150. Memorandum From the Director of the Joint State/Defense Survey Team to Kenya (Hill) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Jones)1
SUBJECT
- Preliminary Findings Joint State/Defense Survey Team to Kenya (U)
1. (U) Undersigned was the Director of the Joint State-Defense Survey Team dispatched to Kenya to assess the threats confronting that nation and the capacity and needs of its Armed Forces to meet these threats. The Team, representing all military departments, OJCS, OSD, European Command, The State Department, and US Embassy (Nairobi), conducted the survey of Kenyan Armed Forces, during the period 18 March–5 April.
2. (C) Our preliminary findings are as follows:
a. Intelligence.
(1) Somalia presents the principal threat to Kenya; tentatively, Somalia has the capability to launch several brigades, with the total strength of a division sized force with limited air and naval support, against Kenya’s Armed Forces. In addition, there is present in Uganda a force sufficient to launch attacks against Kenya in brigade strength. Our best estimate is that Somalia and Uganda will be in a position to launch such attacks within 0 to two years. Over the longer-term of three to five years, a combination of Soviet-Armed Ethiopian or Tanzanian Forces, assisted by Cuban Surrogates, would be in a position to launch attacks of corps-level strength against Kenya. During the next five [Page 399] years, in conjunction with a Somali-Ugandan or Ethiopian-Tanzanian attack, insurgency by the Somali population of Northeast Kenya is probable.
(2) Analysis of terrain discloses the following key points:
(a) There is sufficient space between the borders and key areas to trade space for time except opposite Uganda and Tanzania in the Mombassa port area.
(b) The terrain opposite Somalia favors the attacker, with unobstructed mobility and poor defensive fields of fire due to brush, which will make ground-fired wire guided missiles ineffective and limit tank main gun effectiveness.
b. The Kenyan Armed Forces presently have negligible capabilities to counter the above hostile capabilities. The ground forces are essentially infantry with no antitank defense or air defense means. Some tanks and artillery, on order from Great Britain, will not significantly affect the deficiency in the antitank means, since the equipment on order could not be effectively operated in the terrain facing Somalia. The Air Force is based on obsolete combat and training aircraft with extremely low operational readiness rates. Air support and airlift aircraft, although more advanced, are limited and small.
The incoming squadron of F–5E’s represent a considerable improvement as a general purpose fighter, however the lack of an adequate ground environment (radar, commo, etc.), reduces the capability. The Navy consists of seven patrol boats, three of which are obsolete and in questionable material condition. All vessels are lightly armed, short-ranged, weather limited coastal craft. Plans to improve weapons capability by installing GABRIEL surface-to-surface missile systems have been approved for two craft commencing in March 1979. The other two ships of this class are expected to receive the SSM conversion at a later date. The Armed Forces major asset is a well educated and disciplined enlisted man who compares favorably with US enlisted personnel. The officer corps, on the other hand, particularly at the higher level, is not well-grounded professionally.
3. (S) The Survey Team is developing alternative equipment-training-logistics packages which will augment existing third country programs. The Team approach will involve low, middle, and high cost force improvement packages that are balanced, integrated and time-phased. These will be based on a one-year (quick fix), a two-to four-year period, and an out-year period. The alternative packages will include capital investment costs and increased operating costs associated with force improvement, together with an assessment of the likely impact of these increased costs on the Kenyan economy.
All three alternatives, (force packages) will consider the present equipment on hand and equipment on order from third country [Page 400] nations. Primary emphasis will be placed on avoiding the mixing of similar typed equipment from two or more nations. As an example. the Kenyans are programmed to receive the British Vickers tank (105mm main gun) commencing March 1979. This weapon system provides an adequate armor capability and US tanks will not be recommended as they would complicate the equipment mix. Also, the Kenyans are procurring the United Kingdom’s new 105mm light gun (total of 18) with a maximum range of 17,000 meters. This gun adequately fulfills the immediate field artillery requirement, negating the purchasing of US Howitzers. Similarly, equipment alternatives will be considered to provide the required capability, such as using either TOW or HOT missiles to counter the armor threats.
In addition, the report will identify actions which the Government of Kenya can initiate to improve the capabilities of its Armed Forces, regardless of the type or quantity of new equipment it decides to procure. These include providing dispersal facilities for fighters, constructing taxi ways to enhance the efficiency of fighter bases, bolstering logistic systems, and correcting deficiencies in the officer training program.
No overall cost estimates are presently calculated, however, it is estimated that the initial costs will be low, with emphasis on reform of support systems and integration of equipment on order.
4. (S) Additional factors that bear on US policy are:
a. The Kenyans are experiencing serious difficulties with the British military supply system due to the obsolescence of equipment provided and inadequate logistics backup for available equipment. The Kenyans are developing a close tie with Israel, who is training Kenyan technicians and supplying some key items.
b. The Kenyan political and senior military leadership has provided only partial policy direction, inspiration, and management control. This deficiency adversely affects the professionalism and ability of the Armed Forces to develop the organization and human resources necessary to effectively transition to modern equipment.
c. The physical infirmities of President Kenyatta make the question of political succession a key issue at this time. There is significant dissatisfaction among junior officers which could be an important factor in the post-Kenyatta period should a struggle for power among various contenders prove destabilizing.
d. However, the overall potential of the country is promising. Kenya possesses a capable, educated population, a soundly developing economy, and a significant young leadership with strong nationalistic motivation.
5. (U) An overview of preliminary findings, to include those items that the Kenyans must do for themselves, were presented to members [Page 401] of the US Embassy, the Kenyan Armed Services, and to the Deputy Commander in Chief, USEUCOM. A written report is being prepared with an availability date of three weeks.
Major General, USA
- Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–81–0202, Box 58, Kenya 091.3—1978. Secret. The date is handwritten. In an April 11 handwritten note forwarding the memorandum to Duncan, Lieutenant General W.Y. Smith wrote, “Mr. Duncan, General Jones asked that I provide the attached to you. The complete report on the Kenya trip will be available in about 3 weeks I’m told. I have given a copy of this to Thor Hanson to pass to the NSC Staff. Bill. Cc: Thor Hanson.” The handwritten note is stamped “April 13, 1978 Dep Sec has seen.” (Ibid.)↩