Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLIV, Part 1, National Security Policy, 1985–1988

128. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Poindexter) to President Reagan¹

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

• Interim Restraint Policy

Issue

Whether you should sign the attached National Security Decision Directive (NSDD)² summarizing U.S. interim restraint policy and requesting an interagency study on its further development and implementation consistent with our objectives and our proposal in the START negotiations.

Background

In June, 1985, you decided to go the extra mile with the SALT I and SALT II agreements in order to give the Soviet Union adequate time to join us in an interim framework of truly mutual restraint by: (1) correcting its noncompliance; (2) reversing its military buildup; and (3) negotiating seriously in Geneva. On May 27, 1986 you decided that in view of Soviet failure during the preceding year to allay our concerns and to make progress in these three areas, the United States would base future U.S. strategic force decisions on the magnitude of the threat posed by Soviet forces and not on standards contained in the SALT structure, which was being undermined by continued Soviet noncompliance, and which involved two agreements that had expired and, in the case of SALT II, were unratified.³ You indicated that while the United States would remain in technical observance of the terms of the SALT II Treaty for some months because of two Poseidon submarine retirements this summer, you intended later this year to continue deployment of U.S. heavy bombers with cruise missiles beyond the 131st aircraft without dismantling additional U.S. systems as compensation under the SALT II Treaty.

At the same time, you urged a priority focus on achieving an equitable and verifiable agreement on significant reductions in U.S. and Soviet nuclear arms. While pledging utmost U.S. restraint, you invited the Soviet Union to join us in an interim framework of truly mutual restraint pending achievement of such an agreement. In addition, as matters of unilateral restraint, you indicated that, assuming no significant change in the threat we face, the United States will not deploy more strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (SNDVs) or strategic ballistic missile warheads than the Soviet Union.

At the Special Session of the U.S.-Soviet Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) held in Geneva at the end of July, the Soviets asserted that they were in full compliance, rejected your call for an interim framework of truly mutual restraint, and characterized as unfair your position on SNDVs and strategic ballistic missile warheads. Meanwhile, the Congress, in particular the House, is seeking to impose SALT limits on the United States through legislative fiat.

Discussion

In light of the above considerations and as we approach major U.S.-Soviet meetings this fall, we need to consider more specifically how future U.S. restraint, and the interim framework of truly mutual restraint we have proposed, can be developed and implemented in a manner consistent with established policy guidance and supportive of our objectives and our approach in the START negotiations.

Accordingly, as we seek Soviet correction of their noncompliance and a reversal of their strategic arms buildup, we also believe it helpful to have a study prepared on possible interim limitations on strategic arms, including limitations that might be drawn from SALT and some that might be new, consistent with U.S. policy and with the START negotiations. The NSDD attached for your signature at Tab A summarizes established U.S. interim restraint policy and requests preparation of such a study through the Arms Control Support Group by mid-September.

Recommendation

OK NO

____ ____ That you sign the National Security Decision Directive at Tab A.⁴

1. Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR–093, NSDD 236. Secret. Sent for action. Prepared by Kraemer and Linhard. Reagan initialed the top of memorandum. An unknown hand wrote on the NSC routing slip for the memorandum: “date NSDD & JMP’s outgoing memo 8/25 per RBM.” (Ibid.) Reagan was at Rancho Del Cielo from August 16 to September 7. (Reagan Library, President’s Daily Diary)
2. Printed as Document 129.
3. See footnote 8, Document 109.
4. Reagan approved the recommendation.