Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume IV, National Security Policy

90. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

• Mid-Term Review of Defense Programs

You are scheduled to meet Friday, September 29th, with me, Harold Brown, Jim McIntyre and a few others for a mid-term review of those particular programs in the FY 80 Defense budget that seem likely to have the greatest implications for our overall national security policy.

In arranging this meeting, we planned for Harold to take the lead in framing the issues for discussion. The agenda Harold has proposed (Tab A) is too broad to allow discussion in-depth of any of the issues if we try to discuss them all. Harold will therefore focus on the strategic issues and in particular Minuteman (MM) vulnerability which is by far the most important issue you will face this year.

You should begin the meeting by calling on Harold Brown to outline the strategic forces issues as he sees them. He will then call on Under Secretary of Defense Bill Perry to present more detailed remarks and a “straw man” strategic force structure through the 1980’s, along with development and procurement plans. This presentation and the ensuing discussion will probably consume most of the time of the meeting. Harold will then want to raise some issues on General Purpose Forces which Assistant Secretary of Defense Murray will present in more detail. Finally, if there is time, Harold may call on Dr. Perry to address the question of research and development strategy.

At the end of the general meeting, Harold would like to take 15 minutes to discuss the separate highly classified paper for which not all participants are cleared. When you so indicate, Harold will arrange for those not cleared to leave, or you may want to adjourn to the Oval Office with a much smaller group for that part of the discussion.

As background for the meeting Harold has sent you three short papers (Tabs B–D). In addition, Frank Press has prepared an analysis of the MM vulnerability issue and what we should do about it which is included at Tab E with a forwarding memo and an Executive Summary. The remainder of this memo summarizes and comments on Harold’s papers and provides some questions you can use to channel the discussion in some interesting and useful directions.

Strategic Forces Issues

Harold Brown’s first paper (Tab B) describes a strategic forces modernization plan that addresses three main factors:

1) obsolescence in the bomber and ICBM legs of the Triad;

2) vulnerabilities in the ICBM force and the bomber force created by Soviet ICBM improvements, their construction of an SLBM force that could pose a significant prelaunch threat to our bomber force, and improvements in Soviet air defense; and

3) the need to increase our force capabilities to maintain essential equivalence with the Soviets.

For the long term, Harold presents a “representative strategic force modernization program” aimed at increasing our capabilities through improvements in the forces that most need modernizing. The suggested program raises our steady-state total strategic spending to $9B per year (compared to $5.4B in 1979) and includes the following:

— Development starting in FY 79 of a new “mostly common” missile that closely approximates the M–X missile but provides major components that can be used to upgrade the Navy’s new C4 missile to closely approximate the D5 (Trident II) missile at less than one-fourth the R&D cost of the D5.

— Development in FY 79 of the MAP basing scheme, and either an air mobile or ground mobile basing scheme, or both, with the best system to begin full-scale development by FY 80.

— Development of a cruise missile carrier (CMC) aircraft beginning in 1981 not as a force enhancement program, but as an eventual replacement for our first CMC, the B–52G.

— Production of 3,000 first-generation cruise missiles beginning in 1980 (with an IOC of 1982) plus development of a second-generation cruise missile with reduced detectability.

— Upgrading the B–52H fleet (including new avionics and ECM) to maintain it as a penetrating bomber force until the end of the century.

— 40 new austere inland bases to allow wider dispersal of the bomber and cruise missile carriers.

Harold also notes that the vulnerability of our strategic C3 systems is as profound a concern as the vulnerability of the forces themselves; that our strategic C3 [3 lines not declassified] in a major study by mid-79. The paper also comments that a new penetrating bomber is “indicated by the late 80s” and that we will want to explore smaller submarines than Trident as a possible follow-on.

Comments

Harold’s analysis is based on the judgment that we want to retain a full Triad and will not go to a posture (e.g., Dyad) that depends primarily on SLBMs and bomber/CMs. However, Harold points out that even if his long-term plan is adopted, we will nonetheless face a period from the late 70s to the mid-80s during which our land-based ICBM force will be very vulnerable. Thus, until 1985 when our ICBM force will theoretically get well with some form of mobile basing, we will be very dependent on the other two legs of the Triad.

Whether or not to permit this vulnerable period is an extremely important judgment. Domestically, it will be used against SALT; internationally, it may undermine our Allies’ confidence and be exploited by the Soviets. Harold is also concerned by the argument that if we can live with it for three or more years, why not indefinitely?—which will undercut support for the measures he proposes to rectify the situation in the long term.

Thus, the greatest weakness in Harold’s program is the absence of an interim program to deal with the vulnerability gap in the early 80s. You should press him on this point and ask that specific options be developed for consideration in the final budget meetings at the end of the year.

It is also clear that Harold still believes that the MAP basing scheme is the best long-term solution to the MM vulnerability problem in spite of the fact that others outside DOD (including Frank Press’ panel and the Jason group) have serious reservations about the practicality of MAP, to say nothing of the problems it may create for SALT. You should therefore urge Harold to take a serious look at other schemes on a priority basis.

In light of the above, you might ask Harold the following specific questions:

— How can we bridge the gap from 1980 until we have modernized the Minuteman force? Would the adoption [1 line not declassified] Would the required changes in our C3I/warning systems be useful even after we had completed the modernization of the force? Could these changes be made in 1–2 years?

— Given the limits on our resources, wouldn’t it be better to substitute a short study of the MAP scheme and its more promising alternatives for the year-long parallel development program proposed, and develop only the scheme that the study shows to be best?

— Does it make sense to begin full-scale development of the relatively large “mostly common” missile when the smaller common missile might be more compatible with the basing scheme we end up choosing?

— Why aren’t we considering a more vigorous CMC development program as a means for maintaining essential equivalence?

— Is it necessary to wait until mid-79 to take additional actions to improve our C3I systems? Aren’t there actions beyond those you are currently taking, that we already know we’ll want to take?

The most important thing Harold wants from this meeting is a policy statement from you that we are going to solve the MM vulnerability problem. Such a decision would be of great help in our efforts to widen support for SALT. Harold would like to announce this decision next week, and I would like to follow up on it in a policy speech I am scheduled to deliver the following week in Chicago.

Harold would also like you to indicate whether or not you support specific elements of his long-term plan. I believe that any such decisions would be premature and should be made in the budget review meetings that will be held between now and January.

General Purpose Forces (GPF)

Harold’s GPF paper (Tab C) contains no surprises. It continues the NATO-emphasis improvements in reinforcement (POMCUS) and in strengthening the Army through a vigorous modernization and expansion program.

The most important issue is likely to be the scope of the Army modernization program, particularly in light of the current DOD study of Army force structure that you directed in the Spring budget review.

This study is examining an alternative defense doctrine based on a belt of fixed infantry-manned emplacements, equipped with anti-armor capability and backed up by mobile armored reserves. In the meantime, however, DOD proposes to modernize and expand the Army along the lines of the current “active defense” doctrine which raises the question: should the Army’s plans be held back to await the results of the study?

Although the study may reveal some interesting new concepts, I do not recommend holding back on modernization now. For a number of reasons, we are likely to have the existing doctrine and force structure for some time to come, and failing to modernize as needed would harm near-term capabilities. On the other hand, this is an important issue and an opportunity to re-examine the premises behind our doctrine. DOD should not treat it lightly, as many there would like. To reinforce its importance, I suggest that you ask Harold how the study is coming and what effect it might have on future Army programs.

Shipbuilding is also an important issue, particularly since the budget veto. The veto message said that the Navy has been moving toward larger, more costly ships, but fewer of them. However, the upcoming budget reduces the shipbuilding rate a little further and may make us vulnerable to criticism that although we may be giving more relative emphasis to smaller ships, we are still moving toward lower numbers.

You might ask Harold the following questions:

— What explanations should we present to the Congress and the public for the continuing declines in both the size of the Navy and in our shipbuilding rates?

— Are the smaller ship types that we are building the types we should be building? If we haven’t yet identified the appropriate types of ships to solve the Navy’s force level problem, what efforts do we have underway to do so?

Defense R&D

Harold’s last paper argues that steadily increasing Soviet R&D efforts in combination with US R&D efforts that have suffered a long-term decline due to inflation have led to a situation where the Soviets are seriously challenging our technology lead in many areas.

The paper also presents DOD’s overall strategy for dealing with this situation which is basically—increased funding applied more selectively when projects start to get expensive.

I support this general approach, but would like to see it reflected in a specific collection of new R&D starts that we can use to demonstrate that we are making a concerted effort to draw on our technological strengths to solve our most pressing defense problems. You might express this same interest to Harold and ask him for a rundown of the new technological initiatives that he intends to include in the FY 80 budget.²

1. Source: Carter Library, Donated Material, Papers of Walter F. Mondale, Department of Defense—Subject File, Box 39, Department of Defense—General—I [1]. Secret. Sent for information. Printed from an uninitialed copy of the memorandum. Tabs A–E are attached but not printed.
2. On September 29, Carter met with U.S. officials to discuss the 1979 defense budget in the Cabinet Room at the White House from 3:38 p.m. until 5:39 p.m. From 5:39 to 5:59 p.m. he met with Brown, Duncan, Jones, Brzezinski, Aaron, Perry, McIntyre, and Press in the Oval Office to continue the discussion of the same issue. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials, President’s Daily Diary). No minutes of either meeting were found.