Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLIV, Part 1, National Security Policy, 1985–1988

242. Memorandum From the Vice President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Gregg) and the Vice President’s Military Assistant (Mattke) to Vice President Bush¹

Washington, December 2, 1987

SUBJECT

• ABM Treaty and Non-Withdrawal

As we advised you yesterday,² the Summit arms control planners are involved in a compartmented effort considering what, if any, Joint Statement would be appropriate involving the U.S. and Soviet Union in a “non-withdrawal” from the ABM Treaty. Two very different approaches are being considered. The positions have profound implications for the next President. Briefly stated

The first position simply advocates restating our current proposal to pledge non-withdrawal through 1994.

The second proposal, the State position, embodies a much more restrictive regime. It provides for a ten year non-withdrawal period and provides for negotiations during the ten year span to develop a new agreement. HOWEVER, if the two sides do not develop a new agreement (if the Soviets stonewall) parties revert to the ABM Treaty and remain bound by the withdrawal provisions of article XV.

Under the first proposal, a proposal that accurately reflects what we in fact could realistically expect to be ready to deploy, we would retain for the next President the prerogative to complete SDI research and commence deployment of Strategic Defense systems during the mid-90’s.

But if bound by the more restrictive State proposal, we may be agreeing to defer the program long enough to effectively table and kill it. But the really interesting proposition of the State proposal is buried in the revision clause. Most people don’t recognize that Article XV, the withdrawal article, is very cloudy. We have attached the actual language.³ Some legal interpreters posit that it may be virtually impossible to withdraw from the Treaty! Short of proof that our “supreme interests” are jeopardized (by what?) we are bound not to withdraw for an “unlimited duration.”

That is why we recommended yesterday that you support, as a quid pro quo for any non-withdrawal commitment, a clear “commitment to the RIGHT TO DEPLOY strategic defenses upon withdrawal from the Treaty.”

Such a commitment would clear the path for eventual deployment, should a future President find it in the national interest—and retain a clear path for funding during the period of non-withdrawal.

1. Source: George H.W. Bush Library, Bush Vice Presidential Records, Office of National Security Affairs, Donald Gregg Files, Subject File, OA/ID 19852–016, Arms Control [1]. Secret. Gregg wrote in the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum: “Mr. Vice President, this is an important issue. I’ll be going to the NSPG mtg Friday where this will be discussed. Don Gregg.” On the December 4 NSPG meeting, see footnote 3, Document 241. Bush wrote two checkmarks in the upper left-hand corner of the memorandum.
2. See Document 241.
3. Attached but not printed is a copy of Article XV of the ABM Treaty, which states: “1. This treaty shall be of unlimited duration. 2. Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of its decision to the other Party six months prior to withdrawal from the Treaty. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.”