75. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter1
SUBJECT
- Military Aid to Zaire
The issue is whether and how we respond to President Mobutu’s request for ammunition for U.S. weapons previously supplied Zaire.2 It is estimated that some of the Zairian forces could run out of ammunition if supplies are not in the pipeline in the next few days.
We wish to give President Mobuto a chance to mount a credible defense as the pursuit of a diplomatic solution centered around the OAU goes forward. We must decide how far we wish to go to assist him militarily at this time.
A refusal by the U.S. to provide ammunition would obviously hurt Mobutu’s hope for survival and encourage the invaders to step up the pressure. We could mitigate these adverse effects by providing Zaire with the means to purchase the ammunition. Assuming that we would supply the ammunition directly, Ambassador Cutler has recommended that we respond only at this time to the request for 2 million rounds of M–16 ammunition.
Zaire has asked us for ammunition for M–16 rifles, 4.2 inch mortars, 50 caliber machine guns and LAWs with a total estimated value of $1.5 million. Zaire also has U.S. 75 mm recoilless rifles and 60 mm and 81 mm mortars. Ammunition for all these weapons is produced and can be purchased in Europe. There are no legal impediments to prevent us from authorizing Zaire to draw down on the $28 million in approved FY 1977 FMS funds for military POL imports. In an average month, Zaire spends about $12 million on POL imports.
To arrange this: the oil company from which Zaire purchases its POL or the aircraft manufacturer sends its bill to the Government of Zaire, which then sends the bill to the Defense Department with the [Page 232] normal certificate testifying to the fact that the goods were received and that the Zairian Government wishes to use its credit for this purpose.
If you approve, we would approach the Belgian Government to be sure it has no objection to the purchase of the ammunition, and will facilitate the delivery. There are other countries where the ammunition could also be purchased.
This indirect route of providing Mobutu with ammunition would obviously be more acceptable to Congress than supplying it directly from the U.S. There is no legal impediment to allowing Mobutu to use FMS funds from FY 76 Transitional Quarter and from FY 1977 for the purchase of ammunition in the U.S.
I advise that at this time we arrange to provide Mobutu with the 2 million rounds of M–16 ammunition recommended by Ambassador Cutler, by the indirect route of using Transitional Quarter FMS funds for POL. If you agree, we will promptly start our consultations with the Congress.
Recommendation:
1. That you agree to fund 2 million rounds of M–16 ammunition at an estimated cost of $225,000, by the indirect route of using Transitional Quarter FMS funds for POL.3
OR, ALTERNATIVELY
2. That you approve the use of Transitional Quarter and FY 1977 FMS credits to provide ammunition to Zaire from U.S. suppliers directly.
3. With respect to further ammunition transfers, we should defer a decision for further consideration.4
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Office File, Box 78, To/From President: 3–4/77. Secret. Carter initialed “C” in the upper right corner.↩
- In telegram 2184 from Kinshasa, March 12, the Embassy transmitted Zaire’s finalized request for military assistance. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770085–0351) In telegram 2320 from Kinshasa, March 15, the Embassy provided justification for Mobutu’s request for ammunition for U.S.-made weapons previously supplied by the United States. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770089–0387)↩
- Carter checked the “Approve” option.↩
- Carter checked the “Approve” option and circled the word “defer.”↩