40. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State1
2644. Subj: (S) Southeast Asia After Cambodia.
1. (S–Entire text)
2. Summary: Aside from the possibility of PRC-SRV hostilities, the implications of Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia can be profound for this area. Among them is greater likelihood that Soviets will establish military presence in Vietnam, which is being given further impetus by situation on Chinese border. Second is what might be called the Finlandization of Thailand. The latter has obvious long term adverse implications for Thai political development and for the future of ASEAN. Much depends upon how quickly the Vietnamese consolidate their position in Cambodia. End Summary.
3. Following are preliminary thoughts on some implications of developments in Cambodia for Southeast Asia. It is dangerous to pontificate given the unresolved situation in Cambodia and on the Thai border as well as the closeness of events, but I pass them along for what they are worth.
4. A case can be made that the Pol Pot regime made the situation in Cambodia a unique one, that the Vietnamese are militarily over-extended and beset with enormous economic problems, that they will act henceforth with great restraint, and that they will not threaten Thailand. Many will argue in the same vein that the SEA countries including Thailand will get used to the Vietnamese in Cambodia, that Vietnamese domination in Indochina is a natural historical development, that the Thais have existed with Vietnamese on the Lao border without any great trouble, that ASEAN cohesion has been significantly improved, and that Southeast Asian countries can relatively easily weather the present psychologically difficult situation. In short, basically a view that nothing has changed significantly in this part of the world. There is a good deal to this: Vietnam is very unlikely to pursue further military action in the short run and it has staggering problems. But the conclusion is too benign; the implications of Cambodia can be far-reaching for the type of Southeast Asia we would like to see. One of the critical elements is how quickly the Vietnamese consolidate their position in Cambodia.
What has happened?
[Page 150]5. We need to briefly review the past because of its implications for Hanoi’s future behavior. With hindsight we can see the way Hanoi handled going to war. The decision to put itself in the position to destroy Pol Pot had to be made at least in early 1978 to provide easily for the necessary logistical framework. Against the background of this decision, Hanoi’s subsequent moves over the rest of the year fall into place. It entered COMECON because of a recognized need for greater reliance on the Soviets for economic assistance. Pham Van Dong visited the ASEAN countries to try to sign friendship agreements so as to reduce the impact of the soon-to-be-signed SRV-Soviet pact and to make forthcoming Vietnamese actions in Cambodia appear less ominous. The agreement with Moscow was critical. Without protection of its rear with the PRC, the Vietnamese could not have invaded Cambodia. Finally, the Vietnamese dropped their preconditions and urgently tried to normalize relations with the U.S. before events in Cambodia made it again difficult for U.S. to normalize. World revulsion of the Pol Pot government led Hanoi to believe that, Peking aside, toppling of Pol Pot would not be severely criticized and might even be welcomed. In any event, the Hanoi leadership has resolved its long time struggle for dominance of the Khmer Communist Party, but its bill for Cambodia is still outstanding.
6. It is conceivable that China’s way of upending the Hanoi leadership has been to draw them into a Cambodian quagmire. More likely the PRC has miscalculated and thereby suffered at least momentarily a severe setback. For the people of Cambodia the Chinese have been a disaster. In an early period, the PRC stiffened DK intransigence to a modus vivendi on the border. At the same time, it publicly deepened its commitment to Pol Pot, despite his weak position and China’s limited ability to come to his aid. The PRC apparently did little to produce a more viable regime in Phnom Penh or one that the SRV could live with. Chinese policy toward Vietnam helped push Hanoi into a Soviet embrace and wiped out Peking’s influence in Vietnam. Despite the widely appreciated special circumstances involved, Cambodia is more than the overthrow of a rotten regime whose own actions contributed importantly to its downfall. The nations of the region also see the Vietnamese with Soviet backing giving the PRC a thrashing. China has lost stature and credibility. Everyone in Southeast Asia is talking about it.
7. Moscow has demonstrated again to the countries of the area its willingness to support its clients, even on aggressive ventures. None of this increases love for Moscow in the region, but it does arouse fear and respect, which may be translated into some influence. The Soviet position in Southeast Asia remains limited, but it is certainly not diminished. The Soviets had to know of Vietnamese plans. The SRV could [Page 151] not have undertaken their invasion without certainty that Moscow would support them if the Chinese sent military aid to Cambodia or directly attacked the SRV. Nor would Moscow let a client involve the Soviet Union in possible hostilities with the PRC without its approval. Like Vietnam, Moscow also thought that world might not mind being rid of Pol Pot. It is delighted at Chinese discomfiture.
8. The Thais had been enormously comforted by the bickering and hostilities among the Communist states and thought that all this would continue for some time. The events of January shattered this spell and intensified their feelings of being on the front lines. The Thais dislike and fear the Vietnamese. They have always wanted buffers and the last of the buffer states is now gone. After some confusion as to how to react to new situation, the Thais have chosen at least publicly to stay out of the internal Cambodian situation. They have adopted a neutral position and have so far avoided making trouble for Vietnamese forces in Cambodia. They have taken advantage of the occasion, however, to attack major CPT/TPLA elements who have used Cambodia as a safe haven.
9. Thankfully the United States has been able to stay out of this fighting in Indochina. While we have not been idle, we have largely focused on diplomatic activities, particularly trying to diminish the possibilities of trouble on the Thai border. Thailand and other ASEAN countries have welcomed our efforts. Nevertheless, our image in the area has continued to diminish. We are seen as a major power playing a helpful role vis-a-vis the other powers but increasingly ineffectual in determining events in this region. Soviet arms aid to its ally is contrasted with our limited aid to our friends. US-PRC normalization is now seen as having little impact on Vietnam or on the rest of Southeast Asia.
What does it all mean for the future?
10. The principal uncertainty, PRC-SRV hostility aside, is the situation in Cambodia. Hanoi’s armies have run into greater trouble than Hanoi probably anticipated. They are over-extended logistically and in a number of areas face significant DK opposition. Although Hanoi should be able to defeat remaining main DK forces reasonably quickly, it will need to retain troops in Cambodia, perhaps for a long time, whatever happens to the Pol Pot remnants. Despite its trouble finding capable people to rule the conquered south, Hanoi will have to largely run Cambodia since the Cambodian governing structure has been devastated. The SRV will also need to help reconstruct Cambodia. But its handling of these problems could be immensely complicated by the development of a sizeable and protracted guerrilla resistance in Cambodia. This war is already underway, indicating that the Pol Pot government made some advance preparations. Khmer nationalism will rein [Page 152] force these efforts. But whether they will succeed is uncertain. Much depends on the force Hanoi is willing to bring to bear as well as upon the ability of the Chinese and/or the willingness of the Thais to supply the Pol Pot remnants. The impact of all this on a Hanoi leadership already beset with numerous economic problems and difficulties with China could be profound.
11. The Vietnamese have continued to reassure Thailand and the other ASEAN countries about their benign intentions. They also show some sign of paying heed to Thai and U.S. warnings about their forces on the Thai/Cambodian border. They have not respected the 50 kilometer line the Thais wanted but appear generally to be staying about 10–15 kilometers from the border. But if DK resistance increases in the border area, it is doubtful that the SRV would continue to hold back its forces from the Thai border.
12. The PRC is unlikely to merely sit back and take a licking from Hanoi. Indeed it will not rest content while Hanoi is allied to the Soviet Union. Peking will want to make life costly for its neighbor in every way it can. This could include frequent harassment of the SRV border extending to some large scale fighting. The Chinese also may make things difficult for the Lao Government and for Vietnamese forces in Laos. The PRC might also find some means to supply DK guerrilla elements by sea, but PRC ability to supply the DK is critically dependent on Thai willingness to allow the Chinese to move goods through Thai territory. We would be wise to avoid associating ourselves too closely in Southeast Asia with such a weak, inflexible and unrealistic party as Peking.
13. The Soviets have gained enormous leverage in Vietnam and are closer to being able to establish a military presence in Vietnam. While Hanoi is an autonomous actor and recognizes the political fallout of a Soviet presence, it is more dependent than ever on the Soviets. Growing tensions or SRV fighting with the PRC may well lead to such a presence, a development that transcends Southeast Asia.
14. The Thais do not expect a Vietnamese invasion now, but they do worry about it in later years. Despite Pham Van Dong’s repeated assertions to the contrary, they fear that the Vietnamese will try to take over the CPT and establish liberated areas. A Vietnamese-dominated party would be more dangerous for them and provides an invitation for Vietnamese direct involvement. The Thai love affair with the PRC has eroded and they are more realistic about PRC capabilities. While the PRC provides important political support for Thailand vis-a-vis Vietnam, the Thais will be wary of involvement with the PRC in supporting a guerrilla war in Cambodia. But the Chinese will continue to press Kriangsak to help out and the Thai may covertly provide a degree of support. Conceivably PRC action against the Vietnamese on their border might engender greater Thai enthusiasm in this regard.
[Page 153]15. Politically and diplomatically the situation for the Thais may be profoundly different. Cambodia and resultant uncertainties may well set back the development of a more open and hopefully more stable political process. While Kriangsak still plans for elections in April, the prospects for straight military rule has grown. There is now a more ready excuse for coups.
16. The Thais generally feel they cannot depend on other powers for their security vís-a-vís the Vietnamese. They appreciate that ASEAN has provided useful diplomatic help since 1975, but they do not look to ASEAN for security. Thus the way in which the Thais deal with Vietnam is perhaps changing. The restrained “friendship” may become less restrained. The Thais have bent over backwards to avoid any public confrontations with the Vietnamese. They have refrained from calling Vietnam invaders. They have hidden behind others. They have signed agreements with Vietnam at almost the same time they were joining in the ASEAN Foreign Ministers declaration2 and privately urging others to cut aid to the SRV. In short, however distasteful, they have begun to adjust to Vietnamese on their borders. That adjustment involves movement toward neutrality and greater deference to Vietnamese concerns. Many Thais characterize this movement as a natural Thai inclination as they nervously laugh. Their fiber has been shaken. Even the Crown Prince talked to the British Ambassador in stark terms of five years before the situation in Thailand unraveled.
17. But how far the Thais go in this direction and the way that they get used to the Vietnamese, are critically important for Thailand and ASEAN. That will to a great extent depend on how quickly the Vietnamese consolidate their position in Cambodia. If it takes the Vietnamese a long time and even if it involves an occasional flare-up on the border the Thai sense of confidence should be restored. But if the Vietnamese can dominate and consolidate their position in the next three months or so, the Thais will move toward greater accommodation. The Vietnamese will step up their effort to improve their damaged diplomatic position and the Thais in their search for security are likely to respond. Over time we could see Thailand along with Malaysia try to provide Vietnam an entree into ASEAN, which would lead to its demise. Kriangsak even toyed with such a notion just before Pham Van Dong visited Bangkok in September. The Thai process of accommodation thus has great implications for the future of ASEAN. But how [Page 154] far they accommodate and the pace of the drift to neutralism depends in large part on events in Cambodia. One tip off may be Thai responsiveness to Soviet overtures to improve relations.
18. The U.S. can buck up Thailand psychologically through greater military assistance, strong rhetorical support and the like. But the ability of the U.S. to materially influence the situation in the short run in great part depends on our willingness to help disrupt Vietnamese efforts to gain control in Cambodia or our willingness to strengthen our security guarantee. None of them seem in the cards nor are they necessarily desirable. A neutral Thailand and a declining ASEAN is a situation we can live with but it is not the one we envisaged.
19. This is a rather gloomy analysis of the Thai situation. It may be overdrawn. Flabby Thai attitudes to the Vietnamese may be exaggerated by the present sense of shock. Moreover, the analysis looks down the pike and much can happen that could get in the way of the trend outlined above. Most important, the Vietnamese are more likely than not to be bogged down in Cambodia. Foreign investment could be a critical factor. There is no reason to diminish our efforts to reassure the Thais, attract greater investment, and restore a sense of dynamism and momentum. Our response, so far, the President’s comments3 aside, has been on the anemic side. Similarly, we should continue our efforts to build up ASEAN, but we should recognize the critical role Thai confidence and their handling of Vietnam has for the future of the Five.
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, Box 12, Far East: 12/78–1/79. Secret; Sensitive; Nodis.↩
- The ASEAN Foreign Ministers met in Bangkok January 12–13 to consider the situation in Cambodia. The joint statement issued on January 13 is in telegram 1370 from Bangkok, January 13. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790017–0845) For a summary of the statement, see Henry Kamm, “2 Cambodian Towns Reported Captured,” New York Times, January 13, 1979, p. 1.↩
- Reference is to Carter’s January 17 news conference. See Public Papers: Carter, 1979, Book I, pp. 53–54.↩