Office of the Historian

52. Memorandum From Gerald Funk of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)1

Washington, March 21, 1980

SUBJECT

  • U.S.–Liberian Relations (U)

We do have a serious problem in Liberia. It is growing worse. And the problem won’t cease growing until we are perceived by all groups in Liberia, as no longer “taking Liberia for granted.” (S)

Unfortunately, such a change in perception is going to cost some money. Not much. But more than we have to work with right now. (U)

Tolbert’s basic problem is one of rising expectations by the urbanizing workers and the non-Americo-Liberians, who, ironically, began to get a piece of the action only after Tolbert came to power. At a time of inflation-fueled economic crises, he is caught between these snowballing expectations and an American-Liberian, right-wing backlash. And the only way he can survive is to blame his trouble on CP outside agitations, and demonstrate to everyone, left and right, that he can draw upon the “special relationship” to help out. (S)

He is over-reacting, to some degree, but he is being pressed hard, —by the right to restore traditional elitism; by Foreign Minister Dennis (and many other young Americo-Liberians of the center) to demand [Page 156] that the U.S. quit using Liberia as one-way street; and by the specter of growing urban frustration on the left.2 (S)

His over-reaction is exacerbated by his lack of a clear perception of what kind of help Liberia needs, and how to put it to use. All he knows is that he needs help. Now. And he sees a moral obligation on our part to be somewhat responsive. (S)

Liberia is very important to us. And even if you are offended by Dennis’ bad manners at times, you have to empathize with his case. We are getting a pretty good deal. For virtually no rent (and with $7/8 million or so in aid) we get: (1) an Omega station, (2) a VOA station, (3) a regional commo facility, (4) virtually total access to Roberts Field airport, and (5) use of the port of Monrovia. We would be hard pressed to arrange alternate facilities. (S)

Ambassador Smith is also over-reacting a little. Tolbert will cool off a bit during the next several weeks, as he realizes that the extreme left has not become strongly based in the urban workers—yet. And the Presidential Commission is now scheduled to arrive the last week of April.3 We should not carry off an I.G. study before the Commission does its thing. But we should, and we will, brief the Commission fully and carefully on Liberia’s problems, its importance to us, and our budgetary constraints. We should promote the idea of private sector action with the Commission. But we can nevertheless be certain that the Commission will recommend more USG aid. But we should bite that bullet after we have a report, not before. (S)

To move to an IG study now would be seen as preempting the Commission. And should we decide we do need to do more to protect our investment, we will need the Commission’s study as a basis for action. (S)

  1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 48, Liberia 12/79–1/81. Secret. Sent for information. “ZB has seen” is stamped in the upper right corner and “3/21/80” is written beneath it by an unknown hand.↩
  2. In telegram 2158 from Monrovia, March 18, the Embassy reported on Ambassador Smith’s meetings with Dennis and Tolbert and the Liberians’ complaints that “they thought the United States took Liberia for granted, they did not feel the United States was doing enough for Liberia and we could do a lot more if we really wanted to.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800138–1016)↩
  3. See footnote 3, Document 50.↩