Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XVII, Part 2, Sub-Saharan Africa

127. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, September 11, 1979, 2:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

• US-Zaire Relations.

PARTICIPANTS

• Zaire

  • President Mobutu Sese Seko
  • Nguza Karl-I-Bond, State Commissioner for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation
  • Maitre Nimy, Director, Office of the President
  • Ambassador Kasongo Mutuale, Zairian Ambassador to US
  • Seti Yale, Special Counselor to President Mobutu

• US

  • Secretary Vance
  • Under Secretary Newsom
  • William C. Harrop, Acting Assistant Secretary for African Affairs
  • Lannon Walker, Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs
  • Lewis D. Junior, Director, AF/C (notetaker)

(Note: President Mobutu and the Secretary had just, prior to this meeting, met with President Carter in the White House.)

The Secretary said he wished to pick up the thread from the preceding conversation. He wondered what the security situation was on the Zairian border with Angola and what effect the succession in Luanda would have on that situation.² Were there currently any problems concerning resurgency of the Katangan Gendarmes?

President Mobutu said that all depends upon who will be Neto’s successor. On the one hand there is Pascoal Luvualu who is well and favorably known to Zaire and who would be an acceptable successor from the GOZ viewpoint. The second candidate, however, is Lucio Lara whom President Mobutu considers to be dangerous, a man of the left, and in tight relationship with the Cubans and the Soviets. In regard to the gendarmes, Neto had kept his promises; the gendarmes remaining in Angola are no problem. However, “most” of the gendarmes have fled to Zambia, posing a small problem there. President Kaunda presumably would not voluntarily let them act against Zaire but, given the difficulty of Zambia in controlling that part of its territory, something could happen. Zaire, however, is not greatly concerned because the conditions for such aggression are not favorable; things have evolved for the better in Shaba in the recent past.

Moreover, said Mobutu, he had received agreement that the French, the Belgians and the Chinese military trainers will stay on for two more years in a training capacity to assure that the new Zairian armed forces would be well trained and well officered. The French and Belgians are now integrated in command roles with the newly deployed forces in Shaba. They are working closely with their Zairian counterparts, who should be well-trained at the end of the period.

The Secretary said he wished to make a few general comments concerning Zaire. We all recognize that much remains to be done in Zaire but we have also noted the points of progress in the recent past. These include the new agreement with the IMF,³ the presence of controller-experts in the Banks and the French and the Belgian training effort. The next three months will be very difficult for Zaire. It will take real determination for President Mobutu and his colleagues to stay within the IMF guidelines and to persist with the important question of military reform. The Secretary congratulated President Mobutu on the relationship which he had worked out with President Neto of Angola. He hoped President Mobutu would be able to work with Neto’s successor in a constructive fashion to help maintain peace in the area. The Secretary added that he was impressed by the evolving roles of the Prime Minister and the Parliament in Zaire, a point which President Carter himself had mentioned in the earlier meeting. The Secretary felt it was important that the Prime Minister and his Parliament be permitted to fulfill the promise inherent in those offices. He then asked how President Mobutu saw the development of the economic and financial situation in Zaire in the months ahead.

President Mobutu said that the success of the IMF plan would depend, not only on Zairian determination, but also in large part on assistance from Zaire’s partners. This had been a point discussed at the meeting in Brussels in November of last year when it had been agreed that, following emplacement of a satisfactory stabilization plan in Zaire, the various partners would proceed with their assistance programs.⁴ The USG at that time had indicated a program of help in the range of $35 million or $40 million. Without such external help Zaire will not be able to pursue its plan of recovery and development.

Secretary Vance replied that we will be monitoring carefully the implementation of the IMF agreement. He was well aware of its contents. President McNamara of the IBRD had discussed the matter with him and had noted that not only the IMF but also the IBRD would also be watching the program closely.

The Secretary said that we look forward to working with the Foreign Minister and the Prime Minister. With particular respect to Foreign Minister Nguza, we have found that any problems between us have been settled rapidly and satisfactory with his good help.

President Mobutu said that it was important for him and his colleagues to know that the Americans are supportive of Zaire.

The Secretary responded that, given the long ties between our two countries, President Mobutu could count on the US to help the execution of his reform programs.

The Secretary informed President Mobutu that in the very near future we will be asking agrément for a very good American Ambassador to Kinshasa, a distinguished foreign service officer, a man whom the Secretary knows well having worked with him for the past three years.⁵ The delay in asking agrément was, in fact, due to the difficulty of detaching him from his present responsibilities.

Turning to the broader issues of southern Africa, Secretary Vance asked President Mobutu’s views on the current conference in London on Zimbabwe/Rhodesia, and on the Namibian question.

Concerning Zimbabwe/Rhodesia President Mobutu said that the major important fact is that all of the parties have come together in London. He, Mobutu, had personally always held the view that a settlement could come only by such a conference. He had pressed this on his African friends and at the recent OAU Summit Meeting. He, Mobutu, felt that there is no escaping the fact that this is their problem which can be worked out only together. The important thing is that they should continue to talk to each other.

On Namibia, Mobutu said neither SWAPO nor the SAG are playing by the rules. South Africa would likely accept an independent Namibia only reluctantly. The South Africans were concerned that a Namibian independence would result in a communist government installed on their border. On the other side, Neto had told Mobutu of his tough problems with SWAPO since, according to Neto, SWAPO President Nujoma was afraid to participate in elections he thought he might lose.

Returning to Rhodesia the Secretary said that we are fully supportive of Great Britain in arriving at a peaceful settlement. There was a good chance of drafting a satisfactory new constitution. New elections under such constitution would, of course, be desirable but they would be more difficult, perhaps, to arrive at than the first step of agreeing on constitution.

President Mobutu noted that he had been active in working with leaders such as Kaunda, Nyerere and Obansanjo to encourage an all-parties conference. Everyone seemed more or less agreed with his viewpoint. He added that, while he would not wish to criticise his Nigerian colleagues, he felt that their attitudes “did not make the task any easier.” However, Nyerere has changed for the better and encouraged President Mobutu in his efforts.

Secretary Vance said that Neto’s death might have an unfortunate influence on moving the Namibia problem to a successful conclusion. Were Neto’s successor not of the same view as Neto, the chances of a solution might well disappear.

Mobutu commented that Neto’s death was indeed unfortunate. Turning to another subject Mobutu said that it was not to him to offer advice to the United States Government but he did wish to suggest that the Secretary should follow the Western Sahara question carefully. Developments there could be dangerous. The Secretary agreed, noting that the situation in the Western Sahara had been both dangerous and fragile during the last two months.

Mobutu commented that Algeria alone was no particular problem for Morocco but with other players involved, such as Libyans and the Russians, there was a potential for the question to become very big one.

The Secretary said he wished to return to the subject of US assistance to Zaire, which had been raised only briefly in the cabinet room. He said that the continued progress on reform in Zaire was the key to our ability to maintain current levels of economic and military assistance. We are following closely the progress of the new army units in Shaba; we are pleased that they seem to be making a real effort to enlist the support of the population in Shaba.

Mobutu commented that the units were under strict orders. Mr. Walker had seen them in Zaire during his recent visit and could testify to the state of their discipline.

The Secretary said he wished to raise another problem area, i.e., the lack of agreement so far on rescheduling of the Zairian private and public debt. This was significant because the issue was linked to the question of our ability to provide aid. President Mobutu immediately intervened to say that we should not raise new conditions to US assistance beyond those agreed to at Brussels.

Mr. Walker explained that the linkage lies in our inability to disburse assistance when Zaire is in arrears on its debts. The purpose of rescheduling of the debt was to eliminate the problem of arrearages. He also mentioned to the Secretary that Lazard Freres is now advising the government of Zaire on the question of rescheduling of the debt in the London and Paris Clubs.⁶

Mr. Harrop said that President Mobutu was undoubtedly aware of the very strong criticism to which Zaire had been subjected in the Congress. President Mobutu would be seeing important Congressional personalities tomorrow and would be able to get a first hand appreciation of their attitudes. This was important because it is to the Congress that we must turn for the resources necessary to continue support of Zaire. Secretary Vance agreed, saying that this presented a golden opportunity for President Mobutu to meet directly with and hear the ideas of important Congressmen.

The Secretary then asked President Mobutu’s views on recent events in the Central African Empire and Equatorial Guinea. President Mobutu responded that he did not know Equatorial Guinea well. He had often been invited to visit by the now ex-President but had kept putting the invitation off.⁷ He also noted wryly that he had been charged some seven years ago by the OAU to try to help improve relations between Equatorial Guinea and Gabon.

Mobutu’s view of the situation in the CAE was somber. He expressed his concern for the families of the dead students and of the “bad situation” in the interior of the country.⁸ Without referring directly to the Emperor he mentioned “diabolic” forces at work in the country. He had discussed the problem with Giscard d’Estaing and personally saw no out for the Emperor. Giscard had tried to persuade Bokassa to step down in favor of a regency council but, in the end, Bokassa had refused.

President Mobutu said that unfortunately at the time of Ambassador Cutler’s departure from Kinshasa, he, Mobutu had been away from Kinshasa. Ambassador Cutler had therefore unfortunately left Zaire without the proper honors due him. President Mobutu wished the Secretary to know that Ambassador Cutler had done a great deal for Zairian-US relations. He had therefore ordered that Ambassador Cutler be decorated with the national order of Zaire, the Order of the Leopard, at a ceremony in the Zairian Embassy the following morning. He wished the Secretary to know that Charge Davis in Kinshasa is doing a excellent job and was much appreciated in Kinshasa.

The Secretary responded that he was pleased to hear these kind words and to be informed of Ambassador Cutler’s impending honor. Ambassador Cutler was one of the fine officers of the Foreign Service corps and the Secretary was delighted to see such officers recognized.

At this point President Mobutu laughingly pointed out that, in looking around the room, it might well have been a meeting of his own council of ministers in Kinshasa, with the understandable exception of the Secretary, all present on the American side were familiar with and for the most part had served in Zaire. He had been informed that there was a “Zairian Mafia” in the State Department and he now saw most of the members present. He would have Nguza invite the Secretary to visit Zaire and, thus, close the circuit.

The Secretary expressed his regrets at not being able to attend the dinner given that evening by Governor Harriman for President Mobutu but that he had not enough time. The problem of the Soviet brigade in Cuba was demanding. The Soviets had stated that the brigade was only a training unit which had been in Cuba for many years. The US had only begun discussions with the Soviets on the issue yesterday and the Secretary assumed that the discussions could continue for days or even weeks. President Mobutu asked if the eventual outcome would be withdrawal of the brigade. The Secretary said that the first problem was to determine the facts. We had put a number of questions to the Soviets but as yet had received no answers. After having the facts we would determine what the optimal outcome of the problem should be.

President Mobutu concluded the meeting by saying that he hoped to have the continuing support of the US in his programs. It was the US which was the key to garnering support of other partners.

On the way out, Mobutu showed the Secretary a letter from Senghor in which the Senegalese President stated that he had talked with the head of the Jurists’ Commission which had investigated the atrocities in the CAE and was convinced there was no truth to the rumor that Zairian troops had been involved.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Box 118, Zaire: Mobutu Visit 8–9/79. Secret. Drafted on September 17 by Junior; cleared by Walker and in P; approved on October 9 by Seitz. The meeting took place in the Secretary’s office.
2. Angolan President Neto died on September 10.
3. See footnote 3, Document 126.
4. In telegram 21469 from Brussels, November 10, 1978, the Embassy reported on the results of the November 9–10 Brussels meeting of donor nations to Zaire. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780465–1135)
5. Robert Oakley was appointed Ambassador on November 6 and presented his credentials on November 28.
6. The London Club is a group of private creditors, while the Paris Club comprises public lenders. See footnote 6, Document 81. The London Club first met in June 1976 to reschedule Zaire’s debt.
7. See Document 125.
8. See Document 119.