Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLIV, Part 1, National Security Policy, 1985–1988

144. Memorandum From the Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters (Nitze) and the Special Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of State (Timbie) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, October 27, 1986

SUBJECT

• Alternative to Elimination of Ballistic Missiles

The Soviets did not agree in Reykjavik to the elimination of all ballistic missiles. They are not likely to agree to this proposal in the future, as they consider such an approach would lead to advantages for the U.S. in bombers and cruise missiles. Rather than go beyond elimination of ballistic missiles to discuss elimination of all strategic offensive forces or all nuclear weapons, we should consider the alternative of reducing by 1996 to a small strategic nuclear force. This paper explores this alternative.

Baseline Proposal

— Reduce from [number not declassified] strategic warheads to [number not declassified] by 1996.

— Reduce the sublimits proportionally (e.g., [number not declassified] ballistic missile warheads).

— Ban MIRVed ballistic missiles.

— Less drastic reductions in SNDVs (e.g. from [number not declassified] to [number not declassified]. This would permit several launchers for each ICBM.

— Eliminate all other nuclear weapons (INF, tactical, naval, etc.).

— Continue the SDI research program; ban all ballistic missile defense deployments, including the Moscow system.

— Permit [number not declassified] warheads each for the British, French, and Chinese.

— Ban chemical weapons.

— Balance conventional forces at reduced levels.

Analysis

There is nothing magic about the [number not declassified] figure. It simply illustrates a small residual strategic force with the same balance of ballistic missile warheads and bomber/ALCM forces as permitted under the [number not declassified] limit. The number could be higher or lower.

The ban on MIRVed ballistic missiles would have many of the benefits of the President’s proposal to ban all ballistic missiles, and would enhance stability. There would be a strong incentive in any event to reduce fractionation at such low warhead levels, and this ban would help to make the small forces survivable.

Keeping the SNDV number relatively high would permit us to keep several silos for each ICBM. Together with a ban on MIRVs, this would permit one option for an inexpensive, survivable ICBM force. Other options such as mobile ICBMs would also be permitted. The result could be stability at a low level of forces.

If the objective is a small nuclear force, it makes sense to make each one highly survivable, highly effective and long range. This leads to the conclusion that nuclear weapons other than the [number not declassified] strategic warheads should be prohibited. For example, rather than permit [number not declassified] battlefield weapons, it would make more sense to raise the [number not declassified] ceiling by [number not declassified]. In addition, most battlefield weapons are vulnerable to preemption. Verification would be difficult, but the [number not declassified] permitted warheads would serve as a hedge against cheating.

It would not make sense to permit deployment of SDI at these low levels. Advanced defense could probably call into question the effectiveness of a force of a few hundred ballistic missile warheads. In addition to a ban on all ballistic missile defense deployments, the ballistic missiles we deploy would probably employ penetration aids, including maneuvering RVs, to enhance confidence in their effectiveness (e.g. against advanced air defenses). Continued research would be important to preserve the option for deployment, and Soviet incentives to agree to and implement the reductions.

The British and French will probably accept a level much lower than the U.S. and USSR; the Chinese may not. The Soviets would want to count the British and French warheads against the U.S., and the right to offset the Chinese. Near-nuclear nations will need to be discouraged from joining, as the reductions lower the price of admission to the major league. Resolving this third country problem is likely to be a very difficult negotiating problem.

Such reductions would need to be accompanied by moves to improve the conventional balance, including both Soviet reductions and NATO improvements.

Such an agreement would be consistent with the goal of eventual elimination of all nuclear weapons. It would be a major step in that direction, both in terms of reducing weapons and creating conditions in which we can reduce reliance on nuclear weapons. [1½ lines not declassified]. They would give future leaders the option to retain a small deterrent force, or continue reductions to zero, or move to greater reliance on defenses.

Representative U.S. Force

[3 lines not declassified]

[1 paragraph (3 lines) not declassified]

The agreement would permit deployment of ALCMs, but the counting rules would discourage ALCMs in favor of bombers carrying bombs and short-range missiles.

1. Source: Department of State, Ambassador Nitze’s Personal Files 1953, 1972–1989, Lot 90D397, 1986. Secret; Sensitive. A stamped notation in the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum indicates Shultz saw it. Pascoe initialed the memorandum and wrote “10/30.”