—on the diplomatic front, we can act through intermediaries
(Egyptians, Saudis, perhaps the Germans) to try to defuse the
situation;3
—on the humanitarian side, we can charter an aircraft to evacuate
those Americans who wish to leave, provided Amin is willing to let them
go;
—on the public front, we should say very little;
—on the military end, we can exert some pressure by naval presence,
but effective application of force would take 2½ days to
develop.
Finally, it should be noted that if a genuine crisis develops and action
has to be taken, Kenya and Tanzania would be willing to assist us, and
Tanzania has already even indicated an interest in toppling Amin personally.
Attachment
Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Assistant
for National Security Affairs (Aaron) to President Carter
4
Washington, February 25, 1977
At Dr. Brzezinski’s request,
I chaired a working level meeting of the SCC to consider the situation in Uganda and possible
U.S. responses.
The Situation
There are no new developments that we are aware of in Uganda except
the letter which President Amin has directed to you, Secretary General
Waldheim and a number of
others.5 That
letter essentially responds to charges of human rights violations in
Uganda and makes some counter charges concerning the U.S. It makes
no threats against the U.S. nor does it mention his order to have
all Americans assemble in Kampala on Monday. It does contain the
ominous note that the United States was involved in a recent plan to
invade Uganda, “based on information from 16 people involved in the
plot” who were arrested yesterday.6
[1 paragraph (4 lines) not declassified]
Diplomatic Actions
The State Department is in the process of sending out cables to
African leaders who might be influential with Amin. These messages express our
deep concern over what might happen to our people. The [Page 367] State Department estimates
that this diplomatic activity is not likely to show clear results
for 36–48 hours. It may have to be supplemented by further
diplomatic activity.
It was the consensus of the Working Group that our strategy at this
stage should be to put heavy pressure insofar as we can on Uganda
but not to do so publicly. It is the State Department’s judgment
that public pressure will only provoke
greater counter-action by Amin and may well make him less flexible. If we can
keep Amin faithful to what
he has said thus far—that he is merely calling people in to Kampala
to choose whether they wish to go or stay—we might get through this
without too much trouble.
You will not, however, be able to avoid public
comment. You are currently meeting with Secretary General
Waldheim and some
statement on this subject will be necessary. We will also be pressed
for our answer to Amin’s
letter. On both, we would propose to say the minimum. (Press guidance on both is
attached.)7
Military Actions
Everyone agrees that military actions should only be undertaken in
extremis and that we should avoid preparations now which would
become public and create a crisis atmosphere.
However, the aircraft carrier Enterprise and some other supporting
cruisers are in the general area. They have been directed to proceed
to a position 100 miles off the coast of Kenya. At the current rate
of advance (20 knots), the Enterprise will arrive at noon tomorrow.
Secretary Duncan is
concerned that if the fact of the Enterprise’s movements become
public knowledge, this could be seized by Amin as a pretext for further
action. You should be aware that the Enterprise is being shadowed by
Soviet ships and planes, and the Soviets could well inform Amin.
Everyone believes it is only prudent to move the Enterprise into the
area although it would have no value in helping us evacuate
Americans. It is capable only of offensive operations. It is
probably desirable therefore to slow the carrier down or alter
course slightly so that its mission is not so evident in the next 24
hours.
Other Actions
It was agreed that it might be desirable to offer to send an airplane
to Entebbe to take out those Americans who wish to leave. This would
be consistent with Amin’s
offer. The State Department is arranging to be able to put a
charter—probably foreign flag aircraft—into Entebbe [Page 368] by late Sunday. Your approval of this
step would be required before any action.8
It may prove necessary or desirable to send someone to speak on our
behalf with Amin and observe
his meeting with the Americans on Monday. One suggestion is that we
ask a foreigner such as the Egyptian Foreign Minister or a Saudi to
do this for us. It may be necessary given Amin’s psychology, to send an
American. The State Department will provide us with a list of
possible “emissaries” this afternoon.9
It was also suggested that we might wish to hold a Security Council
meeting. It was generally agreed that this should come only if we
switch to the strategy of applying public pressure. The threat of
holding such a meeting may prove useful to the Africans in
encouraging them to work with Amin.10
Military options are not attractive for reasons that are fairly
obvious. To move in force we would employ elements of the 82d
Airborne which would take 2½ days for the lead elements to arrive,
Major readiness steps could not be taken without public notice
although there are some smaller steps that could be undertaken with
minimum risks if you should so order.
To summarize, we are
— refraining from public comment insofar as possible
— preparing to send a foreign flag aircraft to pick up the Americans
if necessary
— developing a list of possible emissaries
— moving the Enterprise into position
— developing our military planning so that we can act in extremis
— Putting on diplomatic pressure11
If you agree with these steps, the only further decision you need to
take at this point is whether to slow down the Enterprise.
Yes, Slow it down
No, keep it on course for now12
By late this afternoon or early tomorrow morning, you will wish to
decide whether to offer an airplane to pick up the Americans and
whether to offer to arrange to send an emissary.13
We do not have a realistic military option of moving in force before
Monday. After we see what happens then, we will reassess the
situation.
