85. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter1
Washington,
August 30,
1978
SUBJECT
- Report on My SAC/NORAD Trip
On August 20–21 I took advantage of your absence to familiarize myself with NEACP, to be briefed on the C3I2 problem at SAC HQ, to fly a low-level attack mission in a B–52, to inspect a Minuteman silo, to review warning and assessment procedures at NORAD, to inspect tactical fighter training at Nevada, and to visit a site on which I will report orally.
Some key impressions (and you might wish to provide some guidance by marginal notes):
- 1.
- The military enormously appreciate the direct interest you have shown in C3I issues. This was mentioned everywhere. In this connection, I believe that we ought to run an IVORY ITEM on an LNO. We have not done this and that issue could become more critical in the years ahead.
- 2.
- I was struck by the extent of U.S. C3 vulnerability. More work on this is needed, and I will be pressing Harold Brown and my own staff to develop this matter further. I believe that our C3I vulnerability is serious. [4 lines not declassified] This issue could become a more serious problem for crisis stability than the question of [less than 1 line not declassified].
- 3.
- I believe that our strategic forces are well organized and designed for a single large retaliatory attack, but less so for any lesser variant, or for a war lasting weeks. We should not base all of our planning on the assumption that a nuclear war must either escalate or terminate quickly.
- 4.
- Our strategic doctrines are based on the concepts of the sixties, when we had strategic superiority and at least conventional parity. We need a fundamental doctrinal review. I am setting up an office in the NSC on Strategic Planning (under Fritz Ermarth, who is currently serving as the Director of the Strategic Systems Program at Rand) to work on this issue as well as on a comprehensive and integrated strategy for SALT 3 and the grey areas.
- 5.
- Not enough attention has been paid in SALT to the fact that the Soviets can reload and fire from their SS–18, 19, and 17 silos within approximately 24 hours or less. The implications of this need to be examined more fully, especially in view of the lack of a Minuteman silo reload capability. I will have our staff take a look at this.
- 6.
- We have very limited warning capability in the event of a Soviet nuclear attack on Europe and/or China. The Europeans and/or Chinese have even less. This issue could become a political problem in U.S.-European relations.
- 7.
- Our infrared satellite warning system (DSP) has occasional blind spots as well as growing requirements which it cannot meet without added capabilities, especially additional satellites. My staff will be developing the needed review.
- 8.
- We need more political input into the development of LNOs. Until now they have been developed purely by the military. I will be taking corrective actions.
- 9.
- Dave Jones accompanied me. He is immensely worried about the CTB and says the Chiefs will oppose it. He raised the CTB issue with me several times in the course of the trip.
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 52, SAC and NORAD 8/20–21/78 Brzezinski Trip: 7–9/78. Top Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. Carter initialed the upper right corner of the memorandum.↩
- Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence. [Footnote is in the original.]↩