Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLIV, Part 1, National Security Policy, 1985–1988

237. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs (Holmes) to the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Levitsky)¹

Washington, November 9, 1987

SUBJECT

• Conversation in the Secretary’s Office with Former Secretaries of Defense, et al, October 28, 1987

Participants included the Secretary, James Schlesinger, Melvin Laird, Helmut Sonnenfeldt, James Woolsey, John Whitehead, Paul Nitze, Max Kampelman, Roz Ridgway and myself.

The Secretary set the stage by describing in general terms the content and tone of his recent meetings with Shevardnadze and Gorbachev.² He briefly described the four part agenda and gave somewhat more detail on the state of play with regard to the Geneva talks, CW and nuclear testing. The ensuing conversation ranged across the arms control front and included comments and advice regarding State’s relations with Congress, INF ratification prospects, European anxieties about denuclearization in Europe, U.S. strategic force modernization, ABM Treaty interpretation, and Soviet developments and problems.

Inherent in much of what the visitors said was criticism of the Administration in its management of strategic modernization cum arms control issues, both with Congress (and the informed public) and the Allies. A salient example was Jim Woolsey’s highly critical comment on DOD’s decision to test the Trident D–5 missile with twelve RVs even though the Navy plans an eight RV deployment, at least in the initial years. Woolsey thought that such a test could be disastrous for the United States because SALT counting rules, carried over to START, would mean that the Navy might be limited to as few as eight Trident submarines under a 50% reduction. All the Soviets would have to do to track such a reduced force would be to station a number of fast attack boats around the exit points for our SSBNs. He emphasized that this kind of decision, if carried out, could put strategic force survivability seriously at risk. Moreover, it raises the question as to whether there is a coherent center in the Administration where arms control, force modernization and testing come together.

Mel Laird, Hal Sonnenfeldt and Jim Woolsey all highlighted the dangerous perception that the United States is moving away from nuclear deterrence. Laird cited both Jerry Ford and Henry Kissinger on this point. They decried the experience of the Reykjavik Summit, adding that subsequent trans-Atlantic debate, Presidential rhetoric and inadequate Administration leadership on post-INF deterrence compounded public unease, here and in Europe.

On a more hopeful note, Schlesinger said that INF ratification will probably be achieved, but warned the Administration not to overstate verification capabilities. Congress will live with the verification regime if it is not oversold. The visitors agreed with Kampelman’s point that the use of a scale of numbers in assessing verifiability is misleading, even destructive, and should be eschewed.

There was considerable discussion about U.S. strategic force planning, with Woolsey advocating 50 additional MX rail mobile missiles and 500 SICBMs, with the BM RV balance allowed under a START treaty on SSBN’s. Sonnenfeldt asserted that the D–5 is the only new strategic weapon that enjoys bipartisan support on the Hill. Schlesinger said that the Air Force is not supporting the Midgetman because the MX program is not finished. He emphasized the importance of a coherent Administration position on this question.

Schlesinger said we need an informed article on Administration policy regarding nuclear force modernization, U.S. commitment to Europe, etc., to be placed in a German newspaper. He suggested that Paul Nitze should write it. (Comment: Such an article was tasked to EUR.)

Woolsey asserted that Nunn understood the arguments over the narrow/broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty. Nunn’s fight had to do primarily with Senate prerogatives. Woolsey strongly suggested that the Administration set the broad versus the narrow argument aside. Sonnenfeldt said the only way is to negotiate limits with the Soviets outside the treaty; this would be the best way to protect SDI.

On U.S. relations with the Soviet Union, Sonnenfeldt said Moscow needs expanded economic relations with the United States and increased access to sources of Western financing, including the IFI’s. Sonnenfeldt believes that Gorbachev knows that Soviet forces arrayed against the PRC and NATO are extravagant, that it is possible for them to reduce equipment levels. Sonnenfeldt believes the Administration is in a reasonably strong position, that it has substantial leverage, particularly in view of Soviet regional problems. There is solid bipartisan support for the Administration’s position on Pakistan/Afghanistan. The Soviets are having renewed difficulties in Angola.

Schlesinger said he was impressed by Soviet difficulty in controlling internal forces unleashed by glasnost. Despite their almost mystical belief in high technology, they will continue having trouble competing with the West because glasnost will not unleash entrepreneurial forces.

COMMENT: It is noteworthy that the visitors talked to the Secretary as if he were the Secretary of Defense. When he demurred, they pressed their points, arguing that he is the most authoritative figure in the Administration.

1. Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Files, Executive Secretariat Sensitive (ES) and Super Sensitive Documents, 1984–1989, Lot 92D52, Super-Sensitive Nov 1–16 (1987). Secret; Sensitive.
2. Reference is to Shultz’s October 22–23 meetings in Moscow. Memoranda of conversations are printed in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989, Documents 80–85.