Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XVII, Part 2, Sub-Saharan Africa

173. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, February 20, 1980, 10:30 a.m.

SUBJECT

• President’s Meeting with President Moi of Kenya

PARTICIPANTS

• President Jimmy Carter
• Warren Christopher, Acting Secretary of State
• Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
• Wilbert J. Le Melle, U.S. Ambassador to Kenya
• Richard M. Moose, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs
• William C. Harrop, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs
• Jerry Funk, National Security Council Staff
• Gordon R. Beyer, Director, East African Affairs
• Jerry Schecter, White House Staff
• His Excellency Daniel T. arap Moi, President of the Republic of Kenya
• The Honorable Charles Njonjo, Attorney General
• The Honorable Robert J. Ouko, Minister for Foreign Affairs
• The Honorable Godfrey G. Kariuki, Minister of State, Office of the President
• The Honorable Nicholas K. Biwott, Minister of State, Office of the President
• The Honorable Zacharia T. Onyonka, Minister for Economic Planning and Development
• Mr. Jeremiah G. Kiereini, Permanent Secretary, Office of the President
• His Excellency the Ambassador of Kenya and Mrs. Mbogua
• Mr. Philip Ndegwa, Economic Adviser, Office of the President.
• Mr. Simon Nyachae, Permanent Secretary, Office of the President

SUMMARY: See State 47717²

The President opened the meeting by welcoming President Moi and the opportunity his visit presented to consult and to share ideas. He recognized that Moi would be meeting with State and Defense officials and key members of Congress. Moi should call, the President said, if he needed his personal help on any matter.

This was a time of trial, the President continued, for the democracies of the world. Again he wanted to note his admiration for political developments in Kenya in recent months. The successful holding of elections recently was an encouragement to countries throughout the world.³ We had also watched with great interest Kenyan efforts to improve relations with neighboring Tanzania and Uganda. We had followed closely the economic development of Kenya.

The President noted the comment of President Moi to him during the arrival ceremony that a few years ago one fifth of the receipts for the export of coffee were adequate to pay for the import of Kenya’s petroleum needs.⁴ Today the cost of petroleum imports was more than the total receipts for coffee exports. Moi had told him of the temporary shortage of grain resulting from adverse weather conditions, and the United States wished to be of assistance with this problem. The President reiterated his appreciation for Kenya’s staunch support of US positions on the hostages in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. We valued our good relations with Kenya very highly.

The President urged Moi to take up with American Cabinet officers he would be seeing any items not completed at this session. Further, there would be time tonight before dinner and the entertainment for a private talk if there were any additional matters which had not been covered during today.

President Moi expressed his sincere appreciation for the very warm reception that he and his delegation had in the United States. He brought greetings to President Carter from all the Kenyan people. If it were agreeable to the President, he would first discuss East African and related issues and then US-Kenya bilateral relations.

Tanzania—The situation in East Africa is very fluid, President Moi said. He had hoped that the Tanzanian invasion of Uganda would result in greater stability in that country but in fact things had worsened there. There was enormous hostility developing between the Ugandan people and the Tanzanian occupying troops. Kenya had hoped that Julius Nyerere and Binaisa would ask the UK for police training, and perhaps for training of a new army as well. Regretfully, this had not taken place. Uganda had many Marxists in the present government. There was no reconstruction going on in Uganda because, for example, the revenue from the sale of Uganda’s coffee and tea, which was now being sold through Tanzania, was going into Tanzanian coffers. The Tanzanians argued that the Ugandans must pay for the war and for the occupying Tanzanian soldiers. The Tanzanians had between 25,000 and 30,000 troops in Uganda which cost 6 million pounds monthly. Incidents were increasing and in some villages Tanzanian soldiers had been killed.

President Carter asked if any Tanzanian troops were withdrawing from Uganda. Moi said it was not likely that Julius would withdraw his troops soon.

The President asked if Binaisa was independent of Nyerere. Moi said it is impossible for Binaisa to be independent of Nyerere because his security depended on Tanzania. The last time he met with Binaisa, Moi continued, he said he hoped Binaisa wouldn’t repeat everything he told him to Dar-es-Salaam. Kenya was doing what it could to encourage Binaisa to be more independent.

Kenyans sought peace, Moi continued, but were surrounded by potentially hostile countries such as Ethiopia and Somalia as well as Tanzania. There had been a meeting in Arusha in January,⁵ but little was discussed. A second meeting in Mombasa had been planned, but Moi had had to defer it because of his state visit to West Germany. Moi said he hoped to convene the meeting when he returned from his visit to the United States.

President Carter asked if Moi favored an open border with Tanzania. Moi replied that he had no problem with an open border; it was Tanzania that had closed the border. Recently he ordered the Kenyan border closed too, however, and he believed this had brought home to Tanzania the problem of closed borders. President Carter asked if the border might be opened soon. Moi said he didn’t see that as a likely possibility. Further, even when it is open it won’t be as useful as it was before.

President Moi then expressed his concern for the expansion of Tanzanian influence in Africa, e.g. with Mugabe in Zimbabwe, in the Comoros, and with Mengistu in Ethiopia. Moi said many countries in Africa were obtaining arms rather than funds for the economic betterment of their people. He suggested that the US should consider providing economic assistance to only those countries that don’t invest a disproportionate amount of funds in arms. Tanzanian soldiers were currently in Uganda, Seychelles and Mozambique. Further, Zanzibar wants to be separate from the mainland.

Somalia—The situation with Somalia, Moi said, was currently quiet. Moi said he hoped we would tell the Somalis to keep things quiet or the US won’t help them.

President Carter said we recognize the sensitivity of Kenyan-Somali relations and the threat that Somalia has posed in the past to Kenya and may pose in the future. We believe we can be of assistance in protecting Kenya from that potential threat in the future. President Carter said that Moi knew we had opened talks with President Siad. In those talks Siad had asked us to use our good offices to facilitate better relations between Somalia and Kenya.⁶ We were prepared to do so and the President asked that Moi pursue this matter with Acting Secretary Christopher if he desired us to be of assistance in improving understanding between Kenya and Somalia. The President assured Moi that we would be cautious in our dealings with the Somalis and would assure that they posed no threat to Kenya.

Moi expressed his sincere thanks for these comments.

Ethiopia—Moi said the Kenyans did not agree with the current ideological bent of Ethiopia. Tanzania had the same sort of ideological bent. Kenya stayed in touch with the Ethiopians to have some idea of the intentions of the Russians.

Mr. Christopher said that some viewed Mengistu as a nationalist leader while others said he is a puppet of the Soviets. What was the Kenyan view? Moi said that when he visited Ethiopia a year ago Mengistu told him and other members of his delegation that he wanted to preserve the identity of Ethiopia. Moi said he also believed Ethiopians would continue to be Ethiopians and would not change. It would take time, however, for Ethiopian nationalism to return as the dominant force in Ethiopia. Moi said he had recently begun to wonder whether he was right in this judgment about the strength of Ethiopian nationalism. The communists were getting a tight grip on certain sectors of Ethiopian society and might soon take over. It was a difficult situation to judge.

Sudan—Kenya-Sudan relations were very good, Moi continued. The situation in Sudan was stable at the moment but the Sudanese did have serious economic problems and Libya continued to cause trouble. The Saudis were very helpful but were not quick to act. The US played a key role in the Persian Gulf area and if the Saudis were to fall to the Soviets, all the Persian Gulf area and much of Africa would be in danger.

President Carter asked whether Kenya had good communications with Saudi Arabia. President Moi replied that Kenya did not have any formal agreements but it did maintain good diplomatic relations and a good dialogue with both countries.

Zambia—Moi said he told Prime Minister Thatcher that Kaunda should not be left out on a limb. When the Soviets got into a country it was difficult to get them out. Zambia was in a strategically key position. If Zambia bought Russian arms, the East Germans and Cubans would use Zambia as a base to penetrate Zaire and Namibia. The situation in Zimbabwe was still uncertain and Kaunda was still not strong enough to stand alone. Julius was trying to get Kaunda removed. If the UK or the US could give arms to Zambia that would help; and it was not too late to draw Kaunda back from the Soviets. When he told this to Prime Minister Thatcher she said she would send Peter Carrington to Zambia after the elections in Zimbabwe to see what needed to be done. Kaunda was helping Nkomo. Kenya was helping Nkomo too, morally, because Kenya believed that what happened in Zimbabwe would determine what would happen in Namibia. Moi had told Nkomo to form a government of National Unity.

President Carter asked if Moi would like to predict how things would turn out in Zimbabwe. Moi said he hoped things would go well. It would be a choice between Mugabe and Nkomo. Moi reiterated his view that if the Soviets supplied arms and the US supplied economic assistance to a particular country, the US was strengthening its enemy. Western countries should learn this basic fact.

The basic principles of Kenya were unity, peace and love. It was necessary to have all three of these. Israel, for example, must not only be well-armed but must learn to love the Palestinians.

Iraq—Iraq was a country in between, Moi said. The President asked if Moi had visited Iraq. Moi replied he had been invited but he had not been able to go there yet. The President said we would like to have more normal relations with Iraq but they were reluctant.

Kenyan Facilities—In principle it was agreeable for the US to use Kenyan facilities, Moi said. The Kenyan Government would appreciate, Moi said, that the word “facilities” is used and not “bases”. The President assured Moi that we would try to be careful and refer only to use of facilities. Moi said that Kenya already shared many things with the US, and in Mombasa, for example, US naval personnel often assisted in the repair of Kenyan naval equipment or vessels. The President asked how relations were between US military forces and Kenya’s during US naval ship visits to Mombasa. Were they friendly? Moi replied that personal relations were excellent and the personnel of our respective military forces were very friendly with one another. They considered themselves comrades in arms.

Kenya’s Problems—Like other countries in the world, Moi continued, Kenya had a problem today resulting from the rise in oil prices, worldwide inflation, the increase in prices of most imports and the decline in prices of Kenya’s major exports (coffee and tea). The past year had also been difficult for Kenya because of poor weather conditions. As a result there was not enough food this year to feed the people. Kenya usually grew enough maize and wheat to export. Maize was a staple food in Kenya. The decline in agricultural production affected revenues, yet at the same time the government was buying F–5Es which increased Defense expenditures. The result of these several factors was a large increase in the balance of payments gap. He had instructed government departments to cut expenditures wherever possible, even cutting out some services.

They were working to increase food production so that next year Kenya would once again be self-sufficient. He had also created a Ministry of Energy, Moi said, to study these problems.

Some European countries (UK and Switzerland) had offered to help by writing off some of Kenyan’s debts. He had talked to the Germans about these things and they were seeing how they could help. He estimated the balance of payments gap at $150 million during 1980/81. He needed to cover this gap in order to sustain economic development in the country and to ensure continuing stability. He was requesting, therefore, an additional $100 million in balance of payments help, rather than the $18 million originally requested. Secondly, he needed help with the existing military FMS debt of $93 million. He hoped this debt would be waived or rescheduled. If that were difficult, then perhaps some form of other assistance from UNICEF or other UN agencies could be obtained. Those were his problems, Moi said. The people of Kenya were stable and he had their confidence. Without assistance, however, it would be difficult for Kenya in 1980 and therefore he was asking help from his friends.

President Carter said that it would be very helpful to us if President Moi could discuss his problems and Kenya’s needs in detail with the Secretary of Defense⁷ and the Acting Secretary of State⁸ during his meetings with them. They should discuss whether or how payments might be delayed and whether there were other means to manage these problems. It might be possible, for example, for the US to increase its shipments of PL–480 food to Kenya. He hoped, however, that there can be a permanent improvement in Kenyan production of corn and wheat. The US was prepared to share with Kenya the knowledge it had gained of how to improve our agricultural production. The harvests recently had been good.

The overall levels of US aid to Kenya, the President said, could not be raised much more than the delegation which recently visited Kenya had indicated.⁹ Nevertheless, President Moi and his advisors should discuss these matters with other members of his administration during the visit.

Olympic Steering Committee—The President said he hoped it would be possible for Kenya to be represented on the Committee that was seeking to make arrangements for a new place to hold the Olympic games. The President asked President Moi to designate one of the members of his delegation to this task. After a brief consultation with other members of his delegation, Moi designated Ambassador Mbogua.

President Carter commented that alternate games were now supported by about 50 nations which had made firm or at least tentative statements on this issue. Some countries were not as firm as Kenya on this matter and were waiting to see if the Soviets would withdraw from Afghanistan. The Soviets were having difficulty in Afghanistan, the President commented, in that freedom fighters throughout the country were effective. As a result, the Soviets had continued to send in troops and the US now estimated they had 100,000 soldiers in Afghanistan. Today Afghanistan loyalists controlled several regional towns and the Soviets only controlled the central sector of Afghanistan. We did not believe the Soviets would withdraw their forces. We intended to stand firm and would not send our athletes to Moscow. We hoped that others would also stand firm. We intended to keep in close touch with Kenya as circumstances changed.

The President said he hoped Moi would take the initiative to improve relations with Somalia and Sudan, as well as with Uganda and Tanzania. The recent meeting in Arusha, for example, was helpful. The US would be prepared to assist him in improving his relations with Sadat and the Saudis. He could help us, in return, in improving our relations with Iraq which are difficult because of our involvement in the Israeli-Egypt peace process. The President said he was prepared to encourage greater trade and investment by US firms in Kenya. Such additional investment would provide more jobs. Should Moi desire a special trade mission to facilitate increased investment, the President said Moi should let him know through either his Ambassador or the US Ambassador in Nairobi.

Should Moi desire a briefing on intelligence matters or on the President’s relations with other leaders in the Middle East, Pakistan or India, he should send the President a message. The President added that he intended to take Moi’s advice and to look into keeping Kaunda from depending solely on the Soviets for weapons. He would further explore this matter both directly and with the UK. We were optimistic that in another week or ten days there would be a successful election in Zimbabwe. We believe such an event would help break the impasse in Namibia as well as contribute to improvements in the situation in Angola. We planned to share with President Moi whatever information we had on these subjects and would be seeking his advice.

Population Problems—The President asked Mr. Christopher if there were any other matters that should be taken up. Mr. Christopher said that the rate of population growth in Kenya may well be one of Kenya’s most serious problems. The President chided Moi that it would be difficult for Moi as the father of seven children to take the lead in such a campaign. Moi responded that in fact he had publicly urged Kenyans not to produce children that couldn’t be taken care of. The President asked Moi if he had discussed this issue with any other governments. Moi said he had looked at what had been done to control population in Singapore. The President said Prime Minister Lee had done a good job but he had a small country.

Mr. Christopher suggested that it might be a good idea to convene a conference on population matters in Kenya. This might stimulate interest in the problem in Kenya. The US would be willing to help to sponsor such a conference. Moi and other members of his delegation indicated an interest in this proposal.

The President noted that even Catholic countries such as Mexico were becoming concerned by the problem. Moi said Catholics in Kenya were willing to cooperate in population programs. The President commented that Lee in Singapore used penalties and rewards to cut down population growth but that such a system would be difficult for Kenya because Kenya is so large. There might be other ways to tackle the problem.

Ambassador Le Melle commented that what Kenya has needed is policy leadership in this field. Kenya was one of the first countries to establish in 1966 a population council. Now that President Moi was giving this problem his personal leadership it was being taken up at the working levels. Moi said it was difficult to start a new program like this because of the current financial difficulties. He had also found that people won’t listen to parents of large families but will listen to young couples who after having one or two children stopped having more. They are the most effective spokesmen for population control. The President commented that he had been governor of a southern state with a high birth rate. He found the most effective slogan was the phrase “we want every child to be a wanted child”. If this problem is handled sensitively an effective program can be operated. Mrs. Gandhi in India had initiated a very rigid program, perhaps too rigid. China was also working on the problem. There was financial assistance available from international organizations for support of a population program.

The President closed the meeting by noting that some of the points covered could be discussed in greater length at Acting Secretary Christopher’s lunch for the Kenyan party at the Department of State. The President said he would be looking forward to seeing Moi this evening as his guest at the White House. There would be time for a private meeting, he reminded, before the dinner if Moi had any points he wished to raise as a result of his day of talks.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 38, Memcons: President 2/80. Secret. Drafted on March 16 by Beyer; cleared by Harrop and Funk. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room at the White House.
2. In telegram 47717 to Nairobi, February 22, the Department summarized the meeting between Moi and Carter. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P880026–0399)
3. Kenyan elections took place on November 8, 1979.
4. For the welcoming remarks of both Presidents Carter and Moi, see Public Papers of the Presidents: Jimmy Carter, 1980–81, Book I, pp. 352–354.
5. In telegram 32 from Dar es Salaam, January 3, the Embassy reported on an East African summit of Moi, Binaisa, and Nyerere in Arusha on January 2 to “discuss common problems.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800007–0534) In telegram 141 from Dar es Salaam, January 8, the Embassy reported more details on the meeting, in which “little concrete resulted.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800015–0650)
6. In telegram 3839 from Mogadishu, October 22, 1979, the Embassy reported on a meeting between Moose and Siad, in which Siad had requested that the United States help Kenya and Somalia improve their relationship. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790483–1061)
7. Telegram 54823 to Nairobi, transmitted the memorandum of conversation between Moi and Brown, in which they discussed security concerns along the border with Somalia, Kenya’s balance of payments problem, and Kenyan desire to modernize its armed forces. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800105–0704)
8. See Document 174.
9. In telegram 456 from Mogadishu, February 6, the Embassy reported on a February 4 meeting of a U.S. team led by Bartholomew and Moi, in which Moi agreed to U.S. use and development of Kenyan bases, welcomed U.S. military and economic assistance, and agreed to increased U.S. flight and ship visits. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P880031–1903)