55. Memorandum From Thomas Thornton and Marshall Brement of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)1

SUBJECT

  • Soviet Feeler on Afghanistan (C)

We convened a meeting this afternoon of Soviet and Afghan specialists from State and CIA to discuss how we should respond to the message conveyed to our charge in Kabul by the GDR Ambassador. (You will remember that he alerted us that the Soviets would try to oust Amin, probably during August, but that they intended to “protect the Afghan revolution.” He also suggested that the situation might become bloody and pointedly said that he was sending his family home.)2 (S)

We did not come to any agreed conclusions about what the Soviets really mean by passing this signal—perhaps just to alert us to protect our people since we have been hitting them hard in the aftermath of the Dubs killing, or perhaps they want us to acquiesce in Soviet establishment of a new government. (S)

For starters we decided to move along two tracks:

1. Amstutz will be deciding on Saturday whether to evacuate dependents. (There are other good reasons to do so beside the German’s [Page 161] warning.) We will probably accept a positive recommendation from him.3 (S)

2. We will cut out the middle man (the German) and instruct Amstutz to approach Soviet Counselor Safronchuk, who is supposed to be the Soviet point man in the dump-Amin operation and who foreshadowed this entire matter to Amstutz in a previous conversation.4 (S)

State will prepare (and we will clear) instructions to Amstutz for the meeting. He is to raise the question of safety of Americans (appropriately, since the Soviets are the dean of the corps in Kabul) and tell him that we expect the Soviets not to make a propaganda issue out of the withdrawal of US dependents. He will then determine whether the GDR Ambassador was in fact speaking with the full sanction of the Soviets. He will also convey these points: We do not believe that any cosmetic changes in the Afghan Government will solve the Soviets’ problem; we will not give our blessing to any such government; we believe that a restoration of a truly neutral Afghan Government would be in our mutual interests; and we have no interest in seeing a government in Afghanistan that would pose a threat to legitimate Soviet interests.5 (S)

It would be premature to make further decisions about how we will handle this signal until we get a reading on the Safronchuk conversation. We will, however, be giving thought to a number of other questions, not least of all the impact of a Soviet move on the SALT debate. We will also keep our covert action options under review, [Page 162] especially since one part of the Soviet motivation may have been to deflect us from anti-regime activities. (S)

CIA will make a special effort to see what they can pick up in Kabul that would confirm what the German told us and they will try to learn if a similar message has been passed to [less than 1 line not declassified]. Finally, FBIS will see if there has been a cutback in Soviet propaganda alleging US involvement in the insurgency. (S)

Late note: FBIS confirms that there has indeed been a dropoff—perhaps related to the Summit, but they also note that Soviet propaganda sometimes declines as an issue becomes more critical. (S)

  1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Office File, Country Chron File, Box 1, Afghanistan: 1979. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. The memorandum is stamped “ZB has seen.”
  2. Amstutz reported on his “extraordinary meeting” with GDR Ambassador to Afghanistan Dr. Hermann Schwiesau in telegram 5459 from Kabul, July 18. Schwiesau asserted that it was Amin, not Taraki, who effectively controlled the government, and that Soviet Minister-Counselor Safronchuk was working “behind the scenes” with DRA officials to bring about a “radical change” in leadership through an internal military coup. Schwiesau further noted that it would not be possible for Amin and the exiled Parchamist leader Babrak Karmal to be part of the same government; nonetheless, the current Khalqi-dominated government needed to extend its base and share more power with the Parchamists. (Department of Defense, Afghan War Collection, Box 5, Soviets in Afghanistan—General Part #1) According to [text not declassified], March 28, Amin’s elevation the previous day from Deputy Prime Minister to Prime Minister (Taraki remained President) “grants recognition of” Amin’s “de facto control of the country’s affairs.” (Central Intelligence Agency, Job 91T00761R, Box 2, Taraki, Nur Mohammed)
  3. Saturday was July 21. In telegram 189714 to Moscow and Kabul, July 21, the Department relayed Amstutz’s approval of evacuating approximately 100 U.S. dependents and non-essential personnel from Kabul. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790333–0446) In telegram 5631 from Kabul, July 25, the Embassy reported that an Afghan diplomatic note demanded a staff reduction of Embassy Kabul. Amstutz described the note as evidence of the “inept, if not stupid, leadership of the DRA, exemplified by Prime Minister/Foreign Minister Hafizullah Amin, person now desperately trying to survive politically.” (Department of Defense, Afghan War Collection, Box 7, USSR in Afghanistan (July 79))
  4. Brzezinski wrote “OK” in the right margin next to this paragraph.
  5. Brzezinski drew a vertical line and a checkmark in the right margin next to the last sentence of the paragraph. Safronchuk and Amstutz met on August 11. The Embassy reported their conversation in telegram 6152 from Kabul, August 13. According to the telegram, neither the question of the safety of Americans in Afghanistan nor the information passed by the GDR Ambassador arose during the conversation. Safronchuk did acknowledge the possibility that the Soviets would have to deal with a successor regime in the future, but asserted that the USSR “would not under any circumstances” introduce combat troops to support the Afghan Government. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790367–0048) No record of a meeting with Safronchuk was found that might reflect more directly the points Amstutz was to convey per the NSC instructions.