202. Telegram From the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva to the Department of State1
Geneva, February 2, 1987, 1736Z
1001. For the Secretary From Ambassador Kampelman. Subject: Treaty Interpretation.
- 1.
- Secret—Entire text.
- 2.
- Dear Mr. Secretary:
- 3.
- Here is a copy of a private message I have just sent to Frank Carlucci.
- 4.
- Begin text.
- 5.
- This message relates to the agenda of the Tuesday2 meeting. I believe the underlying issue to be the most important to be faced by the President in the remaining period of the Reagan Presidency. Since it deals with an area where the President has given me a major responsibility, I offer my views.
- 6.
- It would, I believe, be a serious blunder were the President now to abandon his policy of limiting SDI Research to the traditional “narrow” ABM Treaty interpretation, or were he to make a decision now for early deployment. And I speak as a strong supporter of SDI. The subject of when and how to broaden the scope of SDI research should be periodically under review, but it should not be made now in the midst of active arms reduction talks in Geneva that are entering a serious stage. Such a decision now would give the Soviets a wide opening to claim that it was made to destroy the current Geneva talks, just as they were showing greater negotiating forthrightness. This position would, I fear, be shared by a majority in Congress of both parties and would be strongly echoed by most of the press and by our European allies. I would hate to see this inevitable polarization be the dominant theme of the next year. Congressional hearings would involve us all. It is not in the national interest or the President’s. Nor will it produce the SDI funding and support we want.
- 7.
- How can we best support SDI? There is no doubt that its development will require going beyond the narrow into the broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty. Its eventual deployment, once it proves itself to the President and the Congress, will require withdrawing from or amending the ABM Treaty. The President has asserted that the broad [Page 704] interpretation is the legally correct one. There is a strong basis for that conclusion. I support it, but it is contrary to the view presented by the Nixon administration to the Senate during the treaty ratification proceedings and by other administrations, including the Reagan administration. Many outstanding international lawyers have persuaded many members of congress of both parties that the contrary legal interpretation is more valid. Why not find a way to avoid a constitutional crisis and achieve our goals without this controversy? A confrontation now, which I believe to be unnecessary, would lead the Congress to respond with firm legislative restrictions that will curb SDIO and its funding. I work closely with the Congress and I have no doubt of the Congressional effort and it will cross party lines.
- 8.
- My objective in Geneva is to reach a negotiating result with the Soviets which will produce for us 50% reductions in strategic offensive arms and reduce medium range missiles by at least 80%—without paying an SDI price. I believe we can bypass a fruitless and intense debate as to what the ABM Treaty means and permit us to pursue SDI without any restrictions at all on our research effort and with either no or very few restrictions on our testing in space requirements. We should know within six months at the latest whether these objectives are attainable. The President can then decide whether he wishes to accept the results and he will then have my recommendation. Our inability to reach a satisfactory negotiating result, if that should be the case, would then justify a presidential decision to proceed. It is prudent to wait.
- 9.
- The SDI program is a good one. The President’s vision is a clear and correct one. The results will prove themselves. There is no need to be precipitous and preemptive. Our task is not to polarize or be divisive. It is to expand the SDI consensus that began with the President’s 1983 speech and not endanger it. That is the best formula for success. End text.
Kampelman