Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLIV, Part 1, National Security Policy, 1985–1988

149. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs (Holmes) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, October 31, 1986

Mr. Secretary:

You asked for additional materials to counter arguments that the US should move now to deploy terminal ABM defenses using currently available technologies.

Proposals in this area are multiplying. PM is collecting materials on the serious studies in the field. We will keep you informed as we proceed.

Some of the current early deployment proposals would require the US to abrogate the ABM Treaty; their obvious result would be to block further arms control progress. Other proposals are more cautious, merely suggesting a shift in the emphasis of our ballistic missile defense research/development toward activities that would give the US the option of nearer-term deployments as a response in case the Soviets should break out from the ABM Treaty.

The central problem with these proposals is that they would make it impossible to realize the President’s vision of a world in which nuclear weapons are rendered impotent and obsolete, and thus can be eliminated. Any defenses we could deploy now or in the near-term could eventually be overwhelmed by proliferation of Soviet offensive forces—and thus would directly undercut the President’s effort to supplant MAD with a cooperative transition to increased reliance by both sides on strategic defense.

In the past the President has made some mild public statements against early deployments. The President gave repeated assurances to Gorbachev in Geneva and at Reykjavik that the US would not deploy defenses for the purpose of supporting our offensive capability. Deployment of partially effective defenses now would be in direct contradiction to those assurances and would undercut the President’s credibility.

Attached are expanded talking points for your use in countering early deployment proposals. I’ve also attached a summary of the early deployment proposals we have identified thus far.

Sincerely,

H. Allen Holmes²

Tab A

Talking Points Prepared in the Department of State³

Washington, undated

Talking Points

Question: Why isn’t early SDI deployment for point defense in the national interest?

— A unilateral deployment decision would undermine the President’s vision of a world free of nuclear weapons. Indeed, it would go in the opposite direction, helping to preserve the doctrine of deterrence by mutual assured destruction. In so doing, it would seriously damage—perhaps fatally—the possibility of a stabilizing cooperative transition by the U.S. and the USSR to increased reliance on defenses.

— Deployment of partially effective defenses in support of our offensive capability would be in direct contradiction to the President’s repeated assertions to Gorbachev that SDI is not intended to enhance our counterforce capability. Early deployment of such limited point defenses would undercut the President’s credibility in the most blatant manner.

— Though some components for early deployment of ground-based defenses are available, we are years away from integrating them into a survivable weapon system that would be effective against the Soviet responsive threat.

— Any system we could deploy in the immediate future (before the mid-1990’s) would be only marginally better than the Safeguard system we abandoned as inadequate in the early 1970s.

— Such a deployment could easily be defeated by a proliferation of Soviet warheads, given their hot production lines, and could lead the Soviets to add extensively to their offensive forces; this would force us to give up our goal of SDI coupled with offensive nuclear arms reductions, and plunge us into a new arms race.

— The Administration would be blamed at home and abroad for destroying its professed hopes for progress in arms control. Domestic support for defense programs would be eroded; neutralist movement in NATO countries would be strengthened.

— Some proponents claim that early deployments would lay the groundwork for a more complete territorial defense later on. This could only contribute to security and stability if it was done in the context of mutual offensive force reductions and mutual agreement to deploy defenses. Without that context, such deployments would only stimulate Soviet countermeasures that would lead us further from our goal.

— Early deployment is most often advocated by supporters of the President who want to help him achieve his goals. They believe that this initial budgetary and political commitment to defense hardware would build support for fuller defenses later on. They do not realize that their proposals would accomplish the exact opposite of what the President is trying to achieve.

— It is true that as long as we still rely on our offensive deterrent forces, we should protect them; however, for the near term we have opted for cheaper and more stabilizing means of protection, e.g. underwater basing on strategic submarines. The near-term defensive deployment options currently available would be destabilizing, costly, vulnerable, only partially effective, and counter to our efforts to reduce the offensive threat. For the longer term, we have opted for developing effective layered defenses.

— Early U.S. deployments could free the Soviets from ABM Treaty constraints and permit them to expand their deployed defenses, an area where they could exploit over the near-term their advantages in production facilities and operational experience. This would create a prompt strategic disadvantage for the U.S.

— Although the Soviets now have the capability to move toward rapid deployment of a ground-based territorial ABM defense, we have no evidence that they have engaged in the testing and construction activities that would indicate intent to break out of the ABM Treaty in the near term (i.e., within ten years). A U.S. move toward early deployment could push the Soviets in this direction.

— Deployment of defenses based on currently available technologies would tend to freeze designs and inhibit conceptual development. We would risk locking ourselves into obsolescent technology.

— Early deployment of a limited and vulnerable, yet extremely costly (several billions of dollars), ground-based ABM system would siphon away needed funds from SDI efforts to develop effective and survivable strategic defenses utilizing advanced weapons, sensors, and battle management software.

— Deployment in Europe of ATBMs based on previously developed ABM-capable systems (with a view to adapting them subsequently for U.S. continental defense in case of Soviet break-out from the ABM Treaty), as some have suggested, would expose us to charges of ABM Treaty violations, since the Treaty prohibits transfer to other states or deployment outside the national territory of ABM systems or components limited by the Treaty.

— Although some of the early deployment proposals claim to use non-nuclear components, most experts admit that any realistic system in the near term would be dependent on nuclear interceptors for the terminal defense portion and would be effective only for hardened point targets.

Tab B

Paper Prepared in the Department of State⁴

Washington, undated

Early Deployment Proposals

1. William A. Davis, 1986: Deployment within NATO of ATBM defenses based on improved LoADS (Low Altitude Defense System) and Sentry systems, to bring to maturity systems that could later be adapted on short notice for terminal US continental defense if the Soviets broke out of the ABM Treaty. At a later stage the Davis proposal would use Homing Overlay-related technology for late-midcourse US continental defenses. Davis claims early operating capability within two to four years given optimum funding. He believes nuclear warheads would perform better, especially against a responsive threat, but recognizes the political problem they would cause and therefore calls for a nonnuclear system in Europe, backed up by nuclear warheads for possible US continental use later on if necessary.

2. Kemp/Courter October 1986: Not yet reviewed but reportedly calls for ATBM deployments in Europe plus reactivation of the ABM system at Grand Forks.

3. AT&T study, October 1985: Study recommends we hold off deployments to allow new technologies to mature. However, the nearest-term deployment option available would use 1500 nuclear warheads to defend 500 silos. National command authority (NCA) would be defended by 100–200 interceptors. Sentry radar technology would be used. Operations capability for NCA defense FY93, for silo defense FY 95.

4. Recent SDIO study: Not yet reviewed but reportedly recommends against nearest-term options using ERIS (Exoatmospheric Reentry Interceptor System). Instead, calls for mid-90s deployments of ground-based and space-based kinetic kill vehicles as first phase of a full SDI architecture. Reportedly SDIO believes that in order to lay the groundwork for this option we would have to apply the broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty.

5. High Frontier, 1982 (we are trying to obtain October 1986 update): Recommended use of nuclear-armed LoADS (Low Altitude Defense System) or nonnuclear SWARMJET interceptors in ground-based point defense of US silos. DOD spokesmen, including General Abrahamson, have criticized the proposed deployments as costly, ineffective, and vulnerable.

1. Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S–IRM Records, The Executive Secretariat’s Special Caption Documents, Lot 92D630, 1986—October. Secret; Not for the System. A stamped notation indicates Shultz saw the memorandum. Shultz wrote in the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum: “Allen, Pls discuss with Paul N & then let’s talk thru this. G.” A typed transcription of Shultz’s note is dated November 4.
2. Holmes signed the letter “Allen” above his typed signature.
3. Secret.
4. Secret.