Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XXII, Southeast Asia and the Pacific

198. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Tarnoff) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, October 4, 1977

SUBJECT

• Singapore Arms Transfer Requests

The Government of Singapore (GOS) wants to purchase a battery of the Improved Hawk surface-to-air missile system (I-Hawk) for about $50 million to replace existing longer-range British Bloodhound missiles, which will become obsolete by 1981. Singapore is also requesting authority to coproduce, together with Thailand, the M–203 grenade launcher, a standard infantry small arm which attaches to the M–16 rifle (both countries already have the M–203 in their inventories).²

These requests contravene the President’s conventional arms transfer policy directive.³ Specifically, the I-Hawk is a recently developed advanced weapons system, and its transfer to Singapore does not seem to meet the requirements of Paragraph 2 of the President’s directive relating to such systems. Although the I-Hawk is a defensive weapon, it is not militarily justifiable in terms of any likely threat. Singapore wishes to upgrade its air defense capability in large part out of concern that Vietnam might eventually engage in active support of socialist/revolutionary movements in Southeast Asia. Even given the sizeable number of aircraft in the Vietnamese inventory, however, its bombers and attack air power cannot be projected to threaten Singapore seriously.

The M–203 grenade launcher (like the M–16 rifle coproduction request by Indonesia) is technically a “significant weapon” under existing munitions control guidelines, and therefore the requested coproduction is prohibited under the President’s policy. However, it must be considered at the lower end of the spectrum of military significance and sophistication; it is in standard use in the region and around the world.

While both sales would contravene the policy directive, there are arguments for making an exception under the provisions of the directive. Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew is already unhappy over certain U.S. actions in the economic field and uncertain as to our general policy toward both Singapore and Southeast Asia. Disapproval would have an inhibiting effect on expanded U.S. Air Force and Navy use of Singapore facilities such as berthing and bunkering for the 7th Fleet, and our ability to obtain approval for nuclear powered warships and P–3 Indian Ocean surveillance aircraft to use Singapore facilities. Further, it would tend to undermine the confidence of other Asian non-communist countries (including Japan) in our stated commitment to maintain U.S. interest in Southeast Asia, including a modest level of military support for ASEAN countries.

On balance, we conclude that we should adhere to the policy and deny both requests. Since the first fiscal year under our new policy is behind us, we believe now is the time to make the controls of that policy take grip. If they are approved, we will set a precedent making it more difficult to disapprove requests from other countries. Additionally, the more countries we permit to produce or acquire such items, the more difficult it is to control their re-transfer. Further, the dollar-ceiling may prove an elusive goal if we do not eliminate marginal cases, especially in view of the decision to account for the AWACS sale in FY 1978. We have been very responsive to Singapore’s legitimate defense needs. New FMS agreements in FY 1977 will be about $113 million.

If a middle ground is sought, disapproval of the I-Hawk and approval of the M–203 would appreciably reduce the damage to our relations with Singapore.

Peter Tarnoff⁴
Executive Secretary

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 69, Singapore, 1/77–1/81. Confidential.
2. In an October 6 memorandum to Brzezinski, Armacost outlined each agency’s view on the transfer request. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Far East, Armacost Chron File, Box 5, 11/1–10/77)
3. Reference is to PD–13. See Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XXVI, Arms Control and Nonproliferation, Document 271.
4. Stephen Oxman signed for Tarnoff above Tarnoff’s typed signature.