244. Letter From Daniel Graham to Secretary of Defense Carlucci1
It is our understanding that your position on SDI is not substantially different from that of Cap Weinberger. We certainly hope so, since this vitally important program will be stifled by political and [Page 883] bureaucratic opposition if it lacks a strong champion in the person of the Secretary of Defense.
Mr. Weinberger summed up the SDI issue very well in his last press conference: It is simply a matter of whether we are going to deploy or not. He’s absolutely right, of course, and at the Summit, President Reagan made it crystal clear that we will deploy, but included a very vague caveat: “when ready.”
Whatever the term “when ready” means, we can be sure that no system will ever be “ready” to deploy until after a decision to deploy it has been made. Herein lie the crucial decisions on SDI which will have to be made by you in 1988.
There is a fundamental disconnect between “deploy when ready” and a 7–10 year delay in deployment decision which would be imposed by an agreement committing us to non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. This basic paradox can be expected to become the subject of heated debate during 1988.2
The term “when ready” requires clarification. If “ready” means that technology is well enough in hand so that a deployment decision can be made involving only reasonable technical risks, there is quite an impressive array of defensive systems “ready” today.3 In fact, if one wished to finesse the ABM Treaty issue, several of these systems can be combined into “treaty compliant” defenses of enormous strategic value. A 100–200 launcher deployment at Grand Forks of Lockheed’s ERIS or Vought-Martin Marietta’s VM3 system, simple gun-based point defenses of silos and other hard points, and the McDonnell Douglas HOMS anti-tactical missile system for protection of the Central Region of NATO can be ordered deployed without undo technical risk, committing no more than 8 billion dollars over 5 years. Such defenses would provide near-perfect defenses against accidental or rogue attack and a defensive increment to deterrence more than offsetting loss of offensive deterrent forces inherent in the INF and START treaties.
You may have noticed, as we have, that the ramifications of INF and START are changing some previously negative views about the virtues of deployed defenses. For instance, Brent Scowcroft (and colleagues Deutsch and Woolsey) declared in a Washington Post article that a 50 percent cut in our triad was dangerous and would make it imperative for us either to deploy SDI, go to launch-on-warning, or redouble the Midgetman program (their preferred solution.) The ink was scarcely dry when Congress delivered the coup de grace to Midgetman, [Page 884] leaving Scowcroft and company to choose between launch-on-warning and deployed SDI. We have no doubt which they would choose, however reluctantly—SDI.
As a matter of fact, the conviction seems to be spreading in all quarters of strategic thought that INF and START demand an offsetting increase in deterrent strength available from SDI. We see this trend auguring well for SDI in 1988.
Your known talent for restructuring organizations may be a critical asset over the next year. As you are almost certainly well aware, the primary obstacles to a deployment decision on SDI are not technical; they are bureaucratic and political.
Arguably, the greatest of these obstacles is bureaucratic resistance. Without overt and tacit support from within the bureaucracy, the purely political opposition would be far less effective.
Regrettably, the most damaging bureaucratic resistance comes from inside the Department. Such resistance will remain strong until some truly independent agency of DOD is given the mission of actual defense against ballistic missiles. Until that happens, SDI will get lip service from your subordinates, but be abandoned by most when the perpetual issue of resource allocations is raised. In particular, the Services will work hard to ensure that SDI remains “research only,” and that a minimum of authority is granted SDIO.
As you know, Mr. Carlucci, High Frontier has been in the thick of the fight for SDI, and we are supported by a sizable “field army” across the country. If we can be of assistance to you, please let me know. We’ll do almost anything except shut up.
Sincerely yours,
- Source: Reagan Library, Frank Carlucci Papers, SECDEF Carlucci’s Library Subject—1988: SDI [01/01/1988–01/28/1988]. No classification marking. A stamped notation indicates Carlucci saw the letter on January 11, 1988. Carlucci wrote in the upper-right hand corner of the letter: “Ron Lehman, I wish to look into the Eris deployment option. Pls consult with Will + Fred on mtg I had with Cy Weiss. FC”↩
- Carlucci drew a downward-facing arrow in the left-hand margin of this paragraph.↩
- Carlucci wrote and circled “DV” in the left-hand margin beside the first two sentences of this paragraph.↩
- Graham signed the letter “Dan Graham” above his typed signature.↩