Phase I deployment plans.” Taft commented that, under that approach, we would be able to deploy only 100 missiles, however, if we were to remain treaty compliant. Frank said he had asked his people to look into the possibility. The JCS, he continued, had stipulated a requirement for the capability to deal with a small surprise attack in their review of SDI military requirements. The program does not now provide for such capability. Shultz noted that, unlike the Soviets, we have not made a deployment of the type permitted by the treaty. “In R&D, you learn by doing,” he continued. “The Russians have deployed and improved and learned a great deal from that . . . we knocked our program down after spending about a billion on it.” Colin noted that our position has been that if we deployed a ground-based system, we could jeopardize funding aimed at eventually deploying the more important boost-phase system. Frank commented that the system he was talking about would only be good for a small surprise attack . . . “but the JCS say that is a requirement.” Shultz asked if we could deploy such a system while remaining within the SDI funding profile. (No one knew.) Frank said he did not have a firm figure, but he thought the system’s cost would run in the low billions. He has asked his people to look at it. RAND has a related idea, he continued; that is to exempt sensors (from the Treaty). “That would get the Soviets off the Krasnoyarsk hook and let us work with sensors . . .”
- Source: National Archives, PROFS system, Reagan Administration, ID 76077. Secret. Copies were sent to Linhard, DeKok, Nicholas Rostow, Alison Fortier, Rodman, Stevens, Courtney, Steiner, and Tobey. No minutes of the breakfast meeting among Shultz, Carlucci, and Powell were found.↩
- See footnote 2, Document 245.↩