Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLIV, Part 1, National Security Policy, 1985–1988

130. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

SOV–M–86–20076X

Washington, August 28, 1986

Soviet Proposals to Restrict SDI Activities [portion marking not declassified]

Summary

Since the Geneva Nuclear and Space Talks opened in March 1985, the Soviets have sought to ban the development of space-related weapons. At the outset they proposed that such a ban should include scientific research and apply to all “space-strike arms”—a term the Soviets use to cover all space-based weapons as well as earth-based weapons capable of striking orbital objects in space. There is evidence, however, that over time the Soviets became convinced that their position calling for a ban on scientific research was politically ineffective. Research on space-based weapons was not prohibited by the ABM Treaty, and the idea that scientific work and technology development should be banned lacked political credibility in the West. [portion marking not declassified]

In a proposal made during the spring 1986 session of the talks, the Soviets omitted any reference to “scientific research” and changed their approach on restricting weapons development activities. They proposed that the United States and the USSR agree to “strengthen” the ABM Treaty and to this end tabled a series of proposed definitions for terms related to space-based weapons. Their proposal allowed each side to conduct research to develop technologies for space-based antiballistic missile (ABM) weapons up to the point of construction of mockups or models of such weapons or their components. The Soviets also proposed separate bans on antisatellite weapons and space-based weapons capable of hitting targets in the atmosphere or on the ground. [portion marking not declassified]

Taken together, the latest Soviet proposals still encompass the activities that would have been affected by the comprehensive ban on space-strike arms that Moscow had called for earlier. Moreover, despite claims by the Soviets that their proposal to strengthen the ABM Treaty represents a concession allowing US research activities, their proposed definition of development proscribes the same activities that earlier they had sought to ban—the construction and testing of mockups and models of space-based ABMs. [portion marking not declassified]

We believe that the Soviet definition of the boundary to be drawn between permitted and banned activities is derived from the Soviet weapons development process. This is particularly evident in the use by Soviet negotiators of specific Russian-language terms to distinguish between permissible and banned weapons development activities: these terms have precise meaning and content in the Soviet weapons design process. There are some ambiguities in the negotiating record that can be interpreted as Soviet efforts to curtail development activities for space-related weapons systems far short of the physical construction of mockups or models of specific weapons or components. For the most part, however, these ambiguities appear to stem from efforts by Soviet negotiators to describe phases of the US weapons development cycle using Soviet terms which are not analogous in meaning in the US and Soviet weapons development process. [portion marking not declassified]

Since the President’s March 1983 announcement of the Strategic Defense Initiative, Moscow has been calling for a ban on all space weapons. The first Soviet SDI-related arms control initiative was announced by then General Secretary Andropov in August 1983. He proposed a multilateral treaty to prohibit the use or threat of force in, to or from space and announced that the USSR would not be the first country to put ASAT weapons in outer space. The second Soviet initiative came in a June 1984 Soviet Government statement proposing space weapon talks with the United States and a bilateral moratorium on ASAT tests. A US counterproposal to discuss ASAT limitations and to resume START and INF talks was rejected by Moscow. At a meeting between Secretary Shultz and then Foreign Minister Gromyko in January 1985, agreement was reached to begin nuclear and space talks (NST) in March 1985. [portion marking not declassified]

Banning Research

In a press interview held soon after his meeting with Secretary Shultz, Gromyko indicated that the activities on which Moscow would seek constraints included research. He rejected the US demand to continue SDI research but acknowledged the difficulty of verifying a ban on such research, particularly—as he put it—the preparation of papers inside a laboratory. He noted, however, that testing areas usually are located next to laboratories and suggested that the Soviets might propose a ban on research beginning with verifiable outside testing activities. [portion marking not declassified]

In the opening two NST rounds, held in March-April and May-July 1985, the Soviets introduced a proposal that called for banning the “development (including scientific research), testing and deployment of space-strike arms” and destroying any such systems already in existence:

— Development was defined as any kind of activity, including scientific research and experimental design work, that leads to the testing and deployment of space-strike arms and their components.

— Space-strike arms were defined as all space-based weapons and those land-, sea-, or air-based weapons capable of striking orbital objects in space. [portion marking not declassified]

Soviet negotiators offered inconsistent descriptions of the kind of research activities they were proposing to ban. We believe this resulted at least in part from an attempt to characterize the stages of the US weapons development process and the products of these stages in terminology derived from their own process, which involves a somewhat different sequence of activities. For example, early in the negotiations they used the term “eksperimental’nyy obrazyets” (experimental model) in defining what they proposed to ban. This term usually is associated with research work done in Soviet scientific institutes where devices often must be constructed to demonstrate the feasibility of a technology or a weapon concept. However, when the Soviets sought to describe in detail the stage when their ban would begin, they said it would begin “when the design principles and technical features of future space-strike weapons take place, and the mockups, models, and experimental models of the weapons and their components are produced.” With the exception of “experimental model,” these terms are usually associated by the Soviets with the development of weapons that have been approved for future production and deployment, which in the Soviet system is done in weapons design bureaus, not research institutes.² [portion marking not declassified]

In discussions held outside plenary sessions, it frequently appeared that the Soviet negotiators were not confident about or familiar with the terms used in the formal presentation of their proposal. What emerged from their statements, however, is an understanding that the key distinction was between basic or exploratory research and goal-oriented or “purposeful” research. Basic research was not necessarily related to weapons development, they said, and exploratory research, even though it might include testing the feasibility of applying particular technologies to weapons use, was not directed toward developing a specific weapon system. Purposeful research, on the other hand, was described as work aimed at creating specific types of arms for production and conducted under instructions and contracts issued by and concluded with the military. It was this kind of research activity, they said, that the United States was conducting and that ought to be banned. [portion marking not declassified]

This Soviet definition of the line to be drawn between permissible and banned activities appears to be based on the Soviet process for developing weapons. In the Soviet process, mockups are the first exemplars of a weapon system or component for which full-scale development has been approved. They are intended to test the validity of its design and its ability to operate according to military specifications. (See figure 1,³ attached, for a diagram and description of the phases of the Soviet process.) By contrast, in the United States construction and testing of mockups of weapon systems or components often occur before the weapon design has been selected and before full-scale development has been approved. (See figure 2⁴ for a comparative description of the major phases of the US and Soviet weapon system acquisition processes and figure 3⁵ for a brief description of Program 6 of the US Defense Program.) [portion marking not declassified]

The Soviets linked their proposed ban on research activities to verification requirements, stating that they wished to address US concerns about verification and that the tests of mockups and experimental models that take place outside a laboratory could be observed by national technical means (NTM). By making this linkage, they seemed to be suggesting that although they wished to ban inside design, construction and testing of mockups and models, they would be willing to accept a ban that began only at the stage of their outside testing. [portion marking not declassified]

The most authoritative statement made about the Soviet position on research was made by General Secretary Gorbachev in a TIME magazine interview conducted in late August 1985. His statement on what areas of research ought to be banned did not differ in substance from what the Soviets had been presenting at the Geneva talks. It probably was made to counter US press statements that the USSR was proposing to ban all research, including basic research. In response to a question claiming the Soviet Union was proposing to stop all research, he said:

When we speak about research and the need to ban it, we naturally do not mean fundamental sciences. This research is going on and, obviously, will continue. What we speak about is development projects in the United States carried out under assignments and contracts from the Pentagon; moreover, about those which have reached a point when there are bound to appear models and experimental prototypes and when out-of-laboratory, field experiments, and tests are to be conducted—in short, when everything necessary for the subsequent stage of designing and producing appropriate systems is being done. When the United States asks us if it is possible to verify compliance with an appropriate ban, we say it is. Verification with the help of national technical means is possible at the stage I have just described. If we now can discern car license plates from space, we will most certainly be able to monitor out-of-laboratory, field tests. The main point here is that if the process is stopped in the initial phase of the so-called research, any interest in the subsequent stages of the development of space weapons will evaporate. (Pravda, 2 September 1985.)

According to US Embassy reporting from Moscow, a few days after he talked with the Time editors, Gorbachev complained to visiting Senators Byrd and Thurmond that the Soviet proposal to ban SDI research had been exploited by the White House, Congress and the US press:

You say that one cannot verify what is inside a scientist’s brain when he fiddles with equations or studies problems in space. This is one side of the question. I am told there may be a terminological problem here. We call this “fundamental” or “basic” research. But as soon as this kind of work goes beyond the walls of the laboratory and involves the fashioning of scale models and mockups and the handing out of military contracts, verification is possible. So it is possible to verify the research stage. We therefore emphasize the need for a ban on the design stage of research. [portion marking not declassified]

Suggestions of a Revised Approach

Toward the end of the second NST round, the Soviets seemed increasingly concerned that their position calling for a ban on scientific research lacked political credibility. After all, “research” on space-based weapons was not prohibited by the ABM Treaty, and the idea that scientific work should be banned lacked political appeal in the West. In addition, they probably were concerned that a broader interpretation of the ABM Treaty was under consideration in the United States which, if accepted, would clear the way for extensive testing of SDI weapons. In what was probably an attempt to influence US deliberations on the ABM Treaty, Soviet officials began to call in public for a reaffirmation of the ABM Treaty and to hint in private comments that Moscow was adjusting its position on SDI research. [portion marking not declassified]

In both an informal conversation at the negotiations and in other discussions involving Soviet diplomats who expected their remarks to reach US officials, Soviet officials began implying that the removal of Gromyko from the Foreign Ministry would result in a change in Moscow’s position on banning research. On 5 July, three days after Gromyko was replaced as foreign minister, General Secretary Gorbachev issued a letter to the Union of Concerned Scientists that called for a reaffirmation of the ABM Treaty and—for the first time in an official Soviet statement on this subject—omitted the call for a ban on scientific research. [portion marking not declassified]

Despite the fact that in the negotiations the Soviets continued to call for a ban on research, there is evidence that Moscow was reconsidering the wisdom of continuing to pursue this line. [less than 1 line not declassified] during the summer of 1985 indicated Soviet officials were hinting that Moscow was considering a proposal which would call for a ban on research and new verification measures. For example, [1½ lines not declassified] banned included some that would have to be verified by “expanded means of verification.” [less than 1 line not declassified] the USSR would be open to expanding verification to include an enlarged realm of open telemetry, on-site inspections and even joint missions in space using the US shuttle and Soviet space stations. [less than 1 line not declassified] the Soviets wanted to ban research that leads to prototype vehicles and testing and that such a ban could be verified by on-site means if necessary. Other reports suggested the Soviets were considering a strategy that included revising the ABM Treaty as a way to constrain SDI:

— [less than 1 line not declassified] the Soviets were considering a proposal that would combine a loosening of the ABM Treaty restrictions on terminal ground-based ABM defenses to allow the use of advanced technology with a strengthened ban on all space-based weapons, including those for ABM defense, antisatellite missions, and space-to-earth systems.

— [less than 1 line not declassified] the Soviets would agree to changes in the ABM Treaty to allow research, development, testing and deployment (at two sites) of ground-based kinetic-energy and directed-energy ABM weapons, but that for space-based weapons only research would be allowed. [portion marking not declassified]

Changing Tactics

These hints of a different approach were followed by a series of tactical moves made by the Soviet delegation during the third and fourth rounds. At the third NST round, which was held in September-November 1985, the Soviets continued to pursue their proposal for a ban on all space-strike arms, but they also called for an ASAT ban, which they depicted as a “partial measure” leading to a comprehensive agreement. This was the first time the Soviets had broken out an idea from their comprehensive proposal. In informal discussions, the Soviets also suggested consideration of General Secretary Gorbachev’s call for a reaffirmation of the ABM Treaty. By differentiating among types of weapon systems, the Soviets seemed to be suggesting that discussions could proceed at different rates in different areas. [portion marking not declassified]

A further adjustment in Moscow’s position came in response to a US “open labs” proposal made during the third round. The United States had proposed to permit mutual inspection of US and Soviet space weapons research facilities to provide opportunities to resolve differences in perceptions of each side’s research. In an effort to turn the US proposal to Soviet advantage, Gorbachev announced at the conclusion of the Geneva summit in November 1985 that the USSR would agree to open its laboratories for on-site inspection, but only to verify an agreement banning an “arms race” in space. (Moscow has long held that verification measures must be directly linked to the arms control provisions they are meant to verify.) [portion marking not declassified]

During the following round of talks, which was held in January-March 1986, Soviet negotiators in Geneva formally stated that they were now proposing—in addition to banning out-of-laboratory testing—to ban the “appearance” of mockups and test models of components of space-strike arms, and they claimed that the opening of laboratories would allow verification of this ban. One Soviet negotiator explained that the Soviets were proposing to open laboratories to verify whether mockups or test models had been built. In putting forward this position, the Soviets used terms that are associated only with work conducted on the development of weapons in design bureaus, not with research conducted in scientific institutes. [portion marking not declassified]

There are two noteworthy points about this position. It is more restrictive than that taken by the Soviets during 1985, when they had indicated they wanted to ban mockup construction and testing inside laboratories but would settle for banning outside activities verifiable by NTM. Also, the lack of any mention of terms associated with Soviet scientific research work suggests that the Soviets were not seeking to ban “research” prior to the physical construction of mockups of weapons or weapon components. [portion marking not declassified]

Soviet negotiators also continued to pursue other approaches to constraining SDI research. In contrast to calling for a reaffirmation of the ABM Treaty, Soviet negotiators now called for strengthening the ABM Treaty, suggesting that they were looking for something more than a statement of continued adherence with the treaty obligations. They also offered for consideration a proposal to prevent the appearance of what they called “offensive space arms,” which they defined as all space-based arms capable of striking targets in space or from space. Specifics of these proposals, however, were not tabled during the round. [portion marking not declassified]

Most Recent Soviet Position

During the fifth round, held in May–June 1986, the Soviets proposed that the United States and the USSR strengthen the ABM Treaty by agreeing not to withdraw from the treaty for a period of 15 to 20 years, to comply with all obligations contained in the treaty (including bans on “large-scale” ABM systems and on the development, testing and deployment of space-based systems and components) and to agree on definitions of key terms “to avoid difficulties in understanding the treaty provisions.” In this proposal they dropped the term “scientific research” from their description of what would be banned and suggested the following definitions:

— The obligation not to develop space-based ABM systems or components, they said, would mean banning the construction and testing of mockups and test models of space-based ABM systems or components inside or outside of laboratories.

— A component would be understood to mean any space-based device capable of being part of an ABM system and capable of being used for tracking strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, guiding kill systems toward them, or actually destroying them.

— A mockup “could” mean a simplified version of a weapon being developed that is used to check out the operational characteristics of the weapon design.

— A test model (a term the Soviets said could be considered virtually synonymous with the US term prototype) “could” mean a device that is exactly like the actual weapon being developed and that is used to verify the operational and design specifications of the weapon.

The proposal calls for each side to use NTM to monitor whether mockups or test models of space-based ABMs have appeared outside the laboratory for testing and to open relevant laboratories to allow the other side to verify that no work on the construction of mockups or test models of such systems or components is being conducted inside. [portion marking not declassified]

In informal discussions Soviet negotiators admitted that there were ambiguities in the proposed definitions. They stated that none of the proposed definitions were final Soviet positions and that they should be considered as “guidelines” for discussion. The use of “could” in the definitions for mockup and test model may indicate that the Soviets are relatively less certain about the definitions they have assigned them. Their definition of “component,” on the other hand, seems more clearly to reflect Soviet concerns and negotiating objectives. The Soviets acknowledged that the only components defined in the ABM Treaty were those of systems existing at the time the treaty was signed and not those of systems based on other physical principles. They said they had concluded that a clearer definition of space-based ABM components was required because it is not apparent what part of a space-based ABM system would replace an ABM interceptor, radar or launcher, that they wanted to make the definition specific to new technologies, and that the term “component” would refer only to major elements. [portion marking not declassified]

In dropping the phrase “including scientific research,” the Soviets made a major tactical shift in pressing their proposed ban on development. This change was a logical accompaniment to their new focus on the ABM Treaty, which uses the word “development” in describing limitations and does not mention research. Soviet officials have sought to portray this shift as a significant concession, asserting they have dropped their proposed ban on research. As in their previous proposal, however, their definition of development would begin with the construction of mockups or models inside or outside laboratories. [portion marking not declassified]

The Soviets proposed two other agreements. One would prohibit the development, testing and deployment of space-based weapons capable of hitting targets in the atmosphere or on the ground, and the other would ban ASAT systems and ensure the immunity of satellites. Taken together, the three proposals reflect the same goals that Moscow has been consistently pursuing since the opening of NST:

— They cover all of the weapons included in the Soviet proposal to ban space-strike arms.

— The constraints on the development process remain fundamentally the same as they sought in their original proposal. [portion marking not declassified]

The Soviets also tabled a new initiative on offensive strategic arms reductions and linked it to US agreement not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for 15 to 20 years. Although they made it clear that agreement on non-withdrawal would imply full compliance with all treaty provisions, it was unclear whether they would also insist on agreement on definitions of the sort they have proposed in urging the strengthening of the ABM Treaty. Two Soviet negotiators have said in informal conversations that agreement on definitions of terms that are aimed at limiting SDI activities is not required for this option. General Secretary Gorbachev’s 16 June statement at a Central Committee meeting on the new Soviet approach, however, suggests a linkage between the two. He linked reductions in offensive nuclear arms to agreement on non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty for 15 years and to limiting work in the field of SDI to the level of laboratory research—a level which he said the United States has already actually approached. Although this proposal does not call for specific limits on space or ASAT weapons, the Soviets could claim that US research and development activities in these areas were aimed at circumventing ABM Treaty restrictions. [portion marking not declassified]

The Soviets have not proposed changes that would affect the ABM Treaty provision that allows research, development and testing of ground-based ABM weapons or components based on new physical principles. Therefore, implementation of the Soviet proposals to strengthen the ABM Treaty or to agree not to withdraw from it for 15 to 20 years would:

— Permit both sides to continue work up to deployment in an area of relative Soviet strength, pursuing advanced ground-based ABM technologies, including those based on exotic technologies, and conducting activities such as the construction of the laser facility at Saryshagan, which potentially could have ASAT applications.

— Stop US SDI activities at the point when mockups or models of space-based ABM systems or components are constructed and tested either inside or outside a laboratory. [portion marking not declassified]

1. Source: Reagan Library, Sven Kraemer Files, Geneva—D&S—July/Aug 1986. Secret; [handling restrictions not declassified]. Prepared in the Office of Soviet Analysis with contributions from the Office of Scientific and Weapons Research.
2. Similarly, in the Soviet weapons development process, the stage referred to as the “design” stage is when mockups of actual weapons are built to production specifications. In the United States, however, “design” generally denotes a much earlier stage of research on weapons concepts. [Footnote is in the original.] [portion marking not declassified]
3. Attached but not printed.
4. Attached but not printed.
5. Attached but not printed.