Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLIV, Part 1, National Security Policy, 1985–1988

216. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Carlucci) to President Reagan¹

Washington, February 17, 1987

SUBJECT

• Sharing the Benefits of Strategic Defense

I. WORK IN PROGRESS

You have described to us your thinking about the concept of international control and sharing of SDI. As a result, Ken Adelman has put some of his experts at work to do a “quick look” at the basic concept you have described. The terms of reference paper for that work is provided at Tab A.

This is not the only work in progress on this idea. Last Summer, at your request, we initiated a compartmented, interagency study of options for sharing the benefits of strategic defense. This work was initiated and designed to support the offer made about sharing in your July 25, 1986 letter to General Secretary Gorbachev.² The first phase of the study, called Thresher Rain, dealt with broad options and criteria for judging their viability. The second phase, currently underway, involves evaluating the technical details of the costs, benefits, and risks associated with each of the options for sharing the benefits of strategic defense.

Our current plan is to review both the results of the ACDA short study when it is completed next week and the status of phase II of the Thresher Rain study. We will then decide whether to have the two efforts work together or in parallel, with the aim of developing the most practical concept.

II. A NOTIONAL SYSTEM

A. ELEMENTS

In your presentation of the concept, you laid out certain key elements. We understand them to be the following:

1. You are prepared to “share the benefits” of any U.S. advanced defensive system (or some significant part of that system) with the Soviet Union and others.

2. You would hope we could agree on a mechanism whereby others could also contribute capabilities to this “common defense.”

3. You would be prepared to agree to international or multinational control of such shared defenses.

4. You would like to be in a position to refine this into a specific proposal, framed as a treaty, which you would be willing to sign immediately.

B. DESCRIPTION

To provide a conceptual starting point, we can hypothesize a system like the one described to you by Cap Weinberger in December, using space-based sensors and kinetic energy interceptors.

In principle, the elements of such a system could be controlled by an international body to ensure that the system would fire against all ballistic missile launches, but ignore peaceful space launches. Moreover, at least hypothetically, through test launches and intercepts, the international commission could verify that the system had not been rigged. Under this concept, strategic defense capabilities that would be primarily ground-based and designed to intercept missiles in the mid-course and terminal phases would remain under national control. These arrangements, and others necessary for the international control of defenses, could be codified in a treaty.

C. ADVANTAGES

Such a sharing arrangement could be proposed to try to allay Soviet fears that we intend to use SDI to gain strategic superiority. If they were to be convinced that the system would protect them, it could diminish Soviet incentives to attack the system in the event of crisis. If these objectives were accomplished, it would also improve the chances for a stable transition to a defense-reliant strategic regime.

D. DISADVANTAGES

The primary disadvantage stems from the fact that in order for our offer to be credible, i.e. for international control to be genuine, the Soviets must have (at a minimum) some means of assuring themselves that the system is not rigged. This would likely require Soviet access to the computer programming and other command and control functions associated with the defenses. From this information the Soviets could derive data necessary for developing countermeasures to the system. Such data could also be derived from tests for verification purposes. Moreover, as the system would depend on our 1990s early warning satellite system for guiding interceptors, the Soviets could gain important insight into our launch detection capabilities.

III. RECOMMENDATION

OK NO

____ ____ That we proceed as outlined above coordinating the ACDA and Thresher Rain studies of “sharing.”³

Tab A

Paper Prepared in the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency⁴

Washington, undated

INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF SDI (TS)

Task

The study will examine the concept of international control over SDI, compare it with the Baruch Plan of 1946, and assess its feasibility in today’s world. (TS)

Study Content

1. A concept of international control over SDI would have as its main feature the sharing of SDI (or sharing the benefits of SDI) through an international body that would control and maintain a unified international strategic defense. (TS)

2. Such an approach is analogous to the U.S. Baruch Plan of 1946 for international control of atomic energy for both peaceful and military purposes. The Baruch proposal was not put into practice because of Soviet resistance. The study will review the substance and history of that approach. (TS)

3. The report will then examine the security implications for the U.S. if the Soviets and others were to agree to such a structure, without any change in the Soviet political system or Soviet geopolitical objectives. It will take into account the changes in circumstances since 1946: the proliferation of nuclear technology, the spread of significant military and political threats to the U.S. that come from outside the Soviet Union, and decreasing U.S. control and influence in international organizations. (TS)

4. The report will also discuss likely Soviet, Allied, and Congressional reactions to any such concept—particularly the impact on our current arms control efforts. (TS)

5. The report will conclude by summarizing the key long-term issues and problems associated with pursuing such a concept. (TS)

Schedule

A first draft will be available for review by February 18, 1987. (TS)

1. Source: Reagan Library, Robert Linhard Files, Arms Control Chronological File, SDI—SHARING THE BENEFITS 02/12/1987. Top Secret; Wincey. Sent for action. A copy was sent to Bush. A stamped notation indicates Reagan saw the memorandum on February 18.
2. Reagan’s July 25, 1986, letter to Gorbachev is printed in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986, Document 254.
3. Reagan approved the recommendation.
4. Top Secret.