Office of the Historian

101. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron) to President Carter1

Washington, May 18, 1978, 12:25 a.m.

SUBJECT

  • Kolwezi Relief Operation

The planning is going forward for the possible rescue operation by the Belgian Government with U.S. support in providing petroleum at a staging base outside the combat area. In addition, the Belgians have asked us through EUCOM to lift the equivalent of three C–141 loads of equipment to Zaire. This equipment would include ammunition. The Defense Department is trying to find out what the equipment involves, the destination of the lift and how essential it is that the U.S. provide this lift. Charles Duncan recommends we take no action on the request until we have the answers to these questions and I agree.

The State Department has a report from the French Ambassador in Kinshasa that the French together with Gabonese forces plan an operation into Kolwezi no later than the morning of the 19th (Friday).2 The French Ambassador reports that the Belgians may participate in that operation or mount a separate one of their own. We are concerned [Page 285] over the degree of coordination, if any, which exists between these efforts and its impact on our support activity and are seeking clarification in Paris and Brussels.3

  1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 87, Zaire: 1–5/78. Secret. Carter initialed the memorandum.↩
  2. In telegram 4936 from Kinshasa, May 18, the Embassy reported that the French Ambassador had informed Mobutu that French, Gabonese, and perhaps other African troops would mount an airborne rescue mission in Kolwezi beginning the morning of May 19. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850070–1878)↩
  3. In telegram 15761 from Paris, May 18, the Embassy reported that as of 10 a.m. Paris time, Giscard was reaching a final decision on French action. The French and Belgians had one fundamental disagreement in that France was inclined toward a French military operation to stabilize the region, while Belgium wanted a more limited rescue operation. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780209–0341) In telegram 9516 from Brussels, May 18, the Embassy reported that the Belgian Foreign Minister’s Chef du Cabinet had described the disagreement in a similar fashion. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780209–0589)↩