Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLIV, Part 1, National Security Policy, 1985–1988

240. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

SOV M87–20112X

Washington, December 1, 1987

The Soviet Negotiating Position on SDI: The Bottom Line

Summary

There is substantial evidence, even after discounting the obvious propaganda aims of Soviet statements on the US Strategic Defense Initiative, that Moscow has little confidence in the USSR’s ability—at least over the next decade—to compete directly with the United States in space-based defenses. While the Soviets have expended considerable effort on certain weapons technologies that could be employed, they trail in most of the key areas of technology critical to implementation of a reliable operational capability. They are pursuing a number of weapons programs—ASAT systems, improved ballistic missile systems, bombers and cruise missiles—that provide alternative approaches to countering strategic defenses, but there is abundant evidence that they consider large numbers of offensive weapons as a critical hedge against a US surge in strategic defense. So long as that perception persists—and we see no prospect that it will not for the foreseeable future—Moscow’s negotiating strategy will continue, in our view, to link offensive weapons reductions to constraints on strategic defense. [portion markings not declassified]

For now, as START negotiations proceed, the Soviets can show flexibility as to how those limits are formulated. Indeed, for tactical purposes pursuant to agreement on a framework or “key provisions” for a future treaty on offensive force reductions, they may well intimate willingness to accept less than a formal commitment to linkage and specific limits on defenses. Before signing a treaty that actually commits them to implementing offensive reductions, however, we believe they will insist upon clearly defined limits on SDI and upon their right to withdraw from a START treaty if the United States exceeds those limits.² An agreement on strategic arms reductions is a major component of Gorbachev’s political strategy for holding down the growth of military spending while he seeks to refurbish the USSR’s antiquated industrial base. But to agree to large cuts in the USSR’s offensive weapons while the US strategic defense efforts remain unconstrained would make Soviet political leaders vulnerable to charges of jeopardizing the security of the Soviet Union—a political risk that Gorbachev, with all of the other political gauntlets he is confronting, would be unwilling, in our view, to incur. [portion markings not declassified]

The Soviets have a number of programs underway—ASAT systems and ABM weapons, for example—that could be expanded substantially over the next ten years, but as counters to the kind of strategic defense envisioned in the US SDI, such systems would amount at best to stopgap measures. The development of the USSR’s high-technology support industries is crucial for the efficient production of the new, more advanced weapons systems that the Soviets would need to undertake a program with capabilities even roughly comparable to the US SDI. The Soviets would need to advance their research base in many high-technology fields such as electro-optics, microelectronics, advanced sensors, and computer hardware and software. They also appear to need at least ten years or more of industrial retooling to advance their manufacturing capability in such fields. As such technologies mature and become producible, the Soviets could initiate development of some types of systems in the 1990s. Given the protracted development times which such systems would entail, the first operational deployment of a Soviet strategic defense system probably could not occur for an extended period of time. [portion markings not declassified]

A particular Soviet concern is the possibility of early or unexpected US deployments. Moscow has said that the United States might be able to “leapfrog” the normal development process and deploy a strategic defense system before it had undergone testing. According to the US delegation, in the opening round of the Nuclear and Space Talks in early 1985 the Soviets illustrated this point by citing US development of the atomic bomb during World War II. They claimed that the first test of the US atomic bomb was carried out with a mockup and that Hiroshima and Nagasaki were destroyed with prototype weapons that had not completed the development and testing process. This concern, moreover, probably is heightened by Soviet awareness that because of the expense of launching satellites and the difficulty in retrieving them, satellites often are deployed without full-scale testing in space. [portion markings not declassified]

There is abundant evidence that the Soviets consider large numbers of offensive weapons as a critical hedge against a US surge in strategic defense. They have consistently argued that if arms control constraints were to limit the size of their offensive forces available to counter SDI deployments, they would be vulnerable to a first strike. This view was expressed most recently in an interview with the New York Times³ by Chief of the General Staff Akhromeyev, who speaks for the military with Politburo backing on these issues. Akhromeyev specifically linked the Soviet concern over SDI to current START proposals, claiming that reductions of strategic warheads to 6,000 on each side would make it possible in theory for the United States to create an effective nuclear shield. In a December 1986 classified military publication, General M.M. Kozlov, former head of the Soviet General Staff Academy, claimed that the purpose of SDI is to disrupt current (sic: offensive) parity and give the United States an edge. [less than 1 line not declassified] a Soviet official said [less than 1 line not declassified] Soviet agreement to reductions for offensive weapons without limits on SDI would be unilateral disarmament. [portion markings not declassified]

In discussing their need to link strategic offensive weapon reductions to limits on SDI, the Soviets also have expressed concern over the possibility of near term deployment of elements of SDI. [2 lines not declassified] linkage was necessary because in two years the United States could have the lift capability that would enable it to quickly deploy a space-based kinetic kill vehicle. This concern about potential near term US defense deployments also was expressed by Major General Boris Surikov, a former advisor to the Soviet SALT delegation and technical expert on ABM systems. [portion markings not declassified]

Buying Time

So far, the Soviet response to SDI appears to involve only increased funding to research and has not impeded Gorbachev’s industrial modernization program. Over the longer term, however, Gorbachev’s ability to pursue his economic revitalization goals will almost certainly require constraints on the growth of military expenditures. He is unlikely to be able to sustain domestic political support for such constraints if the United States is perceived to be pursuing the kind of unconstrained high technology strategic weapons program for which SDI—in the Soviet view—represents the leading edge. [portion markings not declassified]

Tactical Flexibility . . .

The Soviets know they cannot get US agreement to ban development of strategic defenses and, therefore, they have sought through various proposals to ensure that any US deployment of strategic defenses would at least be delayed for an extended period. They regard agreement on an extended period of continued observance of the ABM Treaty as the most readily attainable means to this end. [portion markings not declassified]

The Soviets’ desire to get at least a framework agreement for deep reductions in offensive forces before President Reagan leaves office may lead them to show greater flexibility on the linkage question in the coming months. Their increasing emphasis on the need for agreement on “key provisions” for offensive force reductions suggests they believe that such a framework agreement would guide the transition to the next US administration. We think they would view achievement of such momentum as preferable to an impasse in efforts to achieve a full-fledged treaty, particularly if they could do so in a way that does not explicitly prejudice their long term position on linkage. [portion markings not declassified]

The Soviets acknowledge that agreeing upon and defining specific limits for allowable activity during the continued observance period for the ABM Treaty is a particularly difficult issue, and they do not expect final resolution in the near term. Soviet officials have stated repeatedly that the development of a list of devices and parameters for testing them in space is highly technical and requires the work of experts, and they probably have low expectations of negotiating such a list before the next US election. Moscow’s immediate objective, therefore, is to obtain US agreement in principle to limit SDI-related activity during the continued observance period. [portion markings not declassified]

General Secretary Gorbachev’s approach at the upcoming summit is likely to be a call only for a political commitment to continued observance of the ABM Treaty with some understanding, not necessarily public, about deployments, deferring until later negotiations on interpretative language or specific limits for SDI-related activity. Indeed, according to the US NST delegation, Soviet Chief START negotiator Obukhov said on November 10 that such a solution is the Soviet goal—agreement not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for ten years, with disagreements about interpretation of the ABM Treaty limits to be discussed in the Standing Consultative Commission.⁴ He also said that the Soviets would insist that any “rude” violations of the ABM Treaty by the United States would free the USSR from the START reductions. [portion markings not declassified]

Soviet public [less than 1 line not declassified] statements indicate that Moscow believes that if the United States agrees to continued observance of the ABM Treaty for an extended period, both the present administration and its successor will be confronted with increasing difficulties in justifying large budget outlays for the SDI program and that the Congress will not allow SDI activities to extend beyond those allowed by a narrow interpretation of the ABM Treaty. Indeed [less than 1 line not declassified] a Soviet diplomat said earlier this spring that SDI has proved to be an empty issue and that whatever part of the SDI program potentially subverted the ABM Treaty would likely be curbed by Congress. Moscow calculates that this would be doubly true if violations of the ABM Treaty also would negate a potential START agreement. [portion markings not declassified]

. . . Toward a Strategic Objective

Despite their near term flexibility in approaching the issue of limits, we judge the Soviets are unlikely to agree finally to implement reductions in strategic offensive forces without a clear and public commitment from the United States as to what SDI-related activity is permitted while those reductions are taking place. They also are likely to insist that there be some agreement on how to oversee observance of any limits on SDI-related activity, either through the Standing Consultative Commission or an analogous body. [portion markings not declassified]

There appears to be a strong consensus in the Politburo and military leadership on this issue. The recent ouster of Moscow Party Secretary Boris Yel’tsin, a strong supporter of Gorbachev, has strengthened the influence of the more conservative members of the leadership—particularly Politburo members Yegor Ligachev, Andrey Gromyko, and Chief of the KGB Chebrikov—who appear to be the chief skeptics of Gorbachev’s arms control policies. [less than 1 line not declassified] there has been some opposition in the Soviet military to Gorbachev’s other arms control proposals—the nuclear test moratorium, verification measures, and troop cuts—and that there is concern that his proposals for strategic offensive and defensive weapons would undermine Soviet parity with the United States. [portion markings not declassified]

1. Source: Reagan Library, Robert Linhard Files, Arms Control Chronological File, Washington Summit Run-Up D&S (Defense & Space) 11/27/1987. Secret; [handling restrictions not declassified]. Drafted in the Office of Soviet Analysis.
2. This memorandum is predictive in nature, and there are alternative views about Soviet strategy over the longer term. One view holds that public and Congressional opposition to elements of the SDI program is so strong that the Soviets would not insist upon clearly defined limits on SDI. [Footnote is in the original.] [portion marking not declassified]
3. Reference is to Bill Keller, “Soviet Marshal Sees ‘Star Wars’ Giving U.S. Edge,” New York Times, October 30, 1987, p. A1.
4. In telegram 11928 from NST Geneva, November 12, the Delegation reported that Soviet negotiator Aleksey Obukhov told Lehman on November 10 that the Soviet Union required “some simple, specific language that provides for a commitment not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for ten years.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D870930–0824)