Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985

343. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

Washington, December 27, 1984

SUBJECT

• Strategy for Geneva

Central Concept

We need a clear central concept to guide our planning for the Geneva meetings and subsequent negotiations—and our program for handling Congress, Allies and publics. I suggest the following:

For the next five to ten years our objective should be a radical reduction in the power of existing and planned offensive nuclear arms as well as stabilizing the relationship between offensive and defensive nuclear arms, whether land-, sea-, air- or space-based. We should even now be looking forward to a period of transition, beginning possibly five or ten years from now, to effective non-nuclear defensive forces, including defenses against offensive nuclear arms. This period of transition should lead to the eventual elimination of all nuclear arms, both offensive and defensive. A nuclear-free world is an ultimate objective to which we, the Soviet Union, and all other nations can agree.

US Objectives for Geneva

Our strategy should aim to keep the Soviets on the defensive at both the private and public levels:

—We want to put the onus on Moscow to negotiate seriously by setting forth ideas that could form the basis of meaningful agreements.

—And we want to deny them any basis to charge in public that we had no constructive ideas to present at Geneva, and were unwilling to consider any limits on space arms.

Proceeding from the above, our specific objectives at Geneva are twofold:

—Looking to the future, we want to begin to engage the Soviets in a dialogue on the possibility of a shift away from “mutual assured destruction” to a more stable situation in which both sides rely more on defenses and in which nuclear arms are significantly reduced and, eventually, eliminated.

—In the near term, we want to establish a productive negotiating process that will, for the first time, begin the process of reducing offensive nuclear arms. We would like to open formal negotiations at an early date, but further meetings with Gromyko and/or special representatives may well be needed before we are able to identify enough common ground on which to begin serious give-and-take.

In the long run, these goals are mutually reinforcing: the effectiveness of SDI technologies may depend on our ability to reach agreements that reverse the Soviet offensive build-up; this will constrain them from trying to overwhelm future US defenses.

In the near term, however, there will be tension between these two goals. The Soviets have set as their top priority the “prevention of the militarization of outer space”—which means stopping SDI as well as ASAT. They will link progress on nuclear arms reductions to progress on limiting space weapons; in bargaining over nuclear arms they will almost certainly resist substantial reductions in order to hedge their bets against future US defenses.

We can still hope to accomplish important objectives in renewed negotiations with the Soviets. We may have a window of opportunity to make progress toward agreements that would be in our interest and a big improvement over SALT II. The Soviets, while trying to pressure us in the public arena, will also want to explore the possibilities of achieving mutually beneficial agreements. They likely see negotiated limitations as a way of slowing our strategic programs, and gaining the political and economic benefits that would come with improved East-West relations. For our part, we have a strong interest in preventing the Soviets from gaining the strategic arms advantages that would probably emerge absent any limitations.

Thus, I think we should devote our energies to negotiating agreements that will begin reducing offensive nuclear arms. Broad limits on space weapons are not in the US interest because of SDI. However, in the event it is needed to secure Soviet agreement to offensive arms reductions, we should be prepared to negotiate short-term limits on anti-satellite systems that would have only a minimal impact on our SDI research program.

US Ideas for Geneva

Format

The foregoing objectives could be pursued in a variety of negotiating fora. The important thing is that we avoid a “space” only forum in which the sole subject matter is SDI and ASAT, issues on which we will be on the defensive. I suggest I be authorized to tell Gromyko that we want to address defensive arms, whether based in space or elsewhere (including Soviet defensive nuclear systems) as well as offensive nuclear forces, regardless of basing. As a result of the exchange in Geneva, I would expect there to emerge a general formulation on the order of “defensive and space arms” if there are two negotiating fora, or “nuclear and space arms” if there is a single, combined forum. I would like to be authorized to accept either formulation.

The Offense-Defense Relationship

The most difficult and important subject for us to handle at Geneva may be the discussion of the relationship between offense and defense in the nuclear area as we see it evolving over time. The following approach would allow us to lay down a marker with the Soviets that both sides should consider the possibility of increased reliance on defenses in the longer term, while deflecting Soviet attacks on SDI by raising their actions that have undermined the ABM Treaty (a full version of this presentation is attached).²

I would begin by making clear to Gromyko that we have no aggressive intentions against the USSR but are concerned by the expansion and modernization of their nuclear forces, which force us to keep up our capabilities. Under today’s conditions, each side has incentives to act quickly and decisively with its military power, particularly in a crisis—a very unstable situation.

I would remind Gromyko how we tried in 1972 to address this problem by establishing a regime limiting both defensive and offensive capabilities, but the assumptions underlying that regime have been undermined. On the defensive side, the Soviets have done things we believe are not consistent with the ABM Treaty. More importantly, the comprehensive agreement on offensive arms that was to accompany the ABM Treaty has not been achieved.

I would tell Gromyko that, at least for the near term, we are ready to work with the Soviets to restore the regime that was thought by both sides to be our common objective in 1972. I would stress that SDI is a research program—consistent with the ABM Treaty—and note that in the long term we should recognize that, as we seek to eliminate nuclear weapons, both sides may have an interest in pursuing new defensive technologies. Such a relationship would be more stable than the current one.

Substance

In addition to presenting the conceptual basis for the US approach, Geneva is also an opportunity to demonstrate to the Soviets—as well as Congress, Allies and western publics—that we are, as you have stated many times, prepared to negotiate seriously and constructively. To this end, I should be in a position to preview for Gromyko the general direction in which we are prepared to go in new negotiations. This would follow through on your pledge to Chernenko in your December 7 letter that I will have “concrete ideas” to present at Geneva.³

Thus, I would want to begin laying out an approach that would lead to agreements that begin reducing nuclear arms. This approach would build on the ideas you approved for my Stockholm meeting with Gromyko last January, but which I chose not to lay out because he was unprepared for serious negotiations.

In specific terms, I would like to be authorized to indicate US readiness to move forward in several areas:

—On START, I would like to test Soviet seriousness by suggesting the “common framework” for reductions you approved last January. This would combine elements of the two sides’ previous positions—limiting missiles and bombers together, as the Soviets prefer, in return for their agreement to the real reductions we seek in destabilizing ballistic missile capabilities.

—On INF I would also like to indicate a readiness to consider new approaches consistent with the basic concerns of the US and our allies. One possibility, which would reduce SS–20s while allowing substantial US deployments, would be equal percentage warhead reductions from current Soviet global levels and from planned US European levels, with the US having equal rights on a global basis.

—On space, I would make clear that we are not prepared to accept any new constraints on potentially stabilizing SDI technologies. I would point out to Gromyko that SDI is at present a research program permitted by the ABM Treaty; if, at a future time, testing or deployment of systems not now permitted by the Treaty were contemplated, it would be a matter for negotiation. I would express a readiness to negotiate seriously on space issues, but point out that space is just one aspect of a broader “defensive and space arms” question, and that existing Soviet defensive systems—particularly nuclear defensive systems—need to be addressed as well. If appropriate, I would also like to be in a position to reiterate your September suggestion to Gromyko that we consider short-term limits on ASAT testing in conjunction with Soviet agreement to limits that begin reducing nuclear arms.⁴ (In order to minimize the impact on SDI, I believe such limits should be restricted to existing US and Soviet ASAT systems.)

Attachment

Paper Prepared by Paul Nitze⁵

Washington, undated

A SUGGESTION AS TO HOW TO PRESENT THE
OFFENSE-DEFENSE INTERACTION TO GROMYKO

A. General Considerations

The United States has no territorial ambitions. It is inconceivable that the US would initiate military action against the USSR or the Warsaw Pact unless it or its allies were to be directly attacked. We hope the USSR comparably has no intention of initiating an attack on the US or its allies.

The United States is determined to assure itself and its allies of a high-quality deterrent to an attack by anyone on our vital security interests. We expect that the Soviet Union intends to maintain a similar capability.

B. Tendencies toward Myopia

But it is hard to understand why the USSR places so much emphasis upon massive expansion and modernization of its nuclear forces, both offensive and defensive. The US is forced thereby not to neglect its own offensive and defensive capabilities. Perhaps the explanation is to be found in the fact that each side looks at the nuclear strategic situation primarily from the viewpoint of its own security. Each must assume that at some time a situation may arise in which the risk of war in the immediate future cannot be dismissed. In that situation each side will carefully analyze what it must do to deny the other side a meaningful military victory. Under today’s conditions and those of the foreseeable future, both sides have certain incentives to act quickly and decisively with their military power, both nuclear and conventional. This creates an unstable situation which could make crises more difficult to manage and, if conflict breaks out, makes rapid, perhaps immediate, escalation to high levels of destruction more likely.

C. The Dangers Inherent in the Current Situation

This is a dangerous situation. It is one we must address both together and unilaterally. The political and military measures necessary to do so will be difficult for both sides. But we must tackle this problem; the danger must be defused.

D. Offense-Defense

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, we hoped that both sides would be able to agree on measures which would be helpful to the security of each of us. It was accepted that each side should have rough equality in the aggregate power of its nuclear weapons systems, that if defensive capabilities were to be limited, there should be comparable limitations on offensive capabilities, and that limitations should preclude break-out, circumvention or failure to adhere to the letter and spirit of the limitations agreed upon.

For a time it appeared that we had made some progress in the direction I have outlined. As one looks at the situation today, it appears that U.S. anticipation of such progress may have been illusory.

You would agree, I am sure, that both sides have today substantially greater offensive nuclear capabilities than we had in 1972.

And on the defensive side, you at least have also continued to improve your capabilities. You have done everything permitted by the ABM Treaty, and you have also taken steps we believe may not be consistent with it.

The ABM Treaty rested on the agreed assumption that the principal limitation should be the limitation on Large Phased-Array Radars; these radars took five to ten years to build and were easily identifiable. The limits on such radars would assure each side against break-out or circumvention in less time than would be required for the other side to take offsetting actions. Allowance was made for early warning radars, but these were to be on the periphery, outward looking and should not be defended, and for radars required for space track and for national technical means of verification. It was also agreed that ABM interceptors, launchers, and radars should be non-mobile, non-transportable, i.e., fixed to the ground. It was further agreed that other systems, such as anti-aircraft systems, should not be given ABM capabilities, i.e., that the line between AA defenses and ABM defenses should be kept clear and unambiguous. Finally, it was agreed that the ABM Treaty should be accompanied by a comprehensive treaty on offensive nuclear forces of indefinite duration to parallel the ABM Treaty; it was hoped that such a treaty could be agreed in two years, and certainly within five years.

Today all of those assumptions appear questionable. The five Soviet early warning radars and the Krasnoyarsk radar (which appears to be identical in physical characteristics to those for detecting and tracking ballistic missile RVs) can, if interconnected, provide a base for a nationwide defense. The SH–08 ABM system with its Flat Twin radar seems to be transportable. We have seen it erected and made operational in about a month. The SA–10 and SA–X–12 anti-aircraft systems seem to have a capability against certain RVs in an intercontinental trajectory, thus blurring the distinction between AA systems and ABM systems. You are pursuing active research programs on more advanced technologies, which have a direct application to future ballistic missile defense capabilities, and most importantly, there has been no treaty of indefinite duration on offensive arms to parallel the ABM Treaty.

For the immediate future we wish to work with you to restore and strengthen the regime for stability which, in 1972, was thought by both sides to be our common objective. We must negotiate the follow-on effective limitations on offensive systems called for when we signed the ABM Agreement in 1972, in order to remove the inherent instability in the present and projected array of offensive systems on both sides, and we must reverse the erosion of the ABM Treaty which has taken place. The research, development, and deployment programs of both sides must be consistent with the ABM Treaty. Ours are. Yours should be. If either side ever wishes to amend the Treaty, then there are provisions for discussing that. In our view, such discussions should precede action by sufficient time so that stability is guaranteed.

Our concurrent SDI research program is fully consistent with the ABM Treaty. Your country has had a large SDI program of its own for some years. We do not believe that either country wants at this time to ban research and concept development permitted by that Treaty. We doubt an effective ban on such activities could be designed even if we wanted to.

For the long run we should have bolder and more radical objectives. Both sides seem to be agreed that with respect to nuclear weapons as a whole, the objective should be their total elimination. This should be worldwide and agreed to by all nations. At the same time, we both recognize that we must find a safe path down the road of reductions toward disarmament. We believe that during the transition from reliance on the retaliatory capability of massive forces of offensive arms it could be extremely useful to move toward a more and more effective defense on both sides. It appears that new technologies may open possibilities of assuring the security of both sides through a substantial improvement in our respective defenses. To us high-confidence defenses would appear to be a sounder approach to peace and security than equal and high-confidence vulnerability to every manner of nuclear strike by the other side, and could produce a more stable offense-defense relationship. We recognize that arms control and other forms of cooperation could play an important role in creating and sustaining such a more stable, less threatening environment. We believe that the security interests of both sides could be served by such an evolution. While the possibilities of such a development could be realized in the fairly distant future, we are prepared to initiate a continuing discussion with you now, not only on future roles for strategic defense, but also on other steps we can take to enhance strategic stability while reducing nuclear arms.

Rationale:

The approach outlined above positions the Secretary to defuse SDI as an issue by linking it to our concerns regarding Soviet defensive programs and compliance with the ABM Treaty and the absence of a comprehensive agreement limiting offensive arms, i.e., it is unreasonable for the Soviets to press for new constraints on SDI—a research program permitted by the ABM Treaty—when the assumptions, letter and intent of that agreement are not being lived up to. (This, by the way, may be a more productive manner to raise our concern about Krasnoyarsk than as purely a compliance issue.) It is unlikely the Soviets will be ready to comply with the ABM agreement in this manner, which we can use to counter their anti-SDI efforts.

At the same time, this approach raises the possible transition to a defense-dominant relationship in the long run as something which both sides would be interested in and that we are prepared to discuss.

This approach, particularly the linkage of our view on SDI to Soviet compliance with the assumptions and letter of the ABM Treaty, will also prove useful in defusing SDI with publics, Allies and Congress, as well as refocusing their attention on our concerns about Soviet compliance with the ABM agreement.

1. Source: Reagan Library, Sven Kraemer Files, Geneva—NSDD Package, 12/31/1984–01/01/1985 (3). Secret; Sensitive; King. According to another copy, the memorandum was drafted by Vershbow and Pifer; cleared by Nitze, Gordon, and Courtney. (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, December 1984 Super Sensitive Documents)
2. Nitze drafted this presentation on the relationship between offense and defense. On December 7, he sent Lehman a draft, and the NSC Staff reviewed the paper. Shultz, Nitze, McFarlane, and Lehman discussed the paper and other approaches for Geneva in a meeting on December 10 (see Document 332). On December 15, in a memorandum to McFarlane, Lehman wrote: “The paper is intended to be a guide to our initial presentation in Geneva and does not reflect all of the factors related to offense and defense which we must take into account. My own view is that distinguishing between the near-term and the far-term will help up greatly by increasing pressure on the Soviets and by reducing political pressures on us.” (Reagan Library, Robert McFarlane Files, Subject File, Geneva Talks Background Notebook)
3. See Document 328.
4. See Document 286.

5. Secret; Sensitive; King. The SACG was scheduled to meet December 26 to discuss Nitze’s paper. In a December 24 memorandum, Lehman, Linhard, and Kraemer informed McFarlane: “Based on your guidance, the Chain group did draft a paper evaluating the Nitze idea. The paper was reviewed at a Chain Group IG on Saturday [December 22] and then circulated to SACG principals later that afternoon.” They continued: “The paper is a reasonably good effort. One issue that has surfaced is how integral to the Nitze idea of shifting to an emphasis on defense (vice space) is the focus on nuclear defensive systems.

   “—Nitze feels that it is unlikely that the Soviets will agree to a focus on limiting nuclear defenses and that we should be prepared to fall-back to a characterization of this area as a discussion of ‘defenses’—or if ultimately necessary, ‘defenses and space.’ He feels that the nuclear spin is necessary to get the Soviets to move from their position (space only) and join us in agreeing to discussions about defenses. Once talks began, he would return to press a primary U.S. concern for limiting nuclear defenses and tactically use this throughout the talks.

   “—Some (OSD) feel that the US focus on nuclear defenses should be maintained from the very start of discussions (with no fall back to discussion of defenses—and certainly not to ‘defense and space’) to provide maximum protection to non-nuclear SDI options.

   “—Others (perhaps JCS) like the idea of the shift to defenses but don’t like the focus on nuclear systems. They are concerned that we will unnecessarily alienate those who support nuclear SDI options (i.e., Teller), and that we may be foreclosing such options prematurely.

   “It would be useful to explore this issue a bit on Wednesday to make sure we fully understand how principals feel about both the attempt to shift to an offense/defense formulation and the tactic of focusing on limiting nuclear defenses.” (Reagan Library, Ronald Lehman Files, Subject File, SACG 12/14/1984–12/24/1984)