Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980 Volume XXIV, South America; Latin America Region

123. Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) and the Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Aaron)¹

Washington, February 25, 1978

SUBJECT

• Doing Something Positive on Human Rights—the Case of Bolivia

The Administration is feeling pressure from many different directions to do something positive to show our concern about human rights abroad. The President has also mentioned it a couple of times, and this point is in the PD on human rights.² Mark Schneider, who is Pat Derian’s deputy, phoned me last week to make the same point and suggests that we should try to do something for Bolivia, since its human rights record warrants some special consideration.

I asked Mark to have someone on his staff draft a short memo on human rights improvement in Bolivia, and I attach it at Tab A.³ These improvements include a decision by President Banzer in November 1977 to lift a 3-year-old decree suspending all political activity. At the same time he announced Presidential elections would be held in July 1978; he issued a general amnesty allowing all Bolivian politicians and labor leaders to return from exile. Last December, he released 52 political prisoners, and in January he issued a general amnesty for all political exiles.

If we wanted to do something positive for Bolivia, the one area that would matter the most is USG tin stockpiles. Banzer essentially uses his letter to the President to make a case for why we should be very sensitive to disposals of tin stockpiles.⁴

I understand that the Vice President has asked that we hold up the letter to Banzer from the President until consultations with the Hill on the stockpiles are completed.⁵ I am writing this memorandum simply to repeat that I hope that these considerations—a positive step on human rights in Bolivia—will be taken into account as the final decision on stockpiles is made. I am not saying that this factor should necessarily prevail, only that it should be taken into account—particularly because D/HA in State quite independently suggested that we single-out Bolivia as the example of the U.S. demonstrating its positive concern for human rights.⁶

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 6, Bolivia, 1/77-1/81. Confidential. Sent for information. In the top right-hand margin of the memorandum, Aaron wrote, “ZB—I am consulting on the Hill this Friday. DA”
2. For PD–30 on Human Rights, February 17, 1978, see Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. II, Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Document 119.
3. Tab A, memorandum from Bova to Pastor, February 24, is attached but not printed.
4. The letter from Banzer to Carter, January 27, 1978, as well as translations of it and related materials, is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President’s Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Bolivia: President Hugo Banzer Suarez, 8/77–10/79. A summary of Banzer’s letter, prepared by the State Department and dated February 14, 1978, is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Box 2, Bolivia: 1-12/78.
5. For the letter from Carter to Banzer, see Document 124.
6. Brzezinski highlighted most of this paragraph and wrote at the bottom of the page, “OK—pursue it with the VP’s people and get back to me. ZB”. Next to this note, an unknown hand wrote, “‘Been taken care of’ DA 3/2/78”. In a March 3 memorandum to Carter, Mondale, Eizenstat, Brzezinski, and McIntyre detailed the policy that they had negotiated with Congress regarding the purchase of copper and sales of tin and tungsten from the GSA stockpile. They noted Banzer’s opposition to USG sale of tin but concluded, “While we must respond to President Banzer, neither the Department of State nor the NSC believes that Bolivian opposition should be the determining factor in whether to proceed with the compromise copper legislation.” They recommended that Carter endorse the legislation, including its provision that tin and tungsten sales should be timed so that “such sales do not create market disruption.” Carter approved the recommendation. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President’s Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Bolivia: President Hugo Banzer Suarez, 8/77-10/79)