Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977–August 1978

234. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, March 22, 1978, 11:05 a.m.–12:25 p.m.

SUBJECT

• President’s Meeting with Prime Minister Begin

PARTICIPANTS

• The President
• The Vice President
• Secretary of State Cyrus Vance
• Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
• Hon. Samuel Lewis, U.S. Ambassador to Israel
• Hon. Alfred L. Atherton, Ambassador-At-Large
• Robert Lipshutz, Counselor to the President
• Stuart Eizenstat, Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs and Policy
• Hamilton Jordan, Assistant to the President
• Jody Powell, Press Secretary to the President
• Jerrold Schecter, NSC Staff
• William B. Quandt, NSC Staff
• H.E. Menahem Begin, Prime Minister of Israel
• H.E. Moshe Dayan, Minister for Foreign Affairs
• H.E. Simcha Dinitz, Israeli Ambassador to U.S.
• H.E. Aharon Barak, Attorney General of Israel
• Mr. Meir Rosenne, Legal Adviser, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
• Mr. Yehiel Kadishai, Director, Prime Minister’s Office
• Mr. Yehuda Avner, Adviser to the Prime Minister
• Hon. Joseph Ciechanover, Minister for Economic Affairs, Embassy of Israel
• BGEN Ephraim Poran, Military Secretary to the Prime Minister
• Mr. Dan Pattir, Public Affairs Adviser to the Prime Minister
• Mr. Hanan Bar-On, Minister, Embassy of Israel
• Mr. Elyakim Rubinstein, Director, Foreign Minister’s Bureau

The President: The Prime Minister and I had a delightful supper with our wives last night, and we spent about an hour and a half in private conversation.² We were able to clarify as well as possible the issues that have been addressed and still need to be addressed. I think we have a clear understanding of one another. My assessment of the situation is that we need to be completely honest and frank, and we need to be clear as we bring this meeting to a close. We will continue discussions, with the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister, and through normal means of communication between our two governments.

When President Sadat was here, I had long talks with him, and I tried to get a clear understanding of his positions. After those talks, I put down his positions and ours in my own handwriting. I am now discouraged about the prospects for further progress. Up until now I have been hopeful. We will still make all possible efforts. And I still believe that a comprehensive settlement is preferable, but the first agreement will have to be between Israel and Egypt, and then with Jordan, and then with the others.

I’m going to have to report to Congress this afternoon, before I leave on my trip. I meet with the House International Relations Committee today, and I will see the Senate Foreign Relations Committee tomorrow. We will discuss a number of items, including the talks that have taken place here. Before I meet with them, I’ll tell the group our positions and yours. If I am wrong about your positions, I would like you to correct me.

Our proposals, based on talks with President Sadat and other Arab leaders, and our consultations with Israel, are that peace agreements or peace treaties can be reached, and we understand that the main sensitivity on the Israeli side is that there not be total withdrawal from the West Bank. We think that this position is compatible with the views of Sadat and Jordan. We think there could be a number of security outposts that would be permitted, and we think there could be modifications in the boundaries of 1967, to be negotiated. I’ve told other Arab leaders, including Saudi Arabia, that we have these views. We don’t agree that there must be full withdrawal on the West Bank. We think there can be some modifications. We also do not favor an independent Palestinian state. That is our position, and I think that responsible Arab leaders agree with it.

Concerning the self-rule arrangement, we think that substantially your proposal could be implemented for a five-year period, and then it could be reassessed. Authority for the self-rule administration should come from Israel and Jordan, and perhaps from Egypt as well in Gaza. The Palestinian Arabs living in these areas only would serve in the interim authority, and they would be freely elected. No claim of sovereignty would be made by either Israel or Jordan, nor would they disavow their right to sovereignty in the future. The area would be demilitarized, except for police forces to uphold the peace, and Israel would have some security encampments in outposts. Israel would withdraw military forces except those on the Jordan River and in key vantage points.

During the interim period, negotiations should take place on the final terms for self-rule for the area. On some issues, Israel would retain a veto, such as security and in-migration. There should also be a regional economic plan, with international contributions for assistance. During the period of active negotiations there should be no new or expanded settlements. If negotiations bog down, that would change the situation. This is our concept of how to resolve existing differences. This is my best answer to the problems.

The Israeli position, as I understand, is that even if there were a clear statement by us, and if it were accepted by Egypt, against total withdrawal in the West Bank and against a Palestinian state, Israel would not stop new settlements, or the expansion of settlements; Israel would not give up the settlements in Sinai; Israel would not permit an Egyptian or UN protection over the Israeli settlements in Sinai; even with military outposts, Israel would not withdraw political authority from the West Bank and Gaza; Israel will not recognize that Resolution 242 applies on all fronts, including the principle of withdrawal; Israel will not give the Palestinian Arabs, at the end of the interim period, the right to choose whether they want to be affiliated with Israel, with Jordan, or to live under the interim arrangement. This is my understanding of the present situation. If I am correct, the likelihood that the talks can be resumed with Egypt is very remote. There are no immediate prospects of substantial movement toward a peace agreement. I would like to have you comment. I would like you to correct any mistaken impressions that I may have.

Prime Minister Begin: Thank you Mr. President. I would like to comment on your outline of Israeli policy. Your definitions are all negative. We have positive definitions. I would like to state them positively, and to remove any statement that Israel is not willing to take certain actions.

Stated in a positive way, our position is that we are resolved to negotiate peace treaties to get a comprehensive peace settlement with all of our neighbors. We have accepted Resolution 242 as the basis for negotiations with all of our neighbors, and we stand [on] that. We are determined that negotiations should be direct. We want secure and recognized borders as called for in Resolution 242, but that Resolution does not envisage total withdrawal on all fronts. The possibility for less than total withdrawal exists not just for Judea and Samaria, but also for Sinai and Golan. Israel is not committed to total withdrawal from any of the territories. Israel has made a two-part peace proposal which is positive and constructive. On the bilateral Egyptian-Israeli relationship, Israel has stated its willingness to withdraw to the international border, and has asked for the demilitarization of all of Sinai beyond the passes. We suggest in Sinai that there be two UN zones after Israeli withdrawal. Our settlements will continue in these zones, with protection by an Israeli contingent. This is our perception and our proposal for reaching a comprehensive settlement. Withdrawal, although not total, is assured in Resolution 242. We could ask for border changes, but we did not, for the sake of reaching an agreement with Egypt. But the UN zones with settlements is our alternative to asking for rectifications in the international border. In positive terms, this is our plan, and I hope that you will explain it to Congress in these positive terms.

The second part of our proposal should also be described in positive terms. We suggest self-rule, or administrative autonomy, in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza, for the Palestinian Arabs. They should elect an Administrative Council which would deal with all issues of daily life, no interference from Israel. We have suggested eleven administrative departments. The source of authority for the Administrative Council is the Military Governor in Israel. You suggested the possibility in December of the devolution of authority from an agreement between Israel and Jordan, and we said that we would consider this.³ But there is only one authority now. That is the Military Administration, which we want to abolish. This is an open issue. For the time being, the source of competence for the Administrative Council will be the Military Governor.

Israel will reserve for itself the control over security and public order. This means that our army will be in camps in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza, and we will stay on to see that security prevails. We agree that the question of sovereignty is difficult because there are various claims. Sovereignty should remain open. We will not deal with the question of sovereignty over the territory, but rather with the human beings. The Palestinian Arabs should have self-rule and the Palestinian Jews should have security. We agreed that there will be a review after five years. We suggest that reality be allowed to work, and that people on both sides learn to live together. All of our suggestions are positive. Not everything is now possible. In the Israeli government’s view, it is not now possible to envisage all of the changes which might come after five years. But everything is open for review. This is the meaning of the last article. A review “will” take place. This is the second part of our peace proposal stated in positive terms.

Concerning our policy of settlements, we would also like a positive assessment. Since July, we have had a difference on this issue. The United States Government position is clear, and ours is clear. We decided on no new settlements in Sinai. We will add to the existing settlements, if there is arable land, and some need for housing, and some people who want to go to settlements. But I want to stress this point—there will be no new settlements in Sinai.

In Judea and Samaria, we understand that the former arrangement that Foreign Minister Dayan discussed with you last September⁴ is not now envisaged as the basis for a mutual agreement. We say that the Jewish people have a perfect right to settle in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza. But the government will decide when and where, but we cannot make an unlimited commitment not to settle. We have to be faithful to our commitments to our own people. It is necessary to have settlers in Judea and Samaria in accord with government decisions. If we say no settlements during negotiations, we cannot say how long that might be. It might be very long. When would we be able to restart settlements? Only when the negotiations had failed? That would be very, very difficult. Therefore, we say that it is our right to settle, and this is part of our plan for autonomy. The Palestinian Arabs can also settle in Israel.

Mr. President, we proposed three documents, including the Declaration of Principles.⁵ In that document, we positively accepted Resolution 242 as the basis for negotiations. We have twice been asked to add the words “on all fronts.” This is not in the text of Resolution 242, and it should not be added. If the United States uses these words, that is your right. But the words do not appear in Resolution 242. You yourself told me that Resolution 242 is subject to many different interpretations. There is an Arab interpretation which calls for full withdrawal. Again I repeat, in our draft declaration we accept 242 as the basis for negotiations with all states. This is our document, and there may be a counterproposal from the other parties.

I ask you to say in positive terms that we have produced three documents for peace. We are the only one in the Middle East to have done this. Egypt has some proposals, but really they only have one peace plan which calls for full withdrawal and the creation of a Palestinian state. That takes no intellectual effort. By contrast, we have produced three documents. You yourself should accept the fact that we produced three serious, important documents, and they should be the basis for negotiations. You should tell Egypt to negotiate. They should bring counterproposals. This is the essence of any attempt to get peace treaties after war. Summing up, I should say that we are grateful to you, and we have had a chance to present our point of view, and we would like you to explain our positions in a positive way.

Foreign Minister Dayan: I would like to add a short remark to clarify some points. As far as I know, there are no Israeli military camps inside populated Arab cities or built up areas. What we have is the headquarters of the military commander. But there are not military units in the populated areas. If our plan is accepted and military rule is abolished, and if the commander of the military regime moves out, and if no Israeli soldiers move in, that means that the Arab population is clear of any Israeli military forces. The camps are not in Nablus or in the towns or cities. When you said that Israel wants political control over the West Bank, over Judea and Samaria, if we abolish the military regime, and if we take away the commander there, then practically the Arab populated areas will have no Israeli military forces. This is the meaning of Resolution 242. We go very far in this direction.

When you speak of political control, we do not want any political control over the Arabs. What we, or I, don’t want is their control over the Israeli population in Judea and Samaria, especially over the Israeli settlements. I don’t support the removal of settlements from the West Bank. I think we can reach an agreement with those settlements staying where they are. We should not control the Arabs, but I won’t agree to Israeli settlements being under an Arab-elected body. It would be wrong to say that we want political control during these five years over the Arab population. We want to end it. Maybe they will want us to stay, but if not, we will be relieved. We don’t want political control. Public order has been mentioned before as a possible problem. On the face of it, we are responsible for public order. If terrorists start operating from Nablus to Hebron, then our police will have to deal with the problem if necessary. We hope we won’t have to. We have no complaints now with how Jordan, Syria, and Egypt deal with terrorists. So we don’t interfere. But take the situation in Lebanon, or in Gaza in the old days. Who would take care of those situations? If they can prevent terrorism, or if they at least make a good effort, then there is no problem. But with the PLO, and the hijackings, I think it would be irresponsible for the Israeli Government to say that Israel would not go into Judea, Samaria, and Gaza, when even now we have gone into Lebanon, in an extreme situation. We wish that it would not happen. But there is no alternative.

Concerning the right of Arabs to make their own choice to affiliate with Israel, Jordan, or to keep their own self-rule status, we have no objection in principle, but there is a problem with the method of a referendum. There is also the problem of Gaza. In Gaza there are 400,000 Arabs. We’ve asked Hussein to let them have Jordanian citizenship. All of those in Judea and Samaria, and in Jerusalem, about 800,000 Arabs, are Jordanian citizens. They are not refugees. We have proposed that some of them in Jerusalem also become Israeli citizens, but not even two people have given up their Jordanian citizenship to become Israelis. We are ready, and any Arab who wants to be an Israeli citizen can get Israeli citizenship. What we don’t agree to is the system of referendum. But they can choose Jordanian or Israeli citizenship. None of them will choose Israeli citizenship, or maybe only a few. There is a national feeling. Some may want to keep their local identity card instead of becoming Jordanian citizens. They can then dream of being Palestinians, and no one can force them to have a passport. But they do have Jordanian citizenship now. And we don’t want to prevent them from choosing their citizenship.

There are now Arab refugees in Lebanon, and I don’t believe that we can settle the whole conflict in the Middle East unless the problem of the refugees is solved. It just can’t be done. Look at the history of 30 years. Look at Lebanon today, and Jordan in 1970, and everywhere. When we worked out our paper last October,⁶ we agreed that it should deal with questions of the Palestinian Arab refugees and the Jewish refugees, with both of them. We agreed that this should be discussed in a large group, and that we would have to deal with this soon. If Sadat really wants to pave the way to peace, he would add to his prestige if he pressed forward with this issue. Let’s deal with it. Palestinian refugees could be asked if they wanted to stay in Lebanon, or if they wanted to go to Jordan or the West Bank. Some may be able to go to Israel, and we once agreed to something like 50,000 coming back. If we can manage in two or three years time to settle all of the Arab refugees, and this is feasible, it would be a great development. There are one-half million in Jordan who want to stay. Those in Kuwait will also want to stay. The problem is those in Lebanon. If you ask them what they want, to settle, or compensation, we can deal with this.

In Gaza, half the population consists of refugees. They will have to be settled. They want to stay there. What relationship will there be between them and the rest of the Arab-populated area in Judea and Samaria and Jordan? King Hussein once suggested that there be a corridor, a physical corridor, between the West Bank and Gaza. This is not the way to solve the problem. But there could be some arrangement based on free movement. Where will those in Gaza work? There are no jobs in Gaza, only refugee camps. We do want a settlement, and we don’t want to control the population. We just want our defense forces there without interfering. After five years there will be a question, and we will have to go into this, but for the first five years, if we can solve the refugee problem in Lebanon, and if we are lucky to get Jordan and Syria to sign peace treaties with us, then we will face an entirely different situation in the Middle East, one which we can’t even imagine. I think that Israeli settlements in Sinai would look different after a peace agreement. I don’t know about the Eitan airfield.⁷ All of these things will have an effect on Israeli settlements. If Sadat could agree to discuss the status of settlements, after the status of the military forces has been resolved, this might be one way. Listening to your view, I think you were too gloomy. Maybe because I am used to worse periods in the Middle East, and I don’t think it is so bad now.

The President: When you speak, I can see the opportunity to get some language that would be satisfactory to Sadat. But there are some things that have to be addressed. To refuse to acknowledge the possibility that the withdrawal principle of Resolution 242 applies to the West Bank is an insurmountable problem. In our view, and in the Egyptian view, this is very important. To say that it will not prevail is difficult. All Sadat wants is for Israel to work to resolve the Palestinian question, and to give the Palestinian Arabs a voice in determining their own future. It doesn’t hurt to give them a voice, and they can’t overrun Israel. The only military and security forces in the area will be Israeli. You say that Sadat wants full withdrawal and a Palestinian state, but that is simply not true. We reach a stone wall when you say that. I don’t know where to go. I want to discuss this with you frankly. You say that military camps are not in the populated areas. If this could be defined on a mutual basis with Egypt and Jordan, it might be a good starting point.

Foreign Minister Dayan: I was Minister of Defense. We just have a headquarters in Nablus and Gaza. We don’t have military units. We don’t have soldiers in the cities.

The President: You say you don’t want political control. That is good. But what Prime Minister Begin’s proposal gives them is only a limited voice. Why can’t you accept it that the Palestinian Arabs have a right to participate in determining their own future? One point on which Sadat is very strong concerns settlements. He will not allow you to keep settlements in his territory protected by Israeli forces. Sadat sees a continued presence of Israeli forces to protect settlements as a violation of Israel’s willingness to withdraw from Sinai. I asked him if the settlements could stay under the United Nations. Israel does not accept this point. But on that basis, Sadat said that he could not agree. So this issue is preventing Sadat from negotiating. I wish that Sadat would accept my suggestion. I’m just going back and forth between the parties. We have security interests, and we have friends on both sides. I’m almost desperate to get some common ground, and I am all in favor of the absolute security of Israel, including a US commitment, to be confirmed if necessary, to meet your needs and to help provide the basis for meeting President Sadat’s minimum needs, which seem reasonable to me. There is a hard core beyond which we cannot make any progress. I’ve recently been disappointed to see that Israel says it will not withdraw from the West Bank. It is my impression that Israel has no intention of withdrawing from any part of the West Bank. Is Israel willing to withdraw, even partially, by dividing the area, or to specified encampments in the West Bank? The answer is no. Is Israel ready to have its settlement policy not become an obstacle to peace? It would be OK with me if Sadat would accept Israeli settlements under the UN, but he won’t accept Israeli troops.

To see the prospects for peace with Egypt go down the drain on these two points, and this is how I see the present situation, is something I deplore. I want the advice of Congress. I don’t want to hurt your security. We want to enhance your peaceful right to existence, and we want to prevent a subversive Palestinian state or entity between you and Jordan. Sadat is generally eager to find a basis for agreement with you. His position is reasonable, and our position would be acceptable to him, I think.

Secretary Vance: I do believe that the essential points that the President has outlined could be the basis for bringing Sadat to negotiating a peace treaty with Israel. I am totally convinced that you cannot get negotiations unless you solve these problems.

Prime Minister Begin: We did say that the Palestinians could participate in the determination of their own future.

The President: Under Israeli control?

Prime Minister Begin: Through talks. We have said that they can participate in determining their own future through talks involving Israel, Egypt, Jordan, and the Palestinian Arabs. This is covered in our formulation. Concerning the settlements in Sinai, Sadat never said he would offer a counterproposal that the settlements should be under UN control. He wants them taken away. He said they should be burned, and then he denied this and said that they should be dismantled, and that the bulldozer should come in. This is his position. He has made no counterproposal.

The President: That’s correct.

Prime Minister Begin: We made a proposal, and after the talks that Foreign Minister Dayan had with Mr. Tuhami,⁸ we told him about our proposal for settlements, and he did not refuse. These ideas were conveyed to President Sadat even before he came to Jerusalem, and then he was told about them the second time after his visit. He knows our views. He has made no counterproposals, he has only offered an ultimatum. He has called for total withdrawal and a Palestinian state. I assume that he may have told you something different, but we have documents from him that say exactly that. His text means total withdrawal, and it means a Palestinian state. At Ismailia, in the communique President Sadat called for a Palestinian state.⁹ Since then, the Egyptians have spoken of self-determination for the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. We say that this will lead to a Palestinian state. In our time, self-determination means a state. Sadat now uses different words. I told you yesterday¹⁰ that I would like you to try to clarify where he really stands on these two points. I would like to ask you to do this. Perhaps he said something to you, but in his documents, it is clear.

The President: On the question of settlements, Sadat does not agree with you, despite my request that the settlements should be allowed to stay under the UN. Concerning the determination of their own future, the Israeli language says “through talks,” and the only way for them to participate is through talking with Israel, Egypt and Jordan.

Prime Minister Begin: The Egyptians themselves accepted that language. They called for self-determination through talks, but then they changed their minds.

The President: (Reads from the Egyptian draft)¹¹

Secretary Vance: The President is not asking Israel to accept Egypt’s language on self-determination. Rather we have put forward the Aswan language for your consideration.¹² On self-determination, it seems to me that it does not necessarily mean an independent state if you limit the choices that are put to the people to an affiliation with Israel, with Jordan, or continuation of the status quo. If those are the choices, there will be no independent state.

The President: If the only security forces in the area are Israelis, I don’t see the problem. I’m not trying to criticize your position, or the Israeli Government’s position, nor do I want to underestimate the tremendous effort and courage that you have shown in your proposals. They were notable and courageous. But in spite of Sadat’s recognition of Israel, his offer of peace, and his direct negotiations, and despite your courageous proposals on Sinai and on self-rule, the negotiations have broken down, and I’m trying to find a way to get the negotiations going again. We want to achieve peace. We’ve tried to identify the differences that exist, and to work out comprehensive language. We hope for a clear expression on the key points, and we think you might get started by taking the American proposal. Maybe you could say in a preamble that there will not be full withdrawal and there will be no Palestinian state. With those as the premise, then we could discuss other issues, and we could even talk about greater US involvement in your security.

The best two months for me in the White House were those when you and President Sadat were talking directly. Now we just have to take bad news back and forth from one to the other. We don’t want that role. We don’t want to see the opportunity lost.

Prime Minister Begin: We are striving for direct negotiations. What you said about our peace plan you should say to Congress.

The President: I will.

Prime Minister Begin: The good words that you used, and which you had in your communique,¹³ when you spoke of our constructive attitude, when you used the word courage, makes me feel pain when I now sense that there is a view that my plans are inadequate. Recently an important Senator told me that Israel is giving too much away.

The President: I’ve never said that! I’ve called your plans a major step in the right direction.

Prime Minister Begin: When you put forward our view, please say it positively.

The President: I understand.

Foreign Minister Dayan: After the last meeting with the Secretary, we received a paper,¹⁴ and we tried to develop a better formula for withdrawal. We don’t accept the phrase “on all three fronts.” I believe that we have something now that Sadat should accept. I would like Attorney General Barak to read our suggestion.

Attorney General Barak: In the Declaration of Principles, Article I is OK. In Article II Israel is prepared to say that it accepts all of the principles of 242 as the basis for negotiations between Israel and all of the neighboring Arab states.

The President: Maybe it would be advisable for some of you to work on the language.

Attorney General Barak: On the basis of all of these principles, we would say in the next paragraph, that there will be withdrawal and that there will be secure and recognized borders, using the language of 242.

Prime Minister Begin: Just the language of 242.

Attorney General Barak: In Article IV, we accept the language on participation in the determination of their future, and that there should be a just resolution of the problem of the Palestinian Arabs. Those in Judea and Samaria and Gaza will have the right to participate in determining their own future through talks. In Ismailia, the Egyptians made no mention of legitimate rights of the Palestinian people. We will accept some of the Egyptian formula concerning talks, and we have taken some language from your Aswan formula. I don’t know why that you think we want political control over the Palestinian Arabs. The administration will be theirs, they will have the police, the judiciary, and after five years, everything will be open for negotiations. We can agree on the process, and we can agree that they will participate in determining their own future. Why don’t you see that this is not political control?

The President: I haven’t followed the details on the Declaration. Secretary Vance and Roy have. It might be good to go into the exact language with them.

Secretary Vance: I might meet again with Foreign Minister Dayan and we will study what the Israelis have said.

The President: Roy might be able to give the Egyptian view, but I can’t.

Secretary Vance: On another point, if you indeed do agree that 242 applies to the West Bank, and that 242 does not automatically mean the 1967 borders, then why can’t you simply say that 242 applies on all three fronts?

Prime Minister Begin: We accepted 242 as it is written. Why should we add these three words to a Resolution that we accept? The question is about negotiations. We have to have secure and recognized boundaries. In negotiations, everyone can have an idea.

Foreign Minister Dayan: The only difference in your suggestion and ours is that we do not say “all three fronts.” We say it is the basis for negotiations with all the neighboring states. Otherwise it is the same. We then go on to say withdrawal. The elements are there in these two paragraphs. (Dayan reads from the Israeli draft.) We don’t want, and it is not the wording of 242, to say “on all three fronts.” We want to say that 242 can be the basis for negotiations with all of the neighboring states.

The President: I have to leave now. Secretary Vance can work on this this afternoon.¹⁵ I am sure you can reach some resolution of these differences. Thank you.¹⁶

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East File, Subject File, Box 1, Arab-Israeli Peace Negotiations 1978: Volume I [I]. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the White House Cabinet Room.
2. According to the President’s Daily Diary, Carter, Begin and their wives ate dinner from 7:19 to 8:07 p.m. in the second floor residence of the White House. Carter than spoke with Begin privately in the Oval Office from 8:07 to 9:38 p.m. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials, President’s Daily Diary) No memorandum of conversation has been found.
3. See Documents 177 and 178.
4. See Document 106.
5. The Israeli declaration of principles is printed in Document 197. The other two documents are presumably the framework for peace that Begin gave to Carter on July 19, 1977 (attached to Document 52), and his home rule proposal presented on December 16 (attached to Document 177).
6. A reference to the working paper agreed to by the United States and Israel in October 1977. The working paper is attached to Document 124.
7. An airfield in Sinai.
8. See footnote 4, Document 155.
9. See footnote 9, Document 180.
10. See Document 232.
11. No draft is attached. Possibly a reference to the Egyptian draft of the declaration of principles. See Document 197.
12. See footnote 5, Document 187.
13. Apparently a reference to the statement issued at the end of the December meetings. See footnote 12, Document 178.
14. Not further identified. Possibly a reference to the U.S. draft of the declaration of principles that Vance presented at the January Political Committee meeting. See Document 196.
15. Vance met with Dayan at 2:30 p.m., when they discussed the Israeli draft of the declaration of principles. (Memorandum of conversation; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P880102–0072)
16. For the text of Carter’s and Begin’s statements when Begin left the White House, see Public Papers: Carter, 1978, Book I, pp. 550–553.