Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLIV, Part 1, National Security Policy, 1985–1988

104. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Poindexter) to President Reagan¹

Washington, April 18, 1986

SUBJECT

• U.S. Interim Restraint Policy

ISSUE

What should be the content of the consultations with our Allies and the Congress on a tentative U.S. interim restraint policy?

BACKGROUND

In 1982, on the eve of the Strategic Arms Reductions Talks (START) and in order to foster an atmosphere conducive to serious negotiation, you decided that the United States would not undercut the expired SALT I agreement or the unratified SALT II agreement as long as the Soviet Union exercised equal restraint. Last June you decided to continue this policy by dismantling a POSEIDON SSBN coincident with the sea trials of the seventh TRIDENT. This particular SSBN is being converted to a moored training ship. You also decided to review Soviet actions with regard to their compliance and negotiating records and the state of their strategic buildup on a case-by-case basis as additional U.S. milestones are reached.

Since those decisions, the United States has scrupulously adhered to its commitments and lived within these agreements. By contrast, the Soviet Union has violated major arms control commitments, showed little progress in Geneva and its strategic modernization programs have continued unabated. They have, however, continued to dismantle strategic MIRVed systems as compensation for new forces in accordance with SALT procedures, with the exception of the limit on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, which they have exceeded.

On May 20, 1986, the eighth U.S. TRIDENT SSBN will begin sea trials. At that time, unless current policy is modified, we would be required to retire and dismantle two POSEIDON SSBNs to stay with the SALT II ceiling of no more than 1200 MIRVed ballistic launchers and the SALT I limit on SLBM launchers. The two older, candidate POSEIDONs have been long planned for retirement due to age and the exhaustion of their reactor cores and economic and military realities argue for this retirement at about the time that the TRIDENT goes on sea trials.

If the above compensation is undertaken, the next milestone will occur in November, 1986, when the 131st heavy bomber is fitted for ALCM carriage. At that time, we will not have an SSBN coming to the end of its planned service life to offset the additional cruise missile carrying bombers under the SALT II 1320 MIRVed limit. In fact, we are already within the normal timelines (15 months lead-time) for such a retirement. Therefore, to continue to observe the 1320 limit, the U.S. will likely either have to delay bomber conversions (or retire already modified B–52G aircraft as B–52Hs are converted to cruise missile carriage) or retire existing MINUTEMAN III MIRVs on a one-for-one basis as bombers are converted.

DISCUSSION

In approaching this decision, there are both military and political factors to be considered.

Military Considerations. Continuing interim restraint will have an impact on the number of U.S. forces. Up to this point, we have been able to stay within the applicable SALT constraints by dismantling rather aged systems as the new TRIDENTs come online. This will still be the case in May, but not necessarily so in November.

The real issue is whether the reductions involved affect needed military capability. Given our shortfall in capability to target Soviet hardened installations, and the age of a portion of our POSEIDON fleet, it is most likely that the U.S. military would choose to retire POSEIDON SSBNs in any event. While each POSEIDON SSBN dismantled would mean a reduction of 160 nuclear warheads (the 16 missiles carried by each submarine, each in turn carrying about 10 warheads), the warheads retired can only effectively cover soft targets.

The overall assessment provided to you by Admiral Crowe at this week’s NSPG meeting² was that given the marginal nature of the impact the constraints will have on the overall military capability of both sides, the military factors involved should not drive this decision. However, the Chairman was equally quick to point out that it is essential that the U.S. strategic modernization program proceed as planned, and that the impact of any change in support for this program must be carefully factored into your decision. (We do not lack ballistic missiles for soft targets but we do need hard target kill capability. The way we get that is through MX, D5 and SICBM.)

There may have been some confusion at the NSPG on the costs associated with the POSEIDONs. Secretary Weinberger stated that the inactivation cost per unit was on the order of $17M but we have been unable to confirm this figure. The OSD option is to preserve the option to overhaul, convert or scrap the submarines for one year, at which time a decision would be made on their ultimate status. The cost of this procedure is $23M which is the sum of $14M, to defuel, plus $25,000 per day to keep the submarines in a condition that would permit us to undertake any one of the three configurations. The cost of an overhaul, without the delay, is $167M per unit and conversion to some other platform would be additive to the overhaul cost and depend on the type of conversion chosen. The Navy has never sold a nuclear submarine for scrap because of the problem of ensuring that all irradiated metals were removed and the hull was demilitarized before turning it over to a civilian contractor. The cost of doing this would be additive to the defueling cost of $14M, and probably fall in the $20M range. The unit cost of dismantling under agreed procedures is between $20M and $22M thus, cost savings are not a major issue.

Political Considerations. Political views on this issue are very strong both here at home and abroad. We must carefully consider the impact that retaining some interim restraint framework has both on the Congress and on our allies.

With respect to the Congress, the most important task we face is to maintain support for our critically needed strategic modernization program and for an adequate overall level of defense spending to meet national security needs. The Congress also expects us to undertake some form of concrete action in response to Soviet violations. In dealing with our allies, we must focus our efforts on maintaining their collective and individual support for:

— the NATO LRINF modernization program and continued support for deployment of PERSHING II and GLCM as required;

— the SDI program;

— the U.S. position in the Geneva negotiations; and

— overall efforts to sustain the cohesion of the NATO alliance and the associated military capability needed to give the alliance meaning.

It would be easier to maintain the support identified above if we had an interim framework of mutual restraint, which you outlined last June, supported with equal sincerity by the Soviet Union. Unfortunately, the Soviets have not joined us in such a framework. We have tried to better educate both Congress and our allies about the extent of the Soviet noncompliance problem. Appreciation of the significance of the problem is growing—especially of the obvious fact that you simply cannot have effective arms control unless you are serious about compliance. All reasonable parties would like us to do something to resolve the problem caused by Soviet noncompliance. The political argument revolves around what we should do and how effectively we communicate our intended response to each of these important audiences.

Observations. You have had the benefit of two NSPG discussions over the last month. You have also had subsequent discussions with a number of key players on this issue. The real programmatic response options are few, largely because of fiscal and Congressionally-related constraints and the paucity of overriding military rationale. After reviewing all of these it is my judgement that, even in the face of the serious problem posed by Soviet noncompliance, the critical tasks we face in requiring the assistance of the Congress and the allies will be inestimably more difficult if we set aside the SALT numerical limits without a strong military rationale. At the same time, some concrete form of response is warranted.

Draft NSDD. In light of the above, we have carefully reviewed and drawn upon the policy options presented for your consideration and developed the draft NSDD provided at Tab A.³ It attempts to balance our concern about Soviet noncompliance with the need to sustain the current strategic modernization program while at the same time adjusting it to apply a greater pressure on Soviet behavior between now and November. It also mandates that we take actions which represent proportionate responses to specific instances of Soviet noncompliance.

What, in effect, the decision contained in this NSDD does, is to adjust the timeframe for when we reach the end of the “extra mile.” Instead of calling the Soviet mortgage due now, by retaining submarines that are really too old to be militarily useful, we lay the marker clearly down now that the extra mile will end at the next U.S. deployment milestone, which will occur in November, if the Soviets do not take the positive actions required to meet your established policy criteria. In short, we would dismantle the two older POSEIDONs, that we had planned to retire anyway, on schedule. We would call for additional ICBM options to be readied by November and accelerate the advanced cruise missile program. Finally, we would indicate that the conditions we will face in November are very different from today’s and would signal our resolve to move beyond the 1320 MIRV limit, if needed at that time. While this does kick the can down the road to November, the situation in November will be much better for us in providing economic and military rationales for moving.

By pushing the likely breaking of SALT numerical limits off until November, we should recognize this could impact any plans for a November or December summit. However, as outlined above, the November milestone would be signaled now as an incentive to constructive Soviet behavior and is a much better one to use for the purpose of making an appropriate response if needed. The NSDD makes it clear that unless the Soviets meet your conditions by November, the U.S. will exceed the 1320 SALT II MIRV limit. By making this point early, we shift the burden onto the Soviets’ back and make it something they must factor into their summit plans.

The NSDD does break some new ground in calling for an options paper on the U.S. ICBM modernization program by November, 1985. This is a packaging of work that is already largely in progress in DOD. The new elements are that it raises the possibility of a new mobile MIRVed missile and a program involving both a small, single warhead mobile missile (our MIDGETMAN) and a slightly larger, MINUTEMAN-like MIRVed mobile missile as a follow-on.

The added military utility of a survivable, mobile MIRVed ICBM is obvious. The increased cost effectiveness of such a system is equally clear. (It results in less cost per warhead because it is missiles and mobile launchers, not warheads, that drive the costs up). What may be less clear is the leverage that would be exerted on both the Soviets and the Hill by just the idea that you might really pursue two new mobile missiles, in addition to MX.

On the Hill, as long as you are seen as calling for more options and the rebuilding of bipartisan consensus, we should have a positive tool which adds bargaining leverage for our ICBM modernization and the strategic modernization program, in general. We must avoid giving the impression that we have already decided on a specific path.

By clearly stating your intention to focus on a full range of ICBM modernization decisions in November and by asking the Hill to join you in a bipartisan approach to this decision, you will have affirmed a direct association between our modernization programs and arms control that will be difficult for our opponents to attack. This important advantage can be achieved at little programmatic cost, since the work between now and November will consist of studies not actual development work.

Cabinet Views. I have not coordinated this draft NSDD with either George Shultz or Cap Weinberger. Their positions on this issue are clear. George feels that we should take some responses now, but strongly opposes anything that breaks the SALT II numerical limits. Therefore, he wants us to dismantle the two POSEIDON submarines on schedule. Cap, on the other hand, thinks we should not dismantle the submarines and should thus break the SALT numerical limits now. However, the problem with Cap’s position is that the mechanism he uses to break the limits does not provide a degree of military utility that is sufficient to balance the political costs involved. All this being said, the solution offered in the NSDD meets George’s requirements for now by dismantling POSEIDONs in response to the May milestone while, at the same time, committing us to satisfy Cap’s requirements by not dismantling any more U.S. systems at the next milestone in November, if the Soviets have still not met your criteria. Neither George nor Cap will likely be happy, but I believe this is the best, most prudent course under the circumstances.

Recommendation. I would recommend the approach outlined in this NSDD be used as an appropriate vehicle for consulting with the Congress and our Allies. Their reactions to this approach will be important to consider in your taking the final decision (both the timing and the substance).

Recommendation:

OK NO

___ ___ That you approve the draft NSDD provided for your consideration at Tab A.⁴

1. Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR–092, NSDD 222. Secret. Sent for action. Copies were sent to Bush and Regan. Prepared by Linhard, Wright, and Kraemer. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum reads: “SIGNED.”
2. See Document 103.
3. Printed as Document 105.
4. Reagan initialed his approval, and wrote a checkmark beside his initials.