Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume IV, National Security Policy

68. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron) to President Carter¹

Washington, July 28, 1978

SUBJECT

• NSC Weekly Report #68

1. Opinion

SALT Support Strategy

After meeting with Hamilton, Jody and Frank Moore, I met with Harold Brown and Charles Duncan to see how our defense decisions could be coordinated to build a more positive Congressional climate for SALT. Harold welcomed this initiative and, together, we have identified the following issues which will shape public and Congressional perceptions of our defense posture and the acceptability of a SALT Agreement.

— What should we do about the vulnerability of our land-based missile force; deploy new systems (such as MAP or some other mobile missile) or switch our doctrine away from the Triad?

— What do we do about increasing Soviet lead in counterforce capability; deploy a hard-target MX, Trident II, or a hybrid? Would improving our ICBM survivability suffice?

— What do we do about a future manned, penetrating bomber? (I understand Zbig has talked to you about Air Force ideas on this.)

— Harold also feels that the overall size of the budget is important—in particular, the size of the component devoted to strategic forces.

As you can see, these involve some of the most difficult strategic decisions this country has ever faced. Ideally, we would want more time to decide them, but SALT is forcing our hand. Some policies, such as whether to try to maintain a survivable ICBM force, we might only decide in principle leaving our hardware options (e.g., MAP, Mobiles) open. At the minimum, we will have to identify those issues which might be decided early-on to shape public opinion and those which should be reserved for later to have more direct impact on SALT acceptability in Congress.

The following are the key decision events.

— Your mid-term review of the Defense budget in late August/early September.

— The Defense review of MX and MAP in October.

— The Defense budget decision in December/January, and

— The Secretary’s Posture Statement in February 1979.

The August/September budget review emerges as particularly important. Harold suggests that it provides an opportunity for you to announce some general lines of policy that would start creating a more positive atmosphere on defense issues. He also feels it would be extremely helpful if you could indicate at least privately to him the direction you are inclined to take on the key MX/MAP/bomber issues. This would enable him to better control the Defense bureaucracy and project a more orderly and systematic image to enhance confidence in our decision-making process. It also might be desirable to be more open about the decisions that we make along the way so as to pre-empt the inevitable leaks. Harold recognizes that this procedure might conflict with OMB’s prerogatives but emphasized that the more guidance he can get the better, even if actual formal decisions are not taken until later.

We agreed that I should draw up a draft “scenario” for coordinating Defense actions in support of SALT which I will clear with Harold for presentation to you prior to your August/September budget review session.

2. Alert

Defense Budget Status

On the basis of the Consolidated Guidance (CG), the military services submitted draft five-year programs in their Program Objective Memoranda (POMs). In the spirit of ZBB, the CG called for three programs—basic, decremented and enhanced. The CG basic program implies Defense TOA of roughly $138.4B for FY 80; the decremented and enhanced levels were set at ± 5% around that level.

The POMs reflect a good deal of “goldwatching” by the Services, especially the Air Force. “Goldwatching” is the label given the long-standing Service device of protecting or beefing up their budgets by structuring them in such a way that programs of special importance for the civilian authorities require net additions to the budget. Thus, in the current POMs, many programs have been placed only in enhanced program or are not in any program at all. Examples are M–X/Trident II, ALCM, Cruise Missile Carrier, strategic mobility programs, and GLCM. As a consequence, most of the OSD staff alternatives appear to add to the basic level of the budget.

This poses Harold with a difficult problem. Your tentative budget target for Defense is $135.4B (0.6% real growth). Thus Harold will have to remove $3B, while adding back many of the expensive “goldwatched” programs. We can expect some tough infighting that is likely to spill out into public view—with a possible adverse effect on the image we want to create in Defense for SALT (see item one).

3. National Security Affairs Calendar (See Tab A)²

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 126, Weekly National Security Report: 7–9/78. Secret; Sensitive. Carter initialed the memorandum in the upper right corner.
2. Attached but not printed is a calendar for national security affairs in August and September.