Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLIV, Part 1, National Security Policy, 1985–1988

102. Memorandum From William Wright, Robert Linhard, and Sven Kraemer of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Poindexter)¹

Washington, April 15, 1986

SUBJECT

• Wednesday’s NSPG Talking Points on RSVP

Today we forwarded under System II 90293 a package of RSVP background material for the President’s use prior to the meeting on Wednesday.² This meeting is now scheduled for 10:15 a.m. to accommodate SECDEF’s schedule.³

The talking points for your use in the meeting are at Tab A. They have been scoped to provide a short introductory history of the interim restraint policy evolution, a review of Soviet violations and the relationship to an abbreviated review of two possible declaratory statements that could form the basis of a change in the current policy. Recall that the last NSPG on this, March 25, focussed primarily on programmatic options. The minutes of this meeting are at Tab B⁴ for your review. You will note in the talking points, reference to display boards (Tabs C and D)⁵ which will be available at the meeting.

Recommendation

That you draw upon the talking points at Tab A in your conduct of the meeting.⁶

Tab A

Talking Points Prepared in the National Security Council⁷

Washington, undated

National Security Planning Group Meeting

DRAFT TALKING POINTS

I. Introduction (5 minutes)

— Mr. President, today we are meeting for the second time in recent weeks to review the policy of U.S. restraint in the face of the continued pattern of Soviet noncompliance with arms control agreements.

— Today’s meeting will provide a final NSC-level review before you make your tentative decision that can serve as the basis for necessary consultation with key Members of Congress and our key Allies. As you know, the specific event requiring your early decision is the fact that our eighth Trident submarine begins its sea trials on May 20.

— Unless we dismantle compensatory strategic systems such as Poseidon submarines, this new Trident will exceed numerical limits under SALT I (656 SLBM launchers) and under SALT II (the 1,200 MIRV ballistic missile launchers ceiling).

— This decision has received increasing attention in the media, on the Hill and with our Allies which will increase in volume as the date draws near.

○ Last week some 53 Senators wrote asking that you continue not undercutting SALT I and SALT II through 1986.

○ Some 34 other Senators, including some of your strongest supporters on defense, foreign policy and arms control issues have been equally forceful in expressing support for programmatic responses to Soviet violations. Some ask that the U.S. not dismantle the two Poseidon submarines.

○ The Allies are, on the whole, sympathetic to the need to respond to Soviet noncompliance. However they will be looking carefully at our response for any signal that would be seen as diminishing U.S. interest in arms control progress and a more stable U.S.-Soviet relationship.

○ Prime Minister Thatcher in a letter to you characterized the current policy as “an important act of statesmanship”. She counselled continued restraint.

— Within the Administration we have labored over appropriate and proportionate programmatic options to employ in response to Soviet violations of various agreements; some of which are ratified and in force, others not ratified and still others which are being observed past their stated duration.

— In some sense, these agreements can be viewed like any other complex contractual arrangement in which two individuals should only continue to shape their actions into conformance for as long as the contract remains in their net best interests.

— Preliminary to the discussion with your Cabinet, I will briefly review the existing policy, summarize Soviet violations and describe two alternative policy options in the form of a declaratory statement. The declaratory policy that you eventually choose, Mr. President, whether it is to continue with the existing policy or adapt an alternative formulation, must be seen as logical and proportionate and it also should be viewed as being in the net U.S. national interest.

II. RSVP Policy Review (25 minutes)

— Mr. President, as we begin our discussion today, let us be sure we all understand the essential elements of your “no undercut” or “interim restraint” policy as you have stated it during your Administration.

○ First, the basic policy is that the United States would not undercut existing agreements so long as the Soviet Union exercises equal, or comparable, restraint. You first stated this in May, 1982, as the START negotiations were about to begin. You indicated that you were proposing such interim U.S. restraint in spite of the inequities in the SALT I agreement and the serious flaws in the unratified SALT II agreement, in the hope that it would foster an atmosphere of mutual restraint conducive to the new arms reductions negotiations.

○ Second, the policy requires Soviet reciprocity. You have rejected a double standard, which would permit the Soviets to choose what they violate, while we fulfill all of our contractual commitments. You have stated that such a situation amounts to unilateral disarmament and could undercut U.S. national security and the integrity of the arms control process.

○ Third, the policy has required that we continue to raise our concerns about noncompliance with the Soviet Union in diplomatic channels, including the U.S.-Soviet Standing Consultative Commission (the SCC).

— (Soviet Violations) In that regard, you have issued three detailed reports to the Congress on Soviet noncompliance (most recently last December 23) The two chart boards here (Tab D) indicate the scope of the problem.

— As you can see, the Soviets are violating major agreements, including the SALT I and II agreements, the ABM Treaty, the Geneva Conventions on chemical weapons, etc. [FYI. There may be two more SALT II compliance issues which mentioned, one involving the possible testing, recently, of a follow-on SS–18 (a third new ICBM type) and a second issue, a violation which we have reported to the Congress, but not discussed with the Soviets due to sensitive sources and methods, involving an SLBM (the SS–X–23 throw weight ratio). End FYI.]

○ Fourth, in your report to the Congress last June 10 on the Interim Restraint policy, you stated that you were prepared to go the extra mile, deactivating a POSEIDON submarine later in the year in order to give the Soviet Union adequate time to respond to the serious US concerns.

○ Fifth, as an integral part of the policy announced last June you informed the Congress that the United States would take proportionate and appropriate responses to Soviet violations.

— You indicated that you were asking the Secretary of Defense to recommend specific programmatic responses.

— And you made clear that you would consider future deployment milestones of U.S. strategic systems on a case-by-case basis to be reviewed in light of Soviet actions in three areas: (1) correction of Soviet noncompliance, (2) a reversal of the unparalleled and unwarranted Soviet military buildup, and (3) active Soviet pursuit of arms reduction agreements in the Geneva negotiations.

— At the November summit you expressed your concerns about Soviet noncompliance directly to Secretary General Gorbachev. You pointed out that the United States has scrupulously kept its part of the bargain, undertaking no actions which would undercut existing agreements.

— Mr. President, as we now approach the next U.S. deployment milestone, the Soviet Union has made little progress in meeting the three criteria you set forth last June. First, they have provided insufficient explanation or correction of their violations. Second, as the intelligence briefing you received last week demonstrated, they have continued their military buildup. And, third, in spite of their public rhetoric, and their summit commitment to seek common ground, they have generally not moved forward at the Geneva negotiations.

U.S. Policy Options

— At our last meeting (March 25) we focussed on possible programmatic military options to be considered as proportionate and appropriate responses to Soviet violations. We considered eight specific options at that time. Since then, agencies have continued to review and to refine these options as well as to consider the broader declaratory policy framework in which any programmatic military options should be undertaken.

— Let me now turn to describe one such policy alternative and programmatic actions supported by the Department of State and Ambassador Nitze. The boards (Tab C) contains the elements of our current policy and the alternatives.

○ Under this approach, we would report the lack of progress, emphasize that the strategic modernization program should be fully implemented, with adjustments—in order to respond most efficiently.

○ We would announce the retirement from service of two of the oldest Poseidons on military and economic grounds, and commence dismantlement prior to the May sea trial date.

○ At the same time, we would announce certain additional adjustments to the modernization program to include:

— Equipping three additional Los Angeles class SSNs with SLCMS,

— PENAIDs development,

— And, accelerating the small ICBM. The Midgetman was specifically cited in your June decision, Mr. President, as an appropriate response to the irreversible Soviet violation of flight testing the SS–X–25. Under State’s plan we would reemphasize our commitment to this ICBM.

○ State and Ambassador Nitze would not exceed numerical limits of SALT I or II.

— Next I would turn to the single—but bracketed—policy statement from Defense, ACDA, and Ambassador Rowny.

○ The convergence that they have reached is really quite remarkable, but there are significant differences in the text as highlighted by the brackets.

— All would have the U.S. take actions which exceed SALT II numerical limits by not dismantling two Poseidons. The differences affect what other limits are exceeded.

○ OSD would not begin dismantling the two Poseidons but would defuel and “preserve” them for a future overhaul/conversion option within a year at a cost of about $23M per boat.

○ ACDA and Ambassador Ed Rowny would dismantle one Poseidon at a cost of $22M and dismantle five Titans to stay within SALT I, but not the SALT II limits.

— Essentially, OSD is up front in saying we would no longer be bound by SALT II or the SALT I Interim Agreement while ACDA and Ambassador Rowny would not explicitly cite any future obligations with regard to SALT I but would explicitly comply with the SALT I Interim Agreement by dismantling only enough launchers to do so.

III. Discussion (25 minutes)

— In a sense, the key issue is whether—at this time—the proportionate and appropriate U.S. responses should include any which exceed the numerical limits of SALT II and/or SALT I.

— If the OSD approach were taken, some limits would be exceeded. The issue would be decided now for future milestones, as well.

— If the ACDA/Rowny approach were taken, SALT II limits would be exceeded now. We would have to again address SALT I limits in September 1988 when the ninth Trident goes on sea trials, and we once again face the SLBM launcher ceiling.

— If the State option were taken, the dismantling of two SSBNs would postpone the issue of SALT II limits until November of this year when the 131st ALCM-carrying heavy bomber (AHB) is produced. At that time, we will face either a stop in AHB production, an SSBN dismantlement, some MM III dismantlement or some other ALCM bomber dismantlement.

— The question is what to do, and when.

— Mr. President, if you have no questions, I’d like to proceed around the table asking for the views of your cabinet.

— Secretary Weinberger, would you care to lead? Secretary Shultz? etc . . . . . .

IV. Summary

— Thank you all for coming.

1. Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR–110, NSPG 0131. Top Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum indicates Poindexter saw it.
2. See Document 101.
3. April 16.
4. Attached but not printed. See Document 100.
5. Attached but not printed.
6. Poindexter approved the recommendation.
7. Top Secret; Sensitive. The document indicates that the meeting was scheduled for April 16 from 10:15 a.m. until 11:15 a.m. All brackets are in the original.