Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XVII, Part 2, Sub-Saharan Africa

132. Interagency Intelligence Memorandum¹

NI IIM 80–10005

Washington, March 7, 1980

Sudan: The Nimeiri Regime Under Pressure

[Omitted here are the table of contents, foreword, and a map.]

KEY JUDGMENTS

The greater US role in the northwestern Indian Ocean area has made it increasingly important from Washington’s point of view to have a friendly and moderate government in Khartoum. Sudanese President Nimeiri’s support for the Middle East peace process, in the face of pressure from other Arab states, has also given his country a new significance.

The most serious challenge to Nimeiri’s regime is economic. Despite international financial action, the economic outlook is bleak. Serious shortages of consumer goods and a declining standard of living could cause outbreaks of popular unrest and dissatisfaction within the security forces—Nimeiri’s main base of support—that could threaten his government. The possibility of a commercial-size oil find, his political skill, and the disunity of the opposition will improve his prospects somewhat.

If Nimeiri were deposed, the military presumably would remain in control, although it is possible that a successor regime would be nominally civilian led. In either case, the successor regime would probably identify less with US interests in the area and move some distance toward the Arab consensus, especially with regard to policy toward Egypt and the peace process.² A less likely alternative would be a successor regime controlled by military officers who favored a closer alignment with the hardline Arab states.

US ability to influence Sudanese policy depends primarily on how the Sudanese perceive US resolve and strength. Sudan wants a strong friend and military patron to counter threats it sees presented by the USSR, Ethiopia, and Libya.

As Nimeiri’s hope for political survival over the short term depends in part on his ability to have bread and flour on store shelves when the traditional lean summer season arrives, probably the most important thing that the United States could do to aid him in the near term would be to increase food aid.

[Omitted here is the body of the memorandum.]

1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, History Staff Files. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. This memorandum was prepared by the National Intelligence Officer for Africa with contributions from various components of the National Foreign Assessment Center, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Foreign Broadcast Information Service.
2. For the views of the Defense Intelligence Agency on this sentence, see footnote 7 at paragraph 75 of the Discussion section. [Footnote is in the original.]