Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume IV, National Security Policy

92. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Duncan)¹

Washington, September 30, 1978

SUBJECT

• C3I

Some of the major conclusions I drew from my August trip to SAC and NORAD concern the adequacy of our C3I for the changing U.S.-Soviet strategic balance.² I want to express my thoughts to you on this matter because of your role as Chairman of the WWMCCS Council. The following three points reflect my concerns:

— [1 paragraph (4 lines) not declassified]

— [1 paragraph (9 lines) not declassified]

— Concern was expressed at NORAD about the erosion of Defense’s ability to manage the National Communications System as it impinges on private telecommunications developments and policies. This appears to result from both budgetary trends and pending legislation.

I would like to have your views on how we should deal with these problems. I realize they are enormous in scope and budgetary implications, but I believe we must address them if we are to be prepared to maintain crisis stability in the years ahead. I am particularly concerned that we do not spend large sums rectifying the first problem—connectivity for SIOP execution—by means that fail to address the second problem—C3I survivability for conducting a campaign that might last weeks and perhaps longer.

Zbigniew Brzezinski

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, General Odom File, Box 14, Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (C3I): 7–11/78. Top Secret.
2. See Documents 80–82.