Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLIV, Part 1, National Security Policy, 1985–1988

106. Memorandum From the Vice President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Gregg) and the Vice President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Watson) to Vice President Bush¹

Washington, April 22, 1986

SUBJECT

• President’s Tentative Decision on Interim Restraint

Attached is the April 18 memo² from John Poindexter to the President and the draft NSDD on interim restraint consultations. The very damaging leak to Associated Press yesterday started the cavalcade towards the New York Times and Washington Post stories this morning. Larry Speakes was forced yesterday afternoon to respond even before Ambassadors Nitze and Rowny had a chance to consult with allies and to hear their views.

The President’s tentative decision is to continue for the time being our “no undercut” policy by dismantling and destroying two Poseidon submarines, but also deciding now and serving notice now that in November the United States will exceed the SALT II limit of 1320 MIRVd systems.³ In John’s memo to the President he clearly states that neither Shultz nor Weinberger will be happy with the decision, but sees it as the “best, most prudent course under the circumstances.”

The President’s tentative decision is about as clear a statement as could be made that he has now decided where the end of the “extra mile” will be—November/December 1986. It is also clear that the President’s patience with Soviet behavior has run its course.

Why this decision now?⁴

— In June, 1985, the President decided on the “extra mile” interim restraint policy.⁵

— Soviet violations continue with little abatement.⁶

— No effort by the Soviets to come back into compliance.⁷

— Some of their violations, such as the SS–25 single warhead mobile are irreversible. (Though at the same time, the Soviets deny that they have violated what we cite as examples.)⁸

— Because we have two submarines available now for D&D, we can continue our “no undercut” policy (N.B., not the same as abiding).

— Come November, the Soviets will have had one and a half years to make the effort to return to compliance;⁹ have had seven months notice of our intent. But, most importantly to the USG decision-making structure—we will have no submarines or other MIRVd systems available to trade for the 131st ALCM heavy bomber. (A side comment: This could put the test to the JCS to see how they would resolve having to cut up perfectly good systems for the 131st AHB if the President were to reverse this decision.)

— We need Congressional support now for continuance of the President’s Strategic Force Modernization Program.

In reality, it will be very difficult, if not impossible, for the Soviets to return to compliance. Thus, the President’s tentative decision makes it a foregone conclusion that we will go beyond the SALT II limit of 1320 MIRVd systems.¹⁰

Given that the Summit meeting with Gorbachev appears to be slipping to the end of the year, our policy announcement now lets the implications soak in both here, abroad, and with the Soviet leadership. Does it endanger the Summit? Doubtful—the Soviets will scream and kick, but Gorbachev needs the Summit for domestic political reasons.¹¹

One could read into the decision that the President has decided against Weinberger’s views.

Finally, I would think there is some possibility that we will take flak for commissioning yet another study on ICBM requirements and their basing. The truth is DOD has been unable to get its act together over the years on an ICBM requirements policy and this is yet another attempt by the White House to flush out a recommendation. In asking DOD to study requirements for Minuteman-like mobile MIRVd ICBMs, we will at some point have to consider walking back the U.S. November 1985 START negotiating position banning mobile MIRVs.¹²

1. Source: George H.W. Bush Library, Bush Vice Presidential Records, Office of National Security Affairs, Sam Watson Files, Country File, OA/ID 19865–020, Arms Control–Interim Restraint. Secret; Sensitive.
2. Not attached. See Document 105. Also not attached are the Associated Press story and Speakes’s Statement.
3. Bush underlined much of this sentence.
4. Bush underlined “Why this decision now?”
5. Bush wrote a checkmark in the left-hand margin beside this point.
6. Bush wrote a checkmark in the left-hand margin beside this point.
7. Bush wrote a checkmark in the left-hand margin beside this point.
8. Bush placed a checkmark in the left-hand margin beside this point.
9. Bush underlined this clause.
10. Bush underlined this paragraph. An unknown hand wrote an X in the left-hand margin beside it.
11. Bush underlined the last two sentences of this paragraph. An unknown hand wrote a checkmark in the left-hand margin beside it.
12. Bush underlined the last two sentences of this paragraph.