Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XVII, Part 2, Sub-Saharan Africa

144. Telegram From the Embassy in Burundi to the Department of State¹

Bujumbura, June 27, 1977, 0550Z

722. Subject: Tour d’Horizon With President Bagaza.

1. Summary. During 105 minutes entirely alone with President Bagaza, I ranged over almost all questions of interest to US and to West about Burundi’s foreign orientation, its internal stability, political rivalries, developmental aspirations, Hutu-Tutsi relations,² human rights, attitudes toward Zaire and Rwanda, and the Korean question. The last three items will be covered in septels,³ while this general cable seeks to convey the current state of play regarding the Bagaza regime. In brief, it is a heterogeneous administration, with many conflicting strains pulling at a very sober, intellectual, philosophical, idealistic and relatively moderate young President. He is quite aware of his political enemies, who tend to be radicals in domestic and foreign policy preferences, while simultaneously less concerned about reconciliation with the Hutus and a new deal for the masses. Bagaza is quietly building up his power base, and his watchword to me was prudence and, above all, patience in tactics. End summary.

2. I started the conversation with a general statement about American policy in Africa under the Carter administration, with our increased pressures for peaceful but drastic change in Southern Africa, with our greater flexibility on North-South issues, and with our determination to increase our contributions to development in the neediest African nations, including Burundi. Bagaza reiterated his satisfaction with Washington’s course and added that he had found similar reactions among other chiefs of state whom he had met in recent months (mentioning Nyerere specifically). He reiterated his statement to me of a few months ago that he fervently hoped that the transfer to majority rule in Rhodesia could be peaceful, because, otherwise, the destruction would be enormous and would set back the quest for a decent life in the area for 20 years or more. He indicated approval for the results of the initiatives of the Western Five⁴ with South Africa on Namibia (after I offered a summary rundown of the negotiations), but he said frankly that these were matters in which Burundi could play little role. He would not rpt not personally go to the OAU summit in Libreville.⁵

3. I told Bagaza that with our growing interest in Africa and our hopes in the next years to become substantially more active in furnishing bilateral assistance to Burundi, we were also more concerned to know where his government would be leading the country. In regard to foreign policy orientation, we saw a tendency to displace foreign experts, Western businessmen, and even some missionaries. I had evidence that the Surete (secret police) checked up on U.S. Embassy contacts with Burundian friends and worried about the supposed preferences of American missionaries for Hutus. The media talked more about divisions among Burundians between revolutionaries and reactionaries, and the latter were linked to “imperialism”, which had anti-Western connotations. It was a fact not only for the U.S. Embassy, but for all Western Embassies, that the requirement that all social contacts with Burundians be arranged through the Protocol Office had severely chilled such contacts and led almost to their disappearance. In regard to domestic policy, we noticed ever tighter controls over private businesses (Burundian and foreign) and an increasing resort to state intervention and regulation as a cure for all ills. I commented that statism posed enough problems even in developed countries, but in nations such as Burundi, with an inadequate number of well trained officials, with weak bureaucratic traditions, and with strong habits of corruption, unbridled statism could become a real burden on development. I referred to the planned top level UPRONA party⁶ “seminar” in late July and asked whether it would be proclaiming a new leftist shift in Burundi’s policies.

4. The President said that no Marxist program would be set forth for Burundi, and the country would not become a socialist state. It would remain non-aligned, but its primary orientation for development would be on the West. There were more non-governmental Europeans in Burundi now than before independence. He reiterated that his regime was reformist; it was trying to create a new national spirit of unity and morality. Since the masses of peasants, both Hutus and Tutsis, had suffered most from Micombero’s misrule,⁷ his government’s priority would be on rejuvenating the countryside and modernizing it. However, mentalities had to change equally in the cities. In the past, a small elitist clique in government and business had worked hand in glove to appropriate for themselves a lopsided share of the nation’s wealth, and this had occurred through every manner of corruption and illegality. Of course, these privileged people were now screaming for sympathy as they were forced to change their ways. They knew how to approach foreigners to try to gain their support. This is why the regime had quite deliberately sought to cut off contacts with diplomats in November. But it was not rpt not true that there was any particular suspicion of Americans or missionaries. I suggested that diplomats really did not rpt not want to deal with political has-beens, but with the ministers and officials now on the top. Hence, the curtailment of social contacts for diplomats was self-defeating for the regime. Bagaza said that matters had now evolved far enough so that a relaxation on contacts could start.

5. I also commented that a policy of moderate and controlled reform needed leadership. The President had showed this during his two month tour of the provinces at the beginning of the year, but now he was out of the limelight and some observers said that there was a leadership vacuum. If this was the case, other elements would try to fill it, and I mentioned (UN Ambassador) Simbananiye’s attempts to return to a job in Burundi where he could intrigue more successfully for his leftist and anti-Western policies. I could not rpt not understand how he and others in his group had escaped arrest when 80 or so others had been jailed pending trial about five months ago for past corruption. I cited what I had personally heard about the embezzlement and misappropriation of public funds of Simbananiye, Prime Minister Nzambimana (when he was Public Works Minister in the old regime), and several current ambassadors.

6. Bagaza said I seemed to be well informed even without social contacts. He knew of these charges against people who held high posts in the new government. However, one could not rpt not arrest such people for trial without documentary or other very strong proof. On the other hand, their continued presence in high posts would not rpt not prevent their dismissal and arrest if proof were found. I asked whether he was saying that, since most of these people had helped him to make the coup d’etat on November first, he was more or less in debt to them politically and thus had to accommodate his principles somewhat to political realities. Bagaza said that I must know of the inherent instabilities in Burundi, which had created divisions between ethnic groups, regions, and clans. It was essential to put all this behind them if a modern society was ever to emerge. Hence, he could not rpt not act in such a way as to give the appearance of favoring one region over another, or one clan over another. This made it essential that he bide his time. I should know that investigations were continuing quietly all the time against the people I had named, and others. If enough evidence appeared, he would act, but meantime, the watchword was prudence and, above all, patience.

7. Comment. Though, in parting, Bagaza said that he had enjoyed our conversation because I had made my points strongly and was one of the “rare” ambassadors who told him the truth, he still did not rpt not answer all of my questions directly. He did not rpt not disavow the statist tendencies in the regime, whatever the distinction he drew between that and both Marxism and socialism. I feel that he has rather negative feelings about local free enterprise and that he will try to regulate it severely without taking formal measures to halt it. This attitude has already sapped the confidence of local businessmen, and their holding back on new capital investment and inventory buildup will further prejudice the regime against them. On the other hand, Bagaza would welcome foreign investment in Burundi by larger scale, more modern enterprises, and this means that if U.S. and other investors ever decide that Burundi nickel is an attractive prospect, Bagaza will most probably accept them eagerly.

8. Bagaza also did not respond directly to my queries about the party line that will emerge from the July seminar. However, by his remarks about Simbananiye and the latter’s cohort, Prime Minister Nzambimana, it is clear that he recognizes the efforts of these men to gain a predominant position both personally and politically to his (Bagaza’s) disadvantage. I sense that the President is feeling his way to a confrontation, but, at all costs, wishes to avoid a premature showdown. Thus, he really does not rpt not know just what political line will emerge a month hence, though he personally favors more moderation.

9. About a month ago, rumors spread everywhere in town that Bagaza was about to dismiss Nzambimana and other ministers, but this was later denied and ascribed to an effort by the adherents of the old regime to sow confusion. Father Barakana, the ex-university rector, has told us that the rumors were in fact correct, but that Bagaza backed away from his action because it would have been unseemly to act amidst such public speculation. This version rings true, and, if so, it means that Nzambimana is well aware of the critical challenge that he and others of his (Matana) group face from Bagaza. Perhaps this is why Nzambimana is trying to build up his own more radical constituency. For instance, in a speech at the construction site for the Chinese textile plant on June 22, Nzambimana decried “imperialist” economic aid to Burundi which, unlike Chinese, allegedly tries to block Burundi’s development and to saddle the country with foreign experts indefinitely instead of training native cadres. If Nzambimana is thus, through his demogogy, trying to make himself into a folk hero and less vulnerable to dismissal by Bagaza, we may indeed well be facing a month of fairly critical internal realignment for the future orientation of Burundi’s second republic.

Mark

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D7700228–0703. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Sent for information to Brussels, Dar es Salaam, Kigali, and Kinshasa.
2. In 1972, members of the Hutu population rebelled against the ruling Tutsi population. In response, the Tutsis killed all prominent Hutus. For the U.S. reaction, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol E–5, Documents on Sub-Saharan Africa, 1969–1972, Documents 220, 221, 222, and 223.
3. In telegram 741 from Bujumbura, June 28, the Embassy reported on the condition of human rights in Burundi, arguing that there was no tradition in the Western sense of respect for the individual and that corruption and ethnic tensions were rampant, but that the country was still attempting to stabilize after the 1972 genocide. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770230–1140) In telegram 723 from Bujumbura, June 27, the Embassy reported that Burundi’s relations with Zaire were “frozen” and with Rwanda beset by “malaise.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770228–0713) In telegram 727 from Bujumbura, June 27, the Embassy reported that Ambassador Mark had encouraged President Bagaza to open lines of communication with South Korea, instead of maintaining exclusive ties with North Korea. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770228–0824)
4. The Western Five refers to the United States, United Kingdom, France, Canada, and West Germany, and their diplomatic efforts to bring independence to Namibia.
5. The OAU summit was held July 2–5 in Libreville.
6. UPRONA (Union pour le Progrés National or the Union for National Progress) was the ruling party in Burundi since independence.
7. Former President Michel Micombero was deposed by a military coup in November 1976.