72. Memorandum From Samuel
Huntington of the National Security Council Staff to the
President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)1
Washington,
August 2,
1978
SUBJECT
- PRC Meeting on Civil
Defense
You should read the Summary for a quick survey of the major issues and
options. This memo covers some of the politics and arguments lying
behind them.
The Agenda Paper sets forth three topics for discussion.
[Page 308]
1. Review the PRM/NSC–32 conclusions on the scope, nature, and effectiveness of
US and Soviet civil defense
programs.
The conclusions on these topics set forth in the Overview Report and the
Summary are generally agreed to by all agencies, except for ACDA which dissents vigorously from
almost everything, and possibly State, which questions many things in
more muted fashion. The basic facts in Chapter II on Soviet civil
defense come from the IIM on this
subject; the basic facts about the US
program are also not in dispute. What these mean, however, is highly
contentious.
ACDA makes four principal points.
1. Civil defense is meaningless because the amount of protection that any
CD program can provide will be minor
compared to the absolute levels of destruction resulting from a nuclear
war. In fact, however, everyone is guessing when
it comes to estimating the amount and character of the destruction
resulting from a nuclear war, and it is better to provide some modest
protection on the assumption that it may work, than do nothing at all.
In addition, there is interagency agreement (set forth in Table S–2 on
page 6 of the Summary and Table III–1 in the Report) that feasible and
modest civil defense measures can make a difference in terms of tens of
millions of lives. ACDA will then say
that the survivors of a nuclear war will envy the dead; and the answer
to that is that that is something for the survivors, not us, to
decide.
2. ACDA will argue that the Report and
the Summary neglect the longer-term effects (after 30 days) of a nuclear
war. In fact, however, these are not neglected;
they are referred to in both the Report (page III–2) and Summary (pp.
4–5), but they cannot be described because any judgment as to what the
world will be like 30 days after a nuclear war has to be 90 percent
conjecture. The response to the previous point applies here.
3. ACDA will argue that the Report
overestimates Soviet civil defense capabilities in that it makes a “best
case” assumption that Soviet CD will
work the way in which it is planned to work. In
fact, with respect to some issues this is the case, and both
the Report and the IIM, on which it is
based, make that clear. On the most important issue, however, of
population protection, the IIM and the
Report (pp. II–10–14) emphasize how dependent the Soviet program is on
warning time; they provide evidence for a variety of scenarios.
4. ACDA will say that unlike the
Soviets, the US need not plan for
population relocation because in the event of a crisis, Americans in
target areas will hop into their automobiles and head for the hills as
they do on the Fourth of July weekend. In fact,
some spontaneous evacuation in a crisis undoubtedly will occur, and all
the figures in the Report and
[Page 309]
Summary on US population fatalities
assume a 10 percent spontaneous evacuation of urban population in
addition to that resulting from any planned CD program. Also, however, evacuation is relatively
meaningless unless evacuees go to host areas which are prepared to house
them, protect them (against fall-out), and feed them for up to 30 days.
That is what the proposed Program 3 is designed to do.
Most importantly, there is interagency agreement
on the broad difference which civil defense makes in terms of population
survival. Given current US and Soviet
programs, in the mid-1980s, a major nuclear exchange would probably
leave the US with 35–65 percent of its
population initially surviving, while 80–90 percent of the Soviet
population would initially survive. In short, to take the median figures
in those estimates, 50 percent of the US
population would immediately survive as against 85 percent of the Soviet
population.
2. Review alternative
US civil defense policies and make
recommendations to the President.
Four policy options are set forth in the Summary (pp. 8–10) and Report
(pp. V–8–12):
- (1)
- The myth of civil defense, i.e., civil
defense is useless.
- (2)
- Insurance, which has been the
prevailing US approach, and
which can run from low cost/high risk insurance to high cost/low
risk insurance.
- (3)
- Equivalent survivability, which says
that the proportions of US
leadership, population, and economy surviving a nuclear war
should be roughly equivalent to those of the USSR surviving the war.
- (4)
- Equivalent program, which says that the
US should essentially
duplicate the Soviet civil defense program.
ACDA will probably opt for the Myth of
Civil Defense; State and OMB will
probably go for Insurance; virtually everyone else (i.e., JCS, DCPA, FPA, CIA, and NSC) opted (at least in the Working Group) for Equivalent
Survivability. Since the NSC originated
the concept of equivalent survivability and developed the arguments for
it (Report, pp. V–10–12), I hope you will be persuaded by its logic!
One option which is likely to come forward in the discussion of policy
options is simply to make no decision on policy and to proceed directly
to a decision on program. Policy, after all, it can be said, is simply
rhetoric, it’s program that counts. Policy is also much more contentious
than program. A no-decision outcome on policy could become unavoidable,
but it is also undesirable because:
- (1)
- It will provide no basis for rationalizing program decisions
or linking them to broader strategic issues. It will not provide
a means for either the NSC or
DOD to exercise any policy
guidance over the new Civil Emergency Preparedness Agency and,
as a result, that agency will
[Page 310]
undoubtedly follow its natural tendencies
to give priority to its natural disaster functions rather than
to its civil defense functions.
- (2)
- It will open the way for OMB
to undermine a decision in favor of Program 3 by pleading the
need to cut costs and maintain only the present level of
spending when budget time comes. A decision in favor of
Equivalent Survivability as a policy would prevent this, since
existing programs and spending levels quite clearly do not provide equivalent
survivability.
3. Review alternative
US civil defense programs and make
recommendations to the President.
Five alternative programs (one of which has two variants) are set forth
on pp. 10–11 of the Summary and in Chapter VI of the Report.
Two of them (Programs 4 and 5) involve such substantial increased
expenditures that they are undoubtedly not politically feasible, and
Program 5 is undesirable in any event. One thing which might be worth
suggesting, however, is a study of the longer-term desirability of a
program like Program 4, that is, incorporating shelters into new
construction. This is what the Soviets are doing; it is also what the
Germans and some others are attempting to do. It would not be a pleasant
situation to be in if by the year 2000 we were the only major country
which did not have a shelter capability for a substantial segment of its
urban population.
Program 1, Minimal Civil Defense, can also be excluded, since no one
except ACDA is likely to support it
and since the President has already said that he is in favor of a strong
civil defense.
The differences between Programs 2a and 2b are relatively minor,
involving the extent to which, within existing funding levels, efforts
are concentrated on population relocation planning. In terms of output,
under Program 2a existing planning activities would be completed in the
mid-to-late 1980s; under Program 2b they would be completed by the
mid-1980s. Under both programs, there would have to be a surge period of
about one year to implement the plans. State is likely to support either
Program 2a or Program 2b. OMB will
definitely support Program 2b with the argument that there are a lot of
kinks and uncertainties in relocation planning which should be worked
out before it would be worthwhile to embark on Program 3.
All the other agencies will support Program 3. Harold Brown has, indeed, already
endorsed the population relocation segment of this program within the
DOD, and DCPA is, presumably, going ahead implementing this
decision. In effect, PRC approval of
Program 3 will ratify Harold’s decision on an interagency basis and thus
help DOD ward off the OMB budget cutters this Fall. The other
smaller segment of Program 3 is devoted to continuity of government and
is designed
[Page 311]
to enhance our
currently very weak and fragile leadership protection programs.
All told, Program 3 will involve expenditures of $193 million in FY 1980 as compared with $140 million for
Programs 2a or 2b. Over the next five years, total expenditures for
Program 3 would be $1,625 million, as compared to $700 million for
Programs 2a or 2b. This increased expenditure, however, will buy a major
increase in civil defense capabilities:
- —
- In a major nuclear exchange in the mid-1980s, 60–90 percent of
the US population would
immediately survive, as against 35–65 percent (and the
percentage of survivors with Program 3 is likely to be much
closer to 90 percent than 60 percent; ACDA insisted on the low lower bound). Just taking
the median figure in these estimates, 75 percent of the US population would immediately
survive with Program 3, as against 50 percent with Programs 2a
or 2b. That’s about 55,000,000 additional survivors.
- —
- The survivability of US
leadership goes from low to probably high.
- —
- Of great importance, the surge time required to achieve the
above results declines from one year to one–two weeks. Unless we
can assume that the Soviets will give us a year’s warning the
next time they plan to spring a Berlin blockade, Berlin wall,
Cuban missile deployment, or October War on us, this reduction
in surge time is absolutely essential to having a meaningful
civil defense program.
Attached is a table indicating probable agency positions as they have
manifested themselves in the Working Group.
PROBABLE AGENCY POSITIONS ON CD
POLICIES AND PROGRAMS
|
Myth |
Insurance |
Equivalent Survivability |
Equivalent Program |
| 1 |
ACDA |
|
|
|
| 2a |
|
State? |
|
|
| 2b |
|
OMB |
|
|
| 3 |
|
DCPA (2) |
DCPA (1), NSC, |
|
|
|
|
FPA, JCS, CIA? |
|
| 4 |
|
|
|
|
| 5 |
|
|
|
|
[Page 312]
Attachment
Summary of a Report Prepared in the National Security Council2
PRM/NSC–32 CIVIL DEFENSE
OVERVIEW REPORT
Summary
This summary is not designed to be a section by section precis of the
Overview Report. It is rather designed:
- 1.
- to present a brief summary description of current US and Soviet civil defense
programs;
- 2.
- to provide answers on the basis of the Overview Report to
the key questions posed at the beginning of that
report;
- 3.
- to lay out briefly the options for US civil defense policy and programs set forth
in Chapters V and VI of the Overview Report.
I.
US AND SOVIET CIVIL DEFENSE
PROGRAMS
US strategic doctrine has consistently emphasized deterrence of
nuclear war, rather than effective defense. The US civil defense program has been
viewed as insurance providing some capability to enhance population
survival should deterrence fail, thus fulfilling the government’s
statutory responsibility under the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950
(as amended).3
The Soviets integrate civil defense into an overall scheme of the
likely origins, course, and consequences of nuclear war. Soviet
strategy relies on convincing potential enemies that they cannot win
a nuclear war against the USSR.
Should nuclear war occur, civil defense is meant to help: (1)
maintain a functioning logistical base for operations by their armed
forces to “win” the war; and (2) enable Soviet recovery from war
damage, to improve their postwar position vis-a-vis the US and other adversaries.
At the present time US civil defense
efforts are directed primarily to population and leadership
protection. These programs, currently divided among several federal
agencies, are now scheduled to be
[Page 313]
consolidated with natural disaster functions
in an independent agency.4
Civil defense responsibilities are shared with state and local
governments. The population protection program is slowly being
modified to shift the emphasis from reliance on in-place fallout
protection to crisis relocation planning for high-risk areas. Either
program would take about a year’s “surge” preparation during a
crisis period to reach full effectiveness. Essential governmental
functions will be protected by dispersal of personnel, some by
relocation to hardened facilities; the hardened facilities are
relatively few in number and relatively vulnerable to direct attack.
Minimum efforts are being directed to the protection of industrial
plants and equipment and to preparations for rehabilitation and
recovery. Federal expenditures for the above programs are about $140
million per year; state and local governments spend an additional
$80 million.
Soviet civil defense efforts are much more comprehensive. The Soviet
program has established ambitious goals to protect the civilian
leadership, shelter a portion of the essential industrial labor
force, and evacuate the urban population. The program is centrally
administered under military leadership, and civil defense goals are
influenced by military objectives. The activities of the Soviet
civil defense organization include: the development of evacuation
and shelter plans; training for civil defense units, leadership and
the population at large; coordination of civil defense exercises;
testing and evaluation of command and control; shelter construction;
and implementation of general directives from the central
leadership. The effectiveness of Soviet civil defense measures is
highly dependent on the amount of warning time available. Soviet
civil defense doctrine also espouses effective protection of
industry through hardening and dispersing, but such measures are
being implemented slowly or, in some cases, not at all. It would
cost about $2 billion per year to duplicate the Soviet civil defense
program in the United States; about three-fourths of this amount
would be for personnel.
The most probable results of a massive US–USSR nuclear exchange in 1978 involving an initial
Soviet counterforce/countervalue attack on the US and a US counterforce/countervalue response are set forth in
Table S–1.
[Page 314]
Table S–1 EXPECTED RESULTS FROM MASSIVE US/USSR NUCLEAR EXCHANGE,
1978
| Population Survival |
US (In-Place) |
USSR (Evacuated) |
| Initial Survivors (%) |
35–65% |
80–90% |
| Immediate Fatalities (106) |
72–137 |
23–50 |
| Leadership Survival |
|
|
| Personnel Uninjured |
Less than 40%5 |
High |
| Facilities Undamaged |
Less than 20%6 |
High |
| Economic Survival |
Low |
Low |
II. KEY QUESTIONS
A. What is the Role of
Civil Defense in Strategic Policy?
Significant differences exist as to the role of civil defense in
relation to strategic policy. Some analysts argue that civil defense
capabilities influence an opponent’s perception of the strategic
balance and may, in the extreme, reflect on the credibility of a
deterrent. They further contend that the lack of population
protection could reduce stability and inhibit decision-making.
This argument rests on the following assumptions:
- 1)
- Defensive as well as offensive capabilities contribute to
the strategic balance. Civil defense will therefore be
calculated into the balance of forces.
- 2)
- The effectiveness of population protection will figure
into the cost/risk thinking of an opponent.
- 3)
- There is a positive correlation between surviving
population and a nation’s ability to recover.
- 4)
- Deterrence rests, in part, on a willingness to act. An
inability to protect a population will inhibit decisions to
act, by inducing doubts and increasing the perception of
risks.
- 5)
- The Soviet ability to provide civil defense might put them
in a position to coerce the United States. An asymmetry in
civil defense capability will undercut US confidence in a crisis and
will encourage Soviet risk-taking and intransigence.
In contrast, others contend that civil defense plays no role in the
perception of a nuclear balance. They argue that the population
protection that civil defense can provide is insignificant in light
of the magnitude of destruction following a nuclear exchange. They
argue that civil defense gets no consideration in crisis
decision-making and has no
[Page 315]
impact on stability. Moreover, willingness to act will be influenced
by a variety of political and military factors; uncertain estimates
of population survival will play a relatively minor role in such a
decision.
This argument is based on the following assumptions:
- 1)
- Given the magnitude of offensive power passive defense
will receive little or no consideration in calculating the
strategic balance and the absence of ABM defenses further
undermines potential effectiveness of passive
defenses.
- 2)
- Given the massive levels of destruction contemplated, the
amount of population protection will be insignificant in an
estimation of costs and risks.
- 3)
- There is no demonstrable correlation between population
survival and national recovery.
- 4)
- The ability to protect a population has had little impact
in calculating the potential willingness to use a deterrent.
In past crises the availability of civil defense has had no
influence on crisis decisions or the willingness of US leaders to act.
- 5)
- The absence of a US civil
defense effort would not pose a threat significant enough to
inhibit or coerce policy-makers.
Still a third group argues that civil defense contributes to the
instability of the nuclear balance by fostering among policy-makers
the illusion that the destruction resulting from nuclear war can be
limited and hence encouraging them to take greater risks of nuclear
conflict. This argument rests on the assumption that a major gap
will exist between civil defense capabilities in reality and the
perceptions of them by policy-makers. Carried to the extreme,
unrealistic claims for the effectiveness of civil defense could have
a more adverse effect on perceptions—and thus on stability—than
could a civil defense program itself.
B. Can civil defense measures make a
significant difference in the outcome of a nuclear exchange?
There remains considerable uncertainty as to the extent that civil
defense measures would make a difference in the outcome of a nuclear
exchange. Questions center on each nation’s ability to fully carry
out plans in times of crisis and on the longer-term prospects for
recovery and reconstitution. Civil defense measures would not
prevent massive damage to each nation’s economic, political, social,
and military structure, given the immense nuclear arsenals possessed
by the US and USSR and the immovable physical plant
associated with each of these areas in a modern industrial society.
Civil defense measures designed to improve immediate population,
work force and leadership survival through a combination of
dispersal and fallout protection would be effective to the extent
that plans could actually be implemented (attack timing,
availability of transportation, etc., are uncertainties). In-place
shelters hardened against blast and fallout would provide good
[Page 316]
protection unless directly
targeted. Spontaneous evacuation, a phenomenon often postulated for
the automobile-rich US, could reduce immediate casualties if the net
result was movement out of risk areas. Long-term prospects for the
immediate survivors in both nations would be uncertain and would
depend not only on the availability of subsistence levels of food,
medical supplies, etc., but also on how quickly they could adapt to
what would probably be a radically unfamiliar environment and
severely damaged social structure.
Specifically, properly implemented civil defense measures could:
(1) enhance population survival against the
immediate effects of a nuclear attack (blast, radiation,
fallout). Given sufficient warning time (about a week) and
a successful evacuation (80% was used in the analysis) from urban
industrial targets, the majority of each nation’s population would
survive the immediate effects of a massive US/USSR nuclear exchange. For a
mid-1980’s massive nuclear exchange, analyses of the attack-related
effectiveness of civil defense show that:
- a.
- In the US, successful population evacuation (for which the
US does not now have
plans) would provide for initial survival of 60–90% of the
population, compared with 35–65% survival for the population
in-place and protected only from fallout.
- b.
- In the case of the USSR,
survival levels would be about 80–90% with the population
evacuated, for which the USSR does now plan, compared to 60–80% survival
with population in-place. The differences between estimated
US and USSR population survival
rates are due primarily to the differences in megatonnage
assumed to be delivered by each nation.
(2) enhance work force survival against the
immediate effects of nuclear war. Losses among those
remaining in industrial target areas during an attack would be high;
however, the losses among those who had been evacuated out of target
areas would be low. In one sample of Soviet industrial facilities,
however, hardened shelters existed for 12 to 24% of the peacetime
work force. As in the case of a general population evacuation, the
US does not currently have an
operational plan to protect its work force through either evacuation
or hardened shelters.
(3) enhance leadership survival among those
elements of national/local leadership not directly
targeted. Leadership in shelters identified and targeted
directly would not be expected to survive; however, leadership in
shelters not targeted and reasonably hardened (as in the Soviet
civil defense program) would have a good chance of surviving.
On the other hand, civil defense measures would
not:
- —
- prevent massive damage to each nation’s economic,
political, social, and military structure, that is, damage
levels of 70–90% against the identified industrial target
base of each nation. Protection of industrial and most
military facilities against nuclear attack is virtually
impossible or prohibitively expensive. Only in the case of
extremely
[Page 317]
hard
facilities (ICBM silos,
for example) or highly mobile units can a nuclear target
maintain a chance of survival. Protection of some critical
economic equipment and supplies might be feasible and might
aid in postwar recovery. However, such efforts would be
effective only in peripheral areas, not in areas directly
attacked.
Combined analytical results for a massive nuclear exchange occurring
after the current US and Soviet
civil defense programs are projected into the mid-80s and
implemented as planned (i.e., Soviet evacuated and US in-place, with 10% spontaneous
evacuation) are summarized below in Table S–2. A US evacuation scheme is expected to
increase initial survivors to 60–90%. Spontaneous evacuation out of
risk areas in excess of 10% would lower US in-place casualty figures.
Table S–2 MID-80s CIVIL DEFENSE PROGRAM EFFECTIVENESS
| Population Survival |
US (In-Place) |
USSR (Evacuated) |
| Initial Survivors (%) |
35–65% |
80–90% |
| Immediate Fatalities (106) |
75–145 |
25–55 |
| Leadership Survival |
|
|
| Personnel Uninjured |
Low |
Probably high |
| Facilities Undamaged |
Low |
Probably high |
| Economic Survival |
Low |
Low |
C. What civil defense measures appear to be
most useful? Can these measures be countered by altering the
attack?
Civil defense measures that attempt to reduce vulnerability through
in-place hardening (rather than by redistribution, which
proliferates potential targets and increases the cost, in terms of
weapons required, significantly for attaining a given level of
damage) tend to be less effective and more sensitive to changes in
the attack lay-down. For example, in-place sheltering and hardening
measures can be overcome by changes in the type and/or number of
weapons used against a given target, changes in weapon
height-of-burst, etc., or by targeting such in-place hardened
elements, if they were not already targeted. As noted previously,
only through extreme hardening, concealment, or mobility can a
resource remain a target and maintain a chance of survival.
Civil defense measures that distribute leaders, people, and
industrial resources, as significantly to reduce the efficiency with
which these elements can be targeted, are the most useful and less
susceptible than other measures to being overcome by alternatives in
the attack laydown. For example, population evacuation that
significantly reduces the number of people at risk to a given
nuclear weapons not only enhances population survival against an
economic attack, but also
[Page 318]
retains significant effectiveness should an attacker re-target to
kill population per se (see Table S–3).
Table S–3 IMMEDIATE SURVIVORS OF A MAJOR NUCLEAR EXCHANGE IN
THE MID-1980S (% OF TOTAL POPULATION)
| Population Status |
US |
USSR |
| In place and targeted |
25–40% |
50–65% |
| In place and not targeted |
35–65 |
60–65% |
| Evacuated and not targeted |
60–90 |
80–90 |
| Evacuated and targeted |
50–70 |
70–80 |
If the US launched an attack at the
mid-point of a Soviet evacuation, it would cause 30 million more
fatalities than an attack when evacuation was complete. The use of
large yield weapons would also increase blast and residual damage
and consequently increase fatalities. Detonating weapons on or near
the ground could result in an additional 15 million fatalities in
the Soviet Union due to early fallout.
There is uncertainty about the feasibility of sustaining population
evacuation for a long time (more than about a month), either in a
continuing crisis with no nuclear attacks or one with nuclear
attacks repeated every few days. Soviet evacuation planning aims to
keep industry in operation, but some feel the discomfort and
inconvenience of temporary housing and the transportation problems
engendered in moving workers to and from their factories would lead
to great inefficiencies, low national morale, and eventual economic
stagnation. Adopting a repeated attack policy would require
alterations in current US employment
plans.
D. What important aspects of civil defense
and attack strategies remain unexamined?
The relationship between survival and recovery poses unexplored
questions. Some argue that initial survivability is not a good
measure of longer-term recovery and reconstitution, and that, for
example, a large initial surviving population would quickly deplete
strategic stockpiles and may so overburden the severely damaged
medical and industrial resources of a nation’s postwar economy that
recovery could be hindered rather than helped. Others contend that
manpower is the most basic of a nation’s recovery resources and
military strength, and that initial differences in leadership and
population survivability will probably be translated into similar
differences in reconstitution.
Another question concerns the relationship between initial survival
and longer-term survival. Some contend that longer-term problems and
“neglected” effects will be so severe that many initial survivors
will
[Page 319]
not live to usefully
contribute to postwar recovery. Others contend that the great
majority of initial survivors have a good chance of eventually
returning to useful work.
The role and significance of civil defense for escalation control, in
the event deterrence fails, needs further examination. In addition,
uncertainty exists about the feasibility of sustaining population
evacuation for a long time (more than about a month), either in a
continuing crisis with no nuclear attacks, or one with nuclear
attacks repeated every few days or weeks and so forcing population
to remain sheltered.
Finally, this assessment of civil defense is based on calculated
assumptions about the size, extent, nature, and impact of nuclear
exchanges between the US and the
Soviet Union. A number of potentially important alternative
possibilities have not been carefully examined. They include:
- 1)
- The nature of protracted nuclear campaigns;
- 2)
- The effects of forward based systems, reserve forces
and/or third country forces;
- 3)
- Major differences in weapons yield and level of attack
from those we postulated.
These issues will require further study before their implications for
civil defense can be determined.
III.
US CIVIL DEFENSE POLICY OPTIONS
Civil defense policy sets forth the assumptions, goals, and rationale
underlying program choices. Four alternative policies were
identified in the analysis and are briefly summarized here.
1. The Myth of Civil Defense: This policy
option is based on the assumptions:—that civil defense would be
ineffective in protecting population, given the characteristics of
the US and Soviet nuclear arsenals
and the longer-term effects of a massive US-Soviet nuclear exchange;
that civil defense is neither a significant element of the strategic
balance nor a significant factor during a crisis; and that there are
no indications that the civil defense postures of the superpowers
have a significant effect on the perceptions by other countries of
the strategic balance.
For some, the implications of adopting this policy go beyond merely
eschewing a civil defense program. They would claim that the
analytical results presented in Table S–2 are dangerous because they
could lead to false conclusions about limiting casualties and
thereby weaken deterrence. They would prefer declaratory policy
stressing that the massive absolute levels of destruction expected
in a nuclear exchange, coupled with the longer-term effects, make
recovery and survival of the two societies a moot question. Such a
declaratory policy could also assert the US intention to monitor closely the Soviet civil
defense program and to make adjustments in our offensive forces or
[Page 320]
targeting policy in
order to negate Soviet future civil defense improvements as
necessary.
2. Insurance: This policy is based on the
assumption that the government’s statutory responsibility to protect
its population and enhance national recovery, coupled with the
chance that a large number of initial survivors might live long
lives thereafter, is adequate justification for making the modest
investment in a workable program to increase the number of initial
survivors among the US population.
In the same light, it is argued that, because initial survival of
federal leadership and related continuity of government functions
will likely enhance population survival in the longer term, a small
investment to enhance leadership survival is also prudent. This
policy of “insurance against the failure of deterrence” assumes that
civil defense will have neither a positive nor negative effect on
deterrence nor a significant impact on crisis management. It also
assumes that there is no need to relate US civil defense policy and programs to those of the
Soviets. Instead, decisions on the scope and character of the US program should be made, like
decisions on insurance generally, on the basis of: (1) the type and
severity of the damage that could occur; (2) the probability of the
damage occurring; and (3) the costs of the insurance. Different
judgments on each of these factors can lead to different conclusions
as to what insurance is desirable. The insurance rationale was used
to support both the FY 1962 Kennedy
program ($550 million in FY 1979
dollars) and as well as the modest Nixon program of FY 1974 ($115 million in FY 1979 dollars).
3. Equivalent Survivability. Equivalent
survivability exists if the proportions of the leadership,
population, and economy of the USSR surviving a nuclear exchange are roughly equal to
the proportions of the leadership, population, and economy of the
US surviving the exchange. This
policy starts from the finding that at the present time US policies and programs do not provide
for equivalent survivability. Such a goal is, however, in US national interests and is a
necessary corollary of US strategic
forces policy. Achievement of that goal requires new civil defense
measures.
Current US strategic policy is
directed towards the maintenance of essential equivalence. A marked
asymmetry in the vulnerability of strategic forces would be
incompatible with this goal. So also is marked asymmetry in the
vulnerability of leadership and population, which would make it
difficult or impossible for the US
to achieve an outcome of a nuclear exchange “on the most favorable
terms possible” or one likely to maximize US postwar power relative to the enemy. Marked
asymmetries in survivability could also undermine the credibility of
the US nuclear deterrent with our
NATO and Japanese allies.
Inasmuch as the Soviets believe that effective defenses are
essential to deterrence,
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a
marked difference in the potential survivability of US and Soviet leadership and population
might also lead them to doubt the credibility of the nuclear
deterrent. Equivalent survivability as a policy does not necessarily
imply similar or equivalent programs since survivability is also a
function of the nature of the society and of the attack directed
against it.
4. Equivalent Programs: This policy is based
on the assumption that US civil
defense can assure adequate security and contribute effectively to
deterrence and crisis management only if it is substantially similar
to and equal to the Soviet civil defense program. While it is
essential to have equivalent survivability in terms of outcome
indices, it is equally important, given the uncertainty about
exactly how offsetting US advantages
might be perceived, to have equivalent programs in terms of input
indices. A marked unfavorable discrepancy in programs would lead the
Soviet and others to question the credibility of our nuclear
deterrent.
IV. US CIVIL
DEFENSE PROGRAM OPTIONS
The following represent five alternative civil defense programs (one
with two variations) ranging from the very austere to the very
comprehensive. Material on the relation between these programs and
the policy options, the costs of these programs, and their
effectiveness is provided in Tables S–4, S–5, and S–6.7
Alternative 1: Minimal Civil Defense. Maintain
little or no civil defense (e.g., warning only) for population
protection, and combine and curtail other civil defense
activities
Alternative 2a: Current Level and Program.
Maintain a modest base of civil defense activities with dual use
applications. Continue current modest start on evacuation planning,
with plans to be developed by the mid- to latter 1980s. Supporting
systems needed for effective evacuation operations would not be
enhanced, and a “surge” period of one year would be required to
implement plans.
Alternative 2b: Current Level with Emphasis on
Evacuation Planning. Maintain a modest base of civil
defense activities with dual use applications. Reorient program,
within current ceiling, to complete evacuation plans by the
mid-1980s, with a surge period of one year still required to
implement plans.
Alternative 3: Enhanced Population
Evacuation/Continuity of Government Capability. Increase
capabilities for crisis relocation and for continuity of government
so as to expand substantially protection of population and
leadership and so as to be able to implement plans
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on one-two weeks’ notice. This
capability is to be obtained by the mid-1980s.
Alternative 4: Major Civil Defense Capability (Long
Term). Over the next two decades, develop and maintain a
capability that matches the civil defense program of the Soviet
Union, through the systematic incorporation of fall-out and blast
shelters in new construction.
Alternative 5: Major Civil Defense Capability
(Short Term). Over the next five years, develop a civil
defense capability that matches or surpasses that of the Soviet
Union, by the construction of blast shelters (100 psi) in risk areas and of fall-out
shelters in non-risk areas.
