Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XII, Afghanistan

163. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, January 12, 1980, 3:30–4:15 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Meeting with Agha Shahi

PARTICIPANTS

• President Jimmy Carter
• Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State
• Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
• Warren Christopher, Deputy Secretary of State
• David Aaron, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
• Graham Claytor, Deputy Secretary of Defense
• Harold Saunders, Assistant Secretary of Near Eastern & South Asian Affairs
• Arthur W. Hummel, Ambassador to Pakistan
• Thomas P. Thornton, National Security Council
• Agha Shahi, Foreign Affairs Adviser, Pakistan
• Muhammad Sultan Khan, Pakistan Ambassador
• General Ghulam Jilani, Pakistan
• General Khalid Mahmoud Aref, Pakistan

The President met on Saturday, January 12, with Pakistani Foreign Affairs Adviser Agha Shahi. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room, following meetings that Shahi had had with Dr. Brzezinski and Secretary Vance.² Various advisers were present on each side. (S)

The President opened by welcoming Shahi and noting that he had had a good series of communications with President Zia. President Carter noted that the Soviet invasion is a major adverse development, an ominous change in Soviet practice. He was pleased at the support that he had received from the American people for his responses, and from nations all around the world. The President recalled that we had again reaffirmed the validity of the 1959 agreement, and our recognition of the Durand line as the international boundary between Pakistan and Afghanistan.³ He pointed out that we had put together with great care a strong military and economic aid package, and that some of our top officials will be going to Europe in the next week to discuss sharing of the economic and military burden.⁴ He said that he believed the European leaders were already positively inclined and he would appreciate Agha Shahi’s guidance on the degree to which our efforts in all of these regards should be made public. He noted, of course, that the dimensions of our aid program will have to become public as soon as we present it to Congress. (S)

The President reviewed various measures that we have taken to increase our strength on a permanent basis, including the revitalization of NATO, the establishment of important relations with China, and measured development of Diego Garcia, where the British are now more willing to be forthcoming on expansion. He noted, however, that our relations with India have become difficult following the elections. He told Mr. Shahi that he had had a nonsubstantive telephone conversation with Mrs. Gandhi and that he was disconcerted, although not especially surprised by the speech which the Indian Permanent Representative had made on Afghanistan in the UN General Assembly.⁵ The speech sounded as if it had come from East Germany, Czechoslovakia, or North Vietnam. He told Shahi that we plan to send an emissary to India to attempt to convince Mrs. Gandhi of our attitude towards her country, and to point out that we will be making commitments to Pakistan. (S)

The President said we trust that Pakistan is determined to defend its territory. We will report back on matters of concern to you after we have talked to India and our European allies. The Chinese Foreign Minister will soon be visiting Pakistan and I hope you will share with us, to the proper extent, the results of that visit. (S)

We are talking not about a transient commitment. We value our relations and are aware of our interest in Southwest Asia. Our position on nuclear explosives is clear and I hope you will relay our concern to President Zia. Movement on this is not a prerequisite for cooperation, but our long-term relations will be substantially affected by the question of nuclear explosives. We hope that you could promise not to test during the administration of President Zia. Such a pledge could be kept confidential; we would share it only with a few Congressmen. It could, however, be a prerequisite to the granting of aid. A future explosion by Pakistan would be a matter of deep concern to the United States. The nuclear question, then, is no longer an insurmountable obstacle, but it remains important. (S)

Agha Shahi thanked the President for taking time to see him, and for reaffirming the American commitment under the 1959 Agreement. Mr. Shahi said that no matter how difficult the situation might be, it was always a pleasure to deal with Secretary Vance. (S)

Mr. Shahi agreed that there was a need to continue the discussion between the two sides. He referred to an Army-Air Force-Navy team which would meet with American counterparts to review the threat to Pakistan and discuss its requirements.⁶ He pointed out that the Pakistani requirements were large because their Western Frontier is nearly undefended. All the troops are in the East because Indian forces are massed along that border. (S)

Mr. Shahi said he had received fairly explicit and satisfactory reassurances about our security guarantee. He noted that in the past there had been some question of the applicability of these guarantees, and wondered if an executive agreement would be as effective as a treaty. He said that Secretary Vance had given him the benefit of his views and that he was glad to hear from the President that the American commitment to the region is permanent. He stressed that if Pakistan does face up to the Soviet threat, and once again is left high and dry by the United States, this would pose a great danger to the very existence of Pakistan. Pakistan is now a front-line state; its concerns are legitimate and its demands are not exaggerated. He hoped for some possible strengthening of the 1959 Agreement, particularly one that would be binding on future administrations. (S)

President Carter replied that both he and Dr. Brzezinski had publicly broadcast this commitment to the American people. In addition, it will be possible to send a message to Congress to this effect.⁷ (S)

Secretary Vance pointed out that such a reaffirmation of the 1959 Agreement would be included in the language of the assistance package. (S)

President Carter said that the material included in the legislation would be the same as in the letter that he had written to President Zia. He said it would be impossible to put any treaty to the Senate before the SALT II Agreement was considered, and that was, of course, now deferred. (S)

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Afghanistan.]

President Carter observed that a move of Pakistani forces to the West would be a sign of Pakistani resolve. He said that the United States will be helpful in getting support for Pakistan from other countries and asked that Agha Shahi give Zia exactly the same message that had been given to him. We will stand with Pakistan. Pakistan is vital to United States’ security, and the 1959 Agreement is permanent. It is a pleasure to have Pakistan as a friend. We both now have an opportunity to repair the doubtful relations of the past. Please take to heart the American people’s concern about the spread of nuclear weapons; this concern is not directed particularly at Pakistan, but also a series of other countries who are at the nuclear threshold. (S)

Thereupon the meeting ended. (U)

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Thornton, Country File, Box 96, Pakistan: Presidential Correspondence: 1/80–1/81. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the White House Cabinet Room. The full text of the memorandum of conversation is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XIX, South Asia.
2. Shahi and Brzezinski met in Brzezinski’s office immediately preceding this meeting. (Memorandum of conversation, January 12, 3–3:30 p.m.; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Thornton, Country File, Box 95, Pakistan: 1/79–1/80) No record was found of Vance’s meeting with Shahi. News reports indicated that the two discussed “possible aid and security guarantees.” (Robert B. Cullen, “Vance-Pakistani Talk on Aid Is Termed ‘Very Constructive,’” Washington Post, January 13, 1980, p. A20)
3. See Document 159.
4. Christopher visited Brussels, Bonn, Paris, London, and Rome January 14–16. After he met with the North Atlantic Council in Brussels on January 15, he noted that he was “encouraged” by the progress made toward agreeing on the response to the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. (Flora Lewis, “Gains Reported at NATO Parley on Anti-Soviet Steps,” New York Times, January 16, 1980, p. A10)
5. Carter’s phone conversation with Gandhi took place earlier that day. The January 11 statement by the Indian Permanent Representative was relayed in telegram 714 from New Delhi, January 12. The major points of the statement, as reported in the telegram, included the assertion that the Soviet Union was in Afghanistan “at the invitation of the previous Afghan Government and with the agreement of the present government,” that “India has had assurances from the USSR that Soviets will withdraw on request by Afghan Government,” and “discussion in the UN of an issue involving the sovereign rights of the Afghan people would not be helpful.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800020–0906)
6. A meeting on this topic between senior officials of the Pakistani military and the Department of Defense took place earlier in the Department of State. A cable summarizing the meeting is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XIX, South Asia.
7. The President’s State of the Union Address to Congress, January 23, included the following pledge: “We’ve reconfirmed our 1959 agreement to help Pakistan preserve its independence and integrity. The United States will take action consistent with our own laws to assist Pakistan in resisting any outside aggression.” The full text of the address is printed in Public Papers: Carter, 1980–81, Book I, pp. 194–200, and Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, Document 138. Additionally, in a memorandum transmitting Presidential Determination 80–11, Carter sent Vance authorization, pursuant to Section 2(C) (1) of the Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1962, for the use of $5.3 million “to respond to the urgent humanitarian needs of Afghan refugees in Pakistan.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P800046–2264) Carter signed PD 80–11 on January 28. (45 Fed. Reg. 8539)