268. Letter From Secretary of State Haig to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (Stockman)1
With this letter I am transmitting the consolidated Foreign Assistance budget for Fiscal Year 1983.2 It has been discussed extensively with interested agencies and has the full support of the Department [Page 672] of Defense and the International Development Cooperation Agency. Supporting documentation is included in the Security Assistance Policy Review Working Group and IDCA budget submissions.
In developing our foreign assistance proposal, I insisted we hold a strict balance between the resources necessary to achieve the President’s foreign policy objectives and his priority concern to limit the rate of growth of government spending and to balance the FY 1984 budget.
The $6824 million in budget outlays that I am requesting is, quite simply, the minimum amount necessary to achieve the President’s foreign policy objectives. Beyond doubt, I would have preferred higher levels to give us some margin of flexibility. In a world of real security threats, high political tension and economic disarray, we must be prepared to offer more than rhetoric. Our assistance must be adequate in size and flexibility to assure our friends of our determination to help them meet the very real problems and threats they confront.
We can not possibly conduct the President’s foreign policy with the level of resources suggested by OMB. Programatically, we would have to take the following unacceptable steps:
ESF—We would have to cut contingency funds and programs in Turkey, the Middle East, Sudan, and in the Caribbean Basin.
FMS—Our guaranteed credit request reflects in large part the President’s decisions on Israel, Egypt and Pakistan. Without an adequate direct credit program with flexible terms, realistic financing would not be available to help key countries like Sudan, Turkey, and El Salvador. At less than the levels proposed, we would be seriously weakened in the Middle East peace process, our access and overflight rights to the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf area would be undercut, and we could not adequately support Southwest Asian frontline states like Pakistan against Soviet aggression. Neither could we respond effectively to Soviet threats through its proxies. In short, our strategic position worldwide would be undercut with serious consequences for our credibility as a reliable security partner.
PL–480—Any cuts in PL–480 would have to be made against both Title I and Title II, and such cuts would produce unacceptable foreign policy and domestic consequences.3 Not only would reductions encounter legislative and treaty complications, but they would also force widespread food aid reductions in strategically important countries where [Page 673] we are at least as concerned about the impact of inadequate food supplies on domestic stability as we are about their ability to respond to external threats.
We have outlined our request for bilateral security and economic assistance in terms of nine priority areas of concentration (see annex 2). We have not tried to justify individual countries vis-a-vis all other countries, but rather in terms of their contribution to our specific foreign policy objectives. In terms of multilateral assistance, we have given appropriate weight to how our contributions to the multilateral banks complement our strategic objectives, as well as to the importance of maintaining the President’s credibility regarding undertakings he has made on current commitments.
Besides the foreign assistance items included in the figures mentioned above, there are several other budgetary items I wish to note:
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- I am concerned that OMB has proposed to accelerate sharply the rate at which AID must reduce its staffing levels. It is essential to stick to the 1986 target agreed to last spring, and I will want to review its progress to ensure the consequences do not adversely impact on the management of our foreign assistance programs.
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- It is important that the Peace Corps have adequate funds to carry out the important complementary role it plays in our foreign assistance program.
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- We agreed earlier this year that the U.S. would provide $35 million to the Common Fund in FY 1983; that amount is in addition to my proposal here.
Our request also includes $5 million for a new security assistance program to provide aid to foreign law enforcement personnel in combatting terrorism. This program was approved by the President. We will shortly transmit draft legislation to your staff.
While there can be no doubt as to the importance of achieving the President’s budgetary objectives, I am seriously concerned that we not lose sight of the real issue that we are addressing in this budget, the security of the United States and the safety of the American people. My judgment, shared by the entire national security community, is that any foreign assistance program materially smaller than our proposal would constitute a grave threat to our national interests.
Sincerely,
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Files of the Office of Under Secretary for Security Assistance, Science and Technology, James L. Buckley, Lot 82D352: untitled folder. Confidential. Drafted by John Wolf (T), L. Peters (EB/ODF), and Feldstein (S/P); cleared in PM, EUR, and AID; cleared in draft in EB, ARA, AF, EA, NEA, H, S/P, IO, OES, and PM. Wolf initialed for himself, Peters, and Feldstein.↩
- Annex 1, “Budget by Program Category,” Annex 2, “Definition of Objectives by Policy and Program,” and Annex 3, “Budget by Foreign Policy Objective with Country and Program Detail,” are attached but not printed.↩
- The Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act (P.L.–480), signed into law by Eisenhower on July 10, 1954, established the Food for Peace program. Title I authorizes concessional sales of surplus grains to friendly nations. Title II provides for the donation of U.S. agricultural commodities to private voluntary organizations and international organizations for use in foreign humanitarian feeding programs and for emergency and disaster relief.↩